Plaintiff now seeks remand based on the following asserted defects in defendants' removal papers: (A) none of defendants' removal submissions states that it is joined by the remaining defendants, nor does any submission explain the remaining defendants' absence; (B) the notices filed by Old South and Union Zinc do not articulate facts establishing the parties' diverse citizenship as of the time of removal; and (C) Old South's notice and Tennesee Steel's consent fail to allege that they are timely. These contentions, which I address seriatim, are either without merit or warrant amendment rather than remand.
A. Joinder of All Defendants in Removal
Plaintiff does not dispute that all defendants in fact consented to removal of this action within 30 days of service of his complaint, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1446. Rather, he contends that the procedure was improper because the notice or consent of each defendant did not manifest the joinder of the remaining defendants or affirmatively explain such defendants' absence. It is well settled, however, that while all defendants must join in the removal attempt, they need not all execute the same notice of removal document. See Ogletree v. Barnes, 851 F. Supp. 184, 188 (E.D. Pa. 1994), reconsideration denied, No. 94 Civ. 1278, 1994 WL 193885 (May 18, 1994); Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 841 F.2d 1254, 1262 n.11 (5th Cir. 1988); Adams v. Lederle Labs., 569 F. Supp. 234, 243 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Colin K. v. Schmidt, 528 F. Supp. 355, 358 (D.R.I. 1981). The "unanimity of consent" rule is satisfied where there is "some timely filed written indication from each defendant, or some person or entity purporting to formally act on its behalf in this respect and to have authority to do so, that it has actually consented to such action." Ogletree, 851 F. Supp. at 188. Such a written indication constitutes an entry in the record that can "bind the allegedly consenting defendant." Id. (internal quotation omitted).
Here, each defendant, through counsel, filed its own document evincing intent to remove or join in removal of this action. Old South and Union Zinc each filed a notice of removal. Tennessee Steel filed a "Consent to Removal." These filings were timely and would undoubtedly be deemed to bind defendants were defendants to attempt to disclaim them. Thus, I find that all defendants' have adequately joined in or consented to removal of this case.
B. Allegations of Diverse Citizenship
Also unpersuasive is plaintiff's argument that remand should be ordered because the notices of Old South and Union Zinc fail to allege facts establishing the parties' diverse citizenship as of the time of removal. Plaintiff is correct that diversity jurisdiction must be alleged both as of the time the complaint was filed and as of the time of removal. E.g., Holly Farms Corp. v. Taylor, 722 F. Supp. 1152, 1156 (D. Del. 1989). Nevertheless, in addition to looking at the notice of removal, the court may look to the complaint and other items in the record to find the requisite jurisdictional allegations. See Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363, 1366 n.11 (3d Cir. 1979) (looking to complaint as well as removal petition for diversity allegations); Castner v. Exxon Co., 563 F. Supp. 684, 688 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (Pollak, J.) (looking to complaint and removal petition for diversity allegations); Kerstetter v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., 496 F. Supp. 1305, 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (same). In any event, where, as here, the existence of diversity jurisdiction is not contested and allegations of the parties' diverse citizenship are contained in other documents in the record, the court may deem "technical" pleading deficiencies in the removal notice's jurisdictional allegations and may allow the removing party to cure them by amendment. See Stellwagen v. Chemlawn Servs. Corp, No. 92 Civ. 6437, 1993 WL 9025, at * 2 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1993) (allowing curative amendment to jurisdictional allegations in notice of removal where plaintiff "[did] not deny that diversity existed."). Accord Camacho v. Cove Trader, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1190, 1192-93 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Moser v. Bostitch Div. of Textron, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 917, 919 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Knowles v. American Tempering Inc., 629 F. Supp. 832, 835 n.1 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Holly Farms Corp., 722 F. Supp. at 1156-57; Northern Ill. Gas Co. v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 273-74 (7th Cir. 1982); Hendrix v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 390 F.2d 299, 300-01 (10th Cir. 1968).
The record here convinces me that diversity jurisdiction was adequately alleged as of the time the complaint was filed and as of the time of removal. In any event, there is no dispute that diversity jurisdiction existed at both such points, and thus, even if the defendants' allegations are technically deficient, amendment, rather than remand, is appropriate here.
Old South's notice, in relevant part, reads as follows:
2. In his Complaint, plaintiff alleges that he is a citizen of the State of New Jersey. Defendant therefore believes and alleges that plaintiff is a citizen of the State of New Jersey.