RICO be utilized to combat long-term criminal activity.
In the instant case, we conclude that Norman has failed to set forth facts to support an inference that continued criminal activity looms. By Norman's own admission, the alleged plot was hatched for the specific purpose of thwarting Norman's bid to exercise his power within the company. The scheme's end has been achieved. Thus, we cannot reasonably envision continued unlawful behavior. At its base, this case involves the alleged execution of a plan by a minority shareholder and his cohorts to wrest control of a closely-held company from the majority shareholder. The defendants devised and executed the plan in less than a year's time, and now control the corporation. Thus, our ruling today respects the notion that RICO was enacted to "reach activities that amount to or threaten long-term criminal activity." H.J., 492 U.S. at 243 n.4. Accordingly, because Norman has failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy the continuity requirement, we are compelled to dismiss his RICO claim.
D. The Common Law Claims
We have concluded that the two claims arising under federal law are not viable. In such an instance, our Court of Appeals instructs us that we should exercise supplementary jurisdiction over the remaining claims only under "extraordinary circumstances." Shaffer v. Board of Sch. Directors of the Albert Gallatin Area Sch. Dist., 730 F.2d 910, 912 (3d Cir. 1984)(citing Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1982)); see Nutis v. Penn Merchandising Corp., 610 F. Supp. 1573, 1583 (E.D. Pa. 1985)(dismissing plaintiff's state law claims after finding that plaintiff had failed to state viable claims under the federal securities laws and RICO), aff'd, 791 F.2d 919 (3d Cir. 1986). We conclude that such extraordinary circumstances are not present here, especially since Norman is currently prosecuting a similar action in Montgomery County, where he can pursue relief under state law. Accordingly, we will dismiss the amended complaint in its entirety.
For the reasons set forth above, the defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted and Norman's amended complaint will be dismissed. In light of our disposition, we will deny as moot the motion to disqualify counsel and the motion for a stay. An appropriate order follows.
AND NOW, this 20Th day of February, 1996, upon consideration of Law Firm Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Individual Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and the response thereto, it is hereby ORDERED, for the reasons set forth in the preceding Memorandum, that said Motions are GRANTED. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Counsel and Nominal Defendant Inofast's Motion for a Stay, that said Motions are DENIED as MOOT.
BY THE COURT:
J. Curtis Joyner, J.