this motion, we accept his facts as true and find that Davis has adequately demonstrated that a jury could rule that the retraining requirement was a pretext for discriminating against him on the basis of his sex. For this reason, we deny summary judgment on Count One.
II. Sex Harassment under Title VII and the PHRA
In 1986, the Supreme Court recognized "hostile environment" sexual harassment as a violation of Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986). It held that a plaintiff can show a Title VII violation by showing that "discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Id. A plaintiff can show such an environment with evidence that (1) the employee suffered intentional discrimination because of his sex, (2) the discrimination was pervasive and regular, (3) the discrimination detrimentally affected the plaintiff, (4) the discrimination would detrimentally affect a reasonable person of the same sex in that position and (5) there is respondeat superior liability. Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 447 (3d Cir. 1994). We shall address each element in turn.
1. Intentional Discrimination Based on Sex
Sheraton makes the same arguments as above why Davis cannot show discrimination based on his sex. It maintains that, at most, the red bag incident is discrimination based on gender. It also argues that the singling-out episode does not show discrimination based on sex because an un-reprimanded man was also in the group.
Davis asserts that he has shown discrimination based on sex when those incidents are viewed in the light of the background circumstances of discrimination. Given this background, we find that there is at least an issue of fact as to whether Davis was discriminated against on the basis of his sex.
2. Discrimination was Pervasive and Regular
Sheraton contests this element on the ground that only two incidents of discrimination are alleged in Davis's complaint, the red bag incident and the singling-out incident. Two occurrences, it argues, do not rise to the level of pervasive and regular discrimination.
Davis argues, in contrast, that his female co-workers called him Rochelle for a week before he convinced them to stop. According to Davis, when this is combined with the background circumstances, an environment pervaded by discrimination against men is seen. We, however, do not see such an environment. Plaintiff has provided this Court with evidence of several discreet incidents, none of which are related to each other. Even if we accepted the Rochelle comments as sex-based discrimination, one week of allegedly offensive comments does not rise to the level of a hostile environment workplace. In Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 126 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1993), the Supreme Court held that whether an environment is hostile can only be determined by "looking at all the circumstances." Id. at 371. It instructed courts to look at "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance." Id. (emphasis added). We find that given the totality of the circumstances, Davis has not presented evidence that raises a question of fact as to the pervasiveness or regularity of the discrimination he allegedly suffered.
3. Detrimental Effect
Sheraton concedes that whether Davis was detrimentally affected and whether a reasonable man in his position would be detrimentally affected are questions of fact for the jury.
4. Respondeat Superior Liability
Sheraton contends that Davis has not shown that it is liable for any discrimination inflicted by Kellyman. Rather, it points to its sexual harassment policy, of which Davis concedes he was aware. Further, it argues that Davis only notified it of Kellyman's alleged harassment when he resigned so that it cannot be liable for any discrimination that took place until it received that notice.
Davis argues, though, that Kellyman, a supervisory agent of Sheraton, was aware of the discrimination. Furthermore, he argues that when he informed Harris of the discrimination she simply denied that Kellyman would have done those things and did not follow Sheraton's sexual harassment policy.
We find that there is a disputed issue of fact as to whether Sheraton had notice of Kellyman's alleged sexual harassment of Davis. It is possible that Sheraton should have been put on notice of problems in the GSA department when Davis was denied tuition reimbursement and when his raise was delayed for several months. Regardless of this finding, however, we still rule that summary judgment is appropriately granted on this claim due to our finding on the pervasive and regular prong. For this reason, Count Two shall be dismissed.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 18th day of December, 1995, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and responses thereto, the Motion is hereby GRANTED in PART and DENIED in PART. The Motion is hereby GRANTED to the extent that summary judgment is hereby ENTERED in Defendant's favor on Count Two of Plaintiff's Complaint. The Motion is hereby DENIED with respect to Count One.
BY THE COURT:
J. CURTIS JOYNER, J.