The opinion of the court was delivered by: JOYNER
Daryl Perry, Plaintiff, and the City of Philadelphia, Defendant, have each filed discovery motions. Perry's Motion seeks to compel the City's Self-Executing Disclosures and seeks to deem admitted certain requests for admissions. The City not only opposes this Motion, but also seeks an order directing Lawrence Krasner, Plaintiff's attorney, to show cause why he should not be sanctioned pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c)(1)(B). In addition, the City seeks a protective order relieving it from answering Plaintiff's requests for production of documents and interrogatories and from any future discovery.
Plaintiff's Complaint was served, with a waiver of service of summons, on the City on October 24, 1995. Two days later, on October 26, 1995, Plaintiff served the City with his Self-Executing Disclosures (SED) under the Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan § 4:01. In his SED, Plaintiff "demanded compliance with Section 4:01 by all defendants within the time period set forth in Section 4:01(D)."
Generally, SED are due from a defendant within thirty days of serving its answer to the complaint; so in this case, within thirty days of December 22, 1995. § 4:01(a)(1)(D)(ii). Plaintiff, however, argues that by his 'demand' sentence, he referred to and invoked § 4:01(a)(1)(D)(iii). That section supersedes the general rule and makes SED due "within thirty (30) days after receiving from another party a written demand for early disclosure accompanied by the demanding party's disclosures." According to Plaintiff, therefore, the City's SED were due by November 25, 1995 and are now overdue.
The City contests Plaintiff's argument. It insists that there was no "written demand for early disclosure" and in that event, its responses were guided by the general rule, and therefore not due until January 22, 1996.
We agree with the City. We cannot read Plaintiff's demand as a demand for early disclosure because the demand sentence does not make any reference to early disclosure or otherwise direct the recipient to 4:01(a)(1)(D)(iii) as opposed to (D)(ii). For this reason, Plaintiff's Motion to Compel the City's SED is denied.
At the same time that Plaintiff served his SED on the City, he also served Requests for Admissions. He contends that the responses were due thirty days after service, on November 25, 1995. He allows that at the latest, they would be due thirty days after he contends the SED were due, on December 26, 1995.
Again, the City objects. Section 4:01(b) states that "a party may not seek discovery from . . . another party before the date [SED] have been made by, or are due from, such other party." (emphasis added). For this reason, the City contends, the Requests for Admission were premature and are not overdue.
Again, we agree and therefore deny Plaintiff's Motion to deem admitted the ...