denied plaintiff's request for reconsideration. The same letter that notified plaintiff of this denial nonetheless stated that, following the plaintiff's receipt of the letter, he would have 52 days in which to file a civil action. It is unclear where the 52-day additional period came from. It is also unclear whether the EEOC has the power -- more than a year after denying a charge -- to grant a discrimination claimant an additional period in which to file a civil action.
The views of the EEOC on this matter may be helpful. A district court has inherent authority to appoint amicus curiae to assist in a proceeding. Liberty Lincoln Mercury, Inc. v. Ford Marketing Corp., 149 F.R.D. 65, 82 (D.N.J. 1993) ("District courts have broad discretion to appoint amicus curiae."); United States v. Michigan, 116 F.R.D. 655, 660 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Yip v. Pagano, 606 F. Supp. 1566, 1568 (D.N.J. 1985), aff'd, 782 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1986). The Third Circuit has said that "permitting persons to appear in court . . . as friends of the court . . . may be advisable where third parties can contribute to the court's understanding." Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 603 (3d Cir. 1987). See also Yip, 606 F. Supp. at 1568 (stating that a district court may appoint an amicus when "it deems the proffered information timely and useful"). Although a district court has inherent power to appoint amici, there is no specific statute or rule that so provides, and I am therefore guided by Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under this rule, "[a] brief of an amicus curiae may be filed . . . at the request of the court." Fed. R. App. P. 29. Because I conclude that it would be helpful to hear the EEOC's views on the legal import, if any, of its March 16, 1995 letter, I will not rule on this aspect of the defendant's summary judgment motion, but will instead request that the EEOC submit its views in the form of a memorandum by January 19, 1996. The parties will then have one week from that date to respond to EEOC's submission.
Upon consideration of the defendant's motion for summary judgment, and plaintiff's response thereto, and for the reasons given in the attached memorandum, it is hereby ORDERED that:
1. The motion is GRANTED (a) as to plaintiff's claims of discrimination that allegedly occurred while he worked for defendant from 1980 to 1985, and (b) as to plaintiff's claims of discrimination in defendant's decision to discharge him in 1985.
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is REQUESTED to file a memorandum as amicus curiae to express its views on the legal effect, if any, of its March 16, 1995 letter to plaintiff. A copy of the letter is attached to this order. A copy of this order, together with the letter and the attached memorandum, should be sent to the EEOC's Philadelphia office. The EEOC should file its memorandum by January 19, 1996. Plaintiff and defendant will then have until January 26, 1996 to respond, if they choose, to the EEOC's submission. The remainder of defendant's motion will be ruled on following these submissions.
December 15, 1995
Louis H. Pollak, J.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
PHILADELPHIA DISTRICT OFFICE
1421 CHERRY STREET, 10TH FLOOR
PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19102
March 6, 1995
Mr. Aristides Martinez
117 Spruce Street
Princeton, New Jersey 08542
RE: Martinez v. Cap Cities/ABC-WPVI
Charge No. 170940349
Dear Mr. Martinez:
In your request for Reconsideration, the information presented failed to sway the Commission to rescind its no-cause finding, therefore, your request to reconsider the above-captioned charge has been denied. You have fifty-two days after receipt of this letter in which to file an action in Court.
MARIE M. TOMASSO
District Director (Acting)