have been aware of such an established right. Id.
All statements made by District Attorney Kreisher regarding the scope of the investigation were true. Similarly, all statements made incident to the Virginia McAfee investigation were matters of public record. As such, we are of the view that no constitutional right of the Boykins has been violated by the actions of District Attorney Kreisher in this respect. We will grant Kreisher's motion for summary judgment with respect to Count II of the Boykins' complaint.
We will now address Count X of the Boykins' complaint. Count X of the Boykins' complaint alleges violations of the Boykins' first, fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendment rights under the United States Constitution. Count X is directed towards the individual State Police Defendants who were previously dismissed from this case. Count X was added to the complaint when the Boykins filed a second complaint which named the individual State Police Officers previously identified as John Doe State Police Officers in the Boykins' original complaint. Although Count X is not applicable to Kreisher, we will address it anyway because the Boykins' pleading deficiencies result in generalized allegations of constitutional violations against all Defendants.
As previously discussed in this order, the actions of District Attorney Kreisher did not violate any constitutional rights of the Boykins. We are of the view that the facts in this case fail to establish any cause of action against District Attorney Kreisher under the United States Constitution. We will grant summary judgment on Count X as to Kreisher.
Furthermore, only persons actually deprived of their civil rights can address such rights in a civil rights action. See O'Malley vs. Brierley, 477 F.2d 785, 789 (3d Cir. 1973). The Boykins have presented no evidence that Kreisher took any action against either Margaret or Aaron Boykin. Thus, there is no basis for a cause of action by either Margaret or Aaron Boykin under federal law.
We will now address the Boykins' claims under state tort law. Counts VI through IX allege state tort actions brought pursuant to this Court's pendent jurisdiction. The Boykins allege claims of false imprisonment, defamation, invasion of privacy, and malicious prosecution.
Counts I-IV and Count X of the Boykins' complaint are the only bases for federal subject matter jurisdiction. Because we will grant Kreisher's motion for summary judgment as to the federal claims asserted in Counts I and II and Count X of the Boykins' complaint, we will remand all of the pendent state claims to the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County. See United Mine Workers vs. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726, 16 L. Ed. 2d 218, 86 S. Ct. 1130 (1966).
We will defer the entry of judgment by the Clerk so as not to prejudice any person or persons who may wish to file an ancillary motion or motions prior to entry of judgment.
An appropriate order will be entered.
MUIR, U.S. District Judge
ORDER #2 OF
July 7, 1995
1. Defendant William Kreisher's motion for summary judgment filed on January 31, 1995, is granted with respect to Counts I and II and Count X of the Boykins complaint.
2. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment two weeks from today on behalf of Defendant William S. Kreisher and against the Plaintiffs Michael R. Boykin, Margaret L. Boykin, and Aaron M. Boykin.
3. This case is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas of Columbia County, Pennsylvania.
4. The Clerk of Court shall send a copy of this order to the Prothonotary of Columbia County.
5. The Clerk of Court shall close this file.
MUIR, U.S. District Judge
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