The opinion of the court was delivered by: ANITA B. BRODY
This is an action to enforce compliance with federal regulations located at 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-.662 (1993), which set forth certain complaint resolution procedures states must provide under the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (the "IDEA"). Plaintiffs seek to enforce these complaint procedure regulations under the IDEA itself (the "direct IDEA claim" or the "IDEA claim") and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (the "section 1983 claim"). Before me are plaintiffs' motions for class certification as to both claims and for summary judgment as to the IDEA claim.
I find that plaintiffs' IDEA and section 1983 claims fail at the threshold because plaintiffs do not have a private right to enforce the particular regulatory provisions at issue here. I decline to imply a right of action in favor of private parties such as plaintiffs directly under the regulations at issue, and I find that, in light of the current efforts of the United States Secretary of Education ("the Secretary") to resolve the very problems that are the impetus for this lawsuit, plaintiffs are foreclosed from enforcing those regulations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, I will: (i) deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the direct IDEA claim, and enter summary judgment on that claim in favor of defendants; (ii) enter summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the section 1983 claim on my own initiative, and dismiss that claim without prejudice to re-assert it, if necessary, when the Secretary's involvement in the matters at issue is terminated or after June 30, 1995, whichever is earlier; and (iii) deny as moot plaintiffs' motion to certify for class treatment the IDEA claim and the section 1983 claim.
I. ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THIS OPINION
Because this opinion contains more than the usual number of abbreviated terms, I offer the following glossary at the outset for ease of reference:
DOC Division of Compliance (a unit of the Pennsylvania Department of Education)
EDGAR Education Department General Administrative Regulations
IDEA Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
IEP Individualized Education Program
OSEP Office of Special Education Programs (a unit of the United States Department of Education that reports to the federal Secretary of Education)
PDE Pennsylvania Department of Education
SEA State Educational Agency
Secretary United States Secretary of Education
II. STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
A. The Parties and the Claims
Plaintiffs are several children who need special education and their parents or guardians, and Parents' Union for Public Schools, a public advocacy group that represents disabled children and their families in special education matters. In August of 1993, plaintiffs filed this action against the Pennsylvania Department of Education and its secretary, Donald M. Carroll, Jr. (collectively "PDE"), alleging violations of the IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485, and its implementing regulations
; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and its implementing regulations; and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also sued in his official capacity the United States Secretary of Education, Richard W. Riley, but they later dismissed the Secretary from the suit.
Plaintiffs have each filed with PDE administrative, education-related complaints under the Commonwealth's special education system. The gravamen of their claim here is that the Division of Compliance ("DOC"), the unit of PDE responsible for handling such complaints, has failed to maintain a complaint resolution system that complies with certain regulatory requirements now codified under the IDEA at 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.660-.662 (1993). Specifically, plaintiffs cite as the principal deficiencies in DOC's operation the following alleged violations of these regulations: (i) DOC fails to resolve complaints within the required 60-day time limit; (ii) DOC fails to monitor and enforce the corrective action that it orders subordinate agencies to take; and (iii) DOC fails to address all allegations raised in complaints.
Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief that is both intrusive and detailed. They ask me to compel PDE to: (i) take immediate measures to ensure that DOC's complaint system meets all applicable requirements, including the 60-day time limit; (ii) devise and submit for my approval a plan to ensure such compliance; (iii) file semi-annual reports with me and with plaintiffs for the next five years addressing, in part, the nature and number of complaints filed, the time necessary to resolve complaints, and the methods used by DOC to resolve complaints; and (iv) publicize the availability and procedures of DOC's complaint system.
B. Proceedings in This Case
On November 15, 1993, plaintiffs moved for certification of the following proposed class as to all claims pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2):
All Pennsylvania children, and their parents and/or other representatives, who since July 1, 1990, have used the [Pennsylvania Department of Education's special education] complaint system, or may in the future use that system.
When I first considered the issue of class certification, I referred the matter to a special master, Alfred W. Putnam, Jr., Esq. (the "Special Master"), for a report and recommendation. The reasons prompting my referral were detailed in my memorandum that accompanied the order. Beth V. v. Carroll, 155 F.R.D. 529 (E.D. Pa. 1994). On August 31, 1994, the Special Master filed his report, to which both plaintiffs and PDE submitted responses. Among the Special Master's findings were those concerning the causes of DOC's alleged deficiencies and the status of cooperative efforts undertaken by the Secretary and PDE to remedy the problems. Specifically, the Special Master found that while DOC does have in place procedures that meet federal requirements, PDE concedes that due to understaffing DOC has been unable to meet the 60-day time limit for resolving complaints, which on average require 80 to 90 days to resolve. Report of Special Master, at 3. He also found that, since the commencement of this lawsuit, the federal Office of Special Education Programs ("OSEP"), which reports to the Secretary, has issued a final document (the "OSEP Report") addressing the principal deficiencies of DOC at issue here. Id. at 5. After expressly noting DOC's untimeliness and its failure to resolve all allegations, Report of Special Master, App. C, at 8, the OSEP Report concludes with a detailed order to remedy these problems. Report of Special Master, App. C, at 49.
Included in this order are (i) specific procedures by which PDE must verify that it has corrected the deficiencies cited and (ii) specific deadlines for complying with the OSEP order. Id.
In response to the OSEP Report, the Special Master found, PDE has begun to undertake compliance efforts, producing the following proposals: "Plan for Recruiting, Scheduling and Retaining Personnel to Ensure Investigation and Resolution of Complaints" and "Procedures for Ensuring All Allegations Are Resolved." Report of Special Master, at 7. Observing that PDE hopes to be in compliance with the OSEP Report by early next year, the Special Master reported that OSEP would continue to monitor PDE if necessary, while the Secretary would undertake his periodic compliance review as mandated by statute. Id. at 9.
After the Special Master filed his report, plaintiffs moved for summary judgement on their IDEA claim. On October 25, 1994, I issued an order raising, sua sponte, the threshold question of whether a private right of action existed under either the regulatory provisions that plaintiffs seek to enforce or section 1983, and requiring the parties to brief the issue. Beth V. v. Carroll, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15449, No. 93 Civ. 4418, 1994 WL 594267 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 1994). Both plaintiffs and PDE have submitted papers in response to that order and in reply to each other's submissions.
III. ISSUES TO BE DECIDED
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no disputed material facts. E.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. DeBruicker, 838 F. Supp. 215, 217 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 30 F.3d 1484 (3d Cir. 1994). As developed below, the foregoing facts regarding OSEP's involvement in this case and the results of that involvement, largely findings of the Special Master, are the only facts necessary to resolve the dispositive private right of action questions in this case.
These facts are not contested. As to the Special Master's findings based on the OSEP Report, plaintiffs themselves cite that report in support of their summary judgment motion. See Pls.' Proposed Findings of Undisputed Facts P 67 (describing noncompliance found by OSEP and documented in OSEP Report), PP 79-80 (description of OSEP audit and of finding in OSEP Report that DOC fails to resolve all allegations raised in complaints). Nor do plaintiffs take issue with the fact that PDE has produced in response to the OSEP Report the above-mentioned documentary proposals regarding recruiting and procedures for full complaint resolution. Report of Special Master, at 7. Because these particular findings are not contested, I find that a hearing upon them is not necessary, and I hereby adopt them.
Plaintiffs also accept PDE's representations, supra, at n.3, concerning its more aggressive enforcement posture of late. See Pls.' Reply to Defs.' Resp. to Pls.' Mot. for Summ. J., at 8 n.9 ("Plantiffs applaud any recent efforts by DOC to reform its practices and procedures."). Finally, plaintiffs have not disputed PDE's update as to hiring developments. See supra, at n.3. What plaintiffs dispute, of course, is the legal import of these facts.
Where, as here, a court is already "engaged in the process of determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact, and the parties have had the opportunity to present evidence on the issues," the weight of authority allows summary judgment in favor of a nonmovant such as PDE if warranted. Weil Ceramics & Glass, Inc. v. Dash, 618 F. Supp. 700, 716 (D.N.J. 1985) (citing 10A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, & Mary K. Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2720 (1983), rev'd on other grounds, 878 F.2d 659 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 853, 110 S. Ct. 156, 107 L. Ed. 2d 114 (1989). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986) ("District courts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence."); Caputo v. Fauver, 800 F. Supp. 168, 172 (D.N.J. 1992) (similar), aff'd, 995 F.2d 216 (3d Cir. 1993). Here, plaintiffs initiated my consideration of the issues by moving for summary judgment on the IDEA claim. Because I felt that the parties had overlooked the threshold question of whether a private right of action existed under the regulations at issue or under section 1983, I specifically requested that this question be addressed. Beth V. v. Carroll, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15449, No. 93 Civ. 4418, 1994 WL 594267 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 1994). Plaintiffs then briefed this question thoroughly, appreciating the significance, I must presume, of all uncontested facts in the record that bear ...