factual determination with respect to Camden's proffered justification. Id. Implicit in so doing is a holding that the proffered justification would, if supported by factual findings, support the discrimination embodied in the Camden ordinance.
Plaintiffs have not filed any document directly responsive to defendants' statement of material, undisputed facts (appended to defendants' motion for summary judgment), nor have they presented any reason to discount or disregard the facts recited by defendants. Defendants' stated facts are accepted as true for purposes of the motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Local Rule for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 7.4. As material specifically to the proffer of the outflow of money paid by the Commonwealth to out-of-state construction workers as a substantial reason for the enforcement of § 154, defendants state the facts recited below.
D. Facts Supporting Defendants' Argument
1. Measured by contract price, approximately 15% of PennDOT highway construction projects are completely state funded while 85% are financed totally or partially with federal funds.
2. Non-resident construction workers take construction jobs in Pennsylvania that otherwise would be available to resident construction workers who are qualified and available to do the work.
3. The parties' experts estimate that 5% of the construction jobs available in Pennsylvania are performed by non-resident workers.
4. From May, 1994, through November, 1994, 5,000 members of the Laborers International Union of North America, AFL-CIO, who were Pennsylvania residents were qualified and available for employment on highway construction projects throughout Pennsylvania.
5. Non-residents who work in Pennsylvania remove much of their earnings to their places of residence.
6. For the most part, income "exported" from construction work is lost to the Pennsylvania economy; that is, it is not available in Pennsylvania for spending, saving, or local taxation.
7. Workers who are Pennsylvania residents spend and save much of their disposable income in Pennsylvania.
8. Based on date from 1990 and using the Pennsylvania Economic Model, the Commonwealth's expert estimates that $ 513,773 of construction wages and salaries earned in Pennsylvania flowed out of the state.
9. The estimate of $ 513,733 is net any inflow of income from Pennsylvania residents working in construction outside the Commonwealth. Although not recited by defendants, their expert estimated that this figure doubled between 1990 and 1994. Passmore Declaration at 4 (Documents in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 27).
10. Using data from 1990, the Commonwealth's expert estimates that each construction job in Pennsylvania yielded $ 63,160 in disposable personal income that remained in the state.
11. The spending of a highway construction worker who is a resident of Pennsylvania contributes to the Pennsylvania economy through ripple effects that are not possible for non-residents.
12. Using data from 1990, the Commonwealth's expert estimates that the spending of a single resident highway construction worker generated an additional $ 64,705 of Pennsylvania total industrial output; an additional $ 39,176 of Pennsylvania goods and services sold for personal consumption, investment and government purchases, and for export from the Commonwealth; an additional $ 20,539 of Pennsylvania personal income; an additional $ 34,529 of total Pennsylvania income; and an additional Pennsylvania job.
13. Using 1990 data, the Commonwealth's expert also estimates that the spending of a single resident construction worker generates an average of $ 71 in local income tax.
14. The displacement of a resident construction worker by a non-resident construction worker causes the Pennsylvania economy to forego these ripple effects of spending.
15. Plaintiffs' expert estimates that, in 1990, 139 Pennsylvania residents would have been displaced from completely state-funded highway projects if the residency requirement of § 154 were eliminated.
16. Defendants' expert estimates that, in 1990, 245 Pennsylvania residents would have been displaced from completely state-funded highway projects if the residency requirement of § 154 were eliminated.
17. Assuming 139 workers would have been displaced, defendants' expert estimates that the economic impact in Pennsylvania would have been that state residents would have foregone $ 8,779,240 in disposable income; $ 9,869 in local income tax revenues would have been lost; the value of total industrial output would have been reduced by $ 8,993,995; the value of goods and services produced and sold would have been reduced by $ 5,445,464; total income, wages, salaries and other forms of income would have been reduced by $ 4,799,531; and 139 jobs in other sectors of the economy would be lost.
18. Assuming that 245 workers would have been displaced, defendants' expert estimates that the economic impact on Pennsylvania would have been that state residents would have foregone $ 15,449,700 in disposable personal income; $ 17,395 in local tax revenues would have been lost; the value of total industrial output would be reduced by $ 15,852,725; the value of goods and services produced and sold would have been reduced by $ 9,598,120; total income, wages, salaries and all other forms of income would have been reduced by $ 8,459,605; and 245 jobs in other sectors of the economy would be lost.
E. Effect of Section 154
The conclusion to be drawn from these figures makes this case analogous to United Building. A large amount of money leaves the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania due to out-of-state construction workers. By defendants' expert's estimate, the figure exceeds one million dollars. This effect is felt despite the enforcement of the residency requirement of § 154. Without that requirement, the outflow would balloon dramatically.
In United Building, the Supreme Court analogized a state's interest in controlling property it claims to own to a city's interest in controlling money it expends on public works:
Much the same analysis, we think, is appropriate to a city's efforts to bias private employment decisions in favor of its residents on construction projects funded with public moneys. The fact that Camden in expending its own funds or funds that it administers in accordance with the terms of a grant is certainly a factor--perhaps the crucial factor--to be considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination violates the Privileges and Immunities Clause. But it does not remove the Camden ordinance completely from the purview of the Clause.
United Building at 221. The Court further added:
Every inquiry under the Privileges and Immunities Clause "must ... be conducted with due regard for the principle that the States should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescribing appropriate cures." [Toomer at 396]. This caution is particularly appropriate when a government body is merely setting conditions on the expenditure of funds it controls.