future psychiatric treatment. There is no allegation that she could have suffered a measurably additional amount. For this reason, we find that a significant difference between the compensatory damages and the punitive damages is excessive.
Third, we look to the difference, if any, between the punitive award and the civil penalties authorized. Title VII, the statute most similar to the PHRA, caps all damage awards at $ 300,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)(D). For this reason, this factor also indicates that the jury's award was excessive.
Fourth, we look to whether this award is effective to deter future, similar conduct or whether a lesser amount could serve that end. This award of 3 million, combined with the 1.2 million in other damages, accounts for almost all of Scott's 5.5 million net income last year. Scott's attitude at trial indicated that it did not accept that the treatment Rush suffered was wrong in any way. The jury could reasonably have concluded that a large award was necessary to "wake Scott up and make it smell the coffee." We find, however, that much less than one year's net income would do this job just as well.
Finally, we look to whether the jury had sufficient guidance in arriving at this number. The jury was instructed on the purpose of punitive damages, when they are appropriate, and what to examine in setting an amount, i.e., the offensiveness of the conduct, the amount needed to prevent future misconduct considering the defendant's assets, whether there is a reasonable relation between the actual and punitive damages and finally, instructed to set the award using calm reason, not sympathy for or against any party. This factor, therefore, weighs in favor of the reasonableness of the award.
Given the above, we find that the jury's verdict as to punitive damages was excessive. We do not, however, believe that the verdict was so excessive that it demonstrates passion or prejudice. Auster Oil, 835 F.2d at 603. For this reason, we will deny Scott's motion for a new trial on this ground. We condition this denial, however, on Rush's acceptance of a remittitur of her punitive damages award of $ 2,700,000.
In summary then, Scott's Motions for a Judgment as a Matter of Law and for a New Trial are denied. Scott's Motion for a Remittitur is GRANTED in the total amount of $ 3,600,000. This leaves Rush with a verdict of $ 603,000, of which $ 203,000 is for lost wages, $ 100,000 is for pain and suffering and $ 300,000 is for punitive damages. We find this would fairly compensate Rush and would also punish Scott and deter future illegal conduct.
Rush is given twenty days to consider this result, at which time she should contact this Court and indicate whether a new trial should be scheduled or whether her pending post-trial motions are ripe for review.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 13th day of June, 1996, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50, or in the Alternative, Motion for a New Trial Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59, or in the Final Alternative, Motion for a Remittitur Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 and responses thereto, the Motion is hereby GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART in accordance with the attached Memorandum.
The Motion for a Remittitur is hereby GRANTED and it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for a New Trial is hereby denied only on the CONDITION THAT Plaintiff accept a remittitur of $ 3,600,000 of her damages award from $ 4,203,000 to $ 603,000. Plaintiff has twenty days to consider her response to this Order. Defendant's Motion is hereby DENIED in all other Respects.
BY THE COURT:
J. CURTIS JOYNER, J.