testified before a Grand Jury on August 3, 1995, that one of the photographs looked very much like the face he had seen for a few seconds during the incident. At the suppression hearing, Father Shinn was "quite certain" the person in the photograph was one of his assailants.
23. Father Shinn is a very credible witness, thoughtful and precise.
24. Father Shinn was never shown a photo array of suspects, a line-up, or a show-up by any law enforcement officers.
25. Father Shinn recognized the photograph of DeJesus as one of the individuals who had abducted him, and so informed Special Agent Walsh during an interview on July 13, 1995. He did not recognize defendant Casiano from the photograph.
26. There is no evidence that the defendant was subject to duress during the time he was held in custody. There is no evidence that he was questioned between the first interrogation, the night he was arrested, and the interrogation at which he confessed. There is no evidence that the confession was coerced.
27. There is no evidence of collusion between state and federal authorities to keep the defendant in custody without bringing him before a magistrate. The defendant was arrested shortly before midnight on Thursday, July 6, and confessed to federal authorities shortly before noon on Tuesday, July 11, some four and one-half days later. As Detective Desmond testified, it is not the procedure in New Jersey to take those arrested before a magistrate at once. Unless they are released on bail or a summons, they are remanded to the county jail. Then, they are taken before a magistrate within the week, and normally within two days. Before that week was out, the defendant had confessed.
28. On July 24, 1995, the defendant was arrested on federal charges and brought before a federal magistrate for arraignment.
29. When Camden Police seized the van and when they searched it, they were informed that the owner of the van was Father Shinn and that the van had been stolen.
30. The first interview of the defendant, at approximately 3:45 a.m. on July 7, 1995, by the Camden police, was conducted entirely in English, including the Miranda warnings. As Detective Desmond testified, the defendant did not appear to have any difficulty understanding his questions. The defendant did not request a Spanish interpreter.
31. As indicated by the notes of the second interview, that by FBI agents on July 11, 1995, the defendant was asked if he could understand and speak English. He replied that he could understand English but sometimes was unable to answer questions without using the Spanish language. As Special Agent Delia Kane testified: she is fluent in Spanish and assisted during the July 11 interview; the defendant was read his Miranda rights in both Spanish and English; when Agent Murray asked questions in English, she translated the questions into Spanish to be sure the defendant understood them; and the defendant answered sometimes in English and sometimes in Spanish.
32. The defendant was given Miranda warnings before both interrogations, indicated that he understood them on both occasions, and waived his right to remain silent and his right to counsel on both occasions.
33. As Detective Desmond testified, the Emergency Medical Technicians told police by radio that the suspect van had several males in it. As he further testified, the suspects were in the van when arrested.
A. Suppression of Physical Evidence
1. Warrantless Arrest
Defense counsel argues that all evidence seized as a result of the defendant's warrantless arrest should be suppressed because the arrest was effected without probable cause.
Police are permitted to arrest suspects without an arrest warrant for felonies, so long as there is probable cause for the arrest. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 113, 95 S. Ct. 854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975); U.S. v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418, 96 S. Ct. 820, 46 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1976).
There was ample probable cause to make a warrantless arrest. Father Shinn was assaulted exiting his own van near his home in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania at approximately 10:00 p.m. on July 6, 1995, and he was then forcibly taken in his van to Camden, New Jersey and was held there until he was forcibly removed from the van less than hour later and was shot. Father Shinn provided detailed information to the Camden Police at approximately 11:00 p.m. on July 6, 1995, information which included a description of the van, the license plate number, a description of the assailants as three or four hispanic males, and the fact that there were firearms involved. The emergency medical technician who took Father Shinn to the hospital heard Father Shinn describe the van to the police. The technician later saw the van and followed it in his ambulance while he notified Camden Police via portable radio. Shortly thereafter, the police arrived and apprehended the defendant and two others, all in the van, at approximately 11:45 p.m. The license plate number matched that reported by Father Shinn, and the suspects were three hispanic males. One had a firearm on his person at the time of arrest. Based upon these facts, ample probable cause existed for the officers to make a warrantless arrest.
2. Warrantless Searches of the Van
Defense counsel argues that all evidence seized from the van should be suppressed because the initial search was done without a warrant and without probable cause, and later searches were done without warrants and without the proper police procedures. He asserts a possessory interest in the contents of Father Shinn's van and seeks to have the evidence of guns, fingerprints, DNA evidence, ski masks, and ammunition taken from the van suppressed as the fruits of an illegal search.
The Supreme Court has held that defendants "may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated." U.S. v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 85, 100 S. Ct. 2547, 65 L. Ed. 2d 619 (1980) (overruling Jones v. U.S., 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725, 4 L. Ed. 2d 697 (1960), which gave those charged with possession "automatic standing" to challenge legality of a search). In Salvucci, the Court "declined to use possession of a seized good as substitute for a factual finding that the owner of the good had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched." 448 U.S. at 92. A person in possession of a stolen vehicle does not have standing with respect to its search and the seizure of its contents because he does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the vehicle. See U.S. v. Kucinich, 404 F.2d 262, 266 (6th Cir. 1968) (defendants lacked standing to challenge later search of stolen automobile because police held it as agents of owner, not of defendants). Similarly, the defendant in this case has no legitimate expectation of privacy and no standing to challenge the searches of Father Shinn's van.
The defendant relies on United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1991), in which the court held that a warrantless inventory search of a legitimately seized vehicle was invalid because there was no evidence of any criteria or established routine regarding the scope of an inventory search. Id. at 1121. However, in Salmon, the person aggrieved by the unlawful search was the owner of the vehicle seized, not its alleged thief; he therefore had a legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents. As the court stated,
The requirement that inventory searches be conducted according to such criteria or routine strikes a balance between the government's legitimate interests in such searches and the owner's legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of the seized vehicle.
Id. at 1120 (footnotes omitted).
The defendant in this case does not claim ownership or a possessory interest in the van; he therefore has no legitimate expectation of privacy in its contents. He can claim no interest to balance against "the government's legitimate interest in such searches." Id. His own Fourth Amendment rights have not been violated, and he has no standing to challenge the an inventory search or any other search of the van.
B. Suppression of Written and/or Oral Statements
The defendant argues that his oral statements to the Camden Police on July 7, 1995, and to the FBI on July 11, 1995, should be suppressed for a number of reasons: undue delay in bringing him before a magistrate; improper Miranda Warnings; the fact that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his rights; the fact that his statements were the result of an arrest effectuated without probable cause; and the fact that he was only told of state charges of aggravated assault and weapons offenses and not of the federal charges of carjacking and kidnapping before making the statements he wishes to suppress.
The touchstone for the admissibility of a confession is voluntariness. Title 18 United States Code, Section 3501(a) provides: "In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States . . . , a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given." It states that the trial judge, in determining voluntariness, shall take into account all the circumstances surrounding the confession, including:
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment;