The opinion of the court was delivered by: JAY C. WALDMAN
Plaintiff was employed as a police officer by defendant Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority ("SEPTA"). She alleges that she was sexually harassed at work and terminated for complaining about such conduct and because of her sex. She also alleges that she was terminated without due process. She has asserted claims against all defendants under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3). She also asserts a pendent claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress against all of the individual defendants.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must determine whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corporation, 786 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir. 1986). Only facts that may affect the outcome of a case under applicable law are "material." Anderson, supra at 248.
All reasonable inferences from the record must be drawn in favor of the non-movant. Anderson, supra at 256. Although the movant has the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact, the non-movant must then establish the existence of each element on which it bears the burden of proof. J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 921, 111 S. Ct. 1313, 113 L. Ed. 2d 246 (1991) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986)). The non-movant cannot satisfy its burden by relying on unsupported allegations in its pleadings or statements in its brief. Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorporation, 912 F.2d 654, 657 (3d Cir. 1990).
The pertinent uncontroverted facts and evidence otherwise taken in a light most favorable to plaintiff are as follow.
Plaintiff was employed by SEPTA as a transit police officer from October 24, 1989 to April 23, 1992. On October 4, 1991, plaintiff reported for a routine medical examination by defendant Van de Beek, a SEPTA physician, to assess her fitness for duty. During the examination defendant Van de Beek intentionally and unnecessarily placed a stethoscope under her brassiere and pressed his pelvic area against her buttocks while examining her back. Plaintiff related the incident to Kathleen Blankley, a SEPTA investigating officer, who relayed the report to Judith Pierce, then chief administrative officer of SEPTA. There were similar reports by four of the other women examined by Dr. Van de Beek over the two days that the physical examinations were conducted.
They reported that the doctor had pressed his pelvic areas against their hand or knee, although one stated that at the time she believed this was accidental.
Usually the Civil Rights Department of SEPTA would conduct any investigation of such reports. In this instance, however, Judith Pierce assumed control over the internal investigation assigned to Ms. Blankley. Ms. Pierce instructed Ms. Blankley to keep the investigation confidential, reporting only to her, SEPTA Police Chief Sharpe or Deputy Chief Evans. When Officer Blankley suggested that she advise Dr. Van Beek of his Miranda rights before interviewing him because his alleged conduct could constitute a crime, she was ordered not to do so by Ms. Pierce who told her that this was purely a civil matter.
Ms. Pierce told plaintiff that Dr. Van de Beek's reputation was at stake and he could sue her for claiming that he sexually harassed her. Ms. Pierce stated that nothing was going to happen to Dr. Van de Beek. Ms. Pierce also told plaintiff that she could pursue a complaint through the SEPTA Office of Civil Rights. Defendants Pierce and SEPTA permitted the investigation to lapse without taking any action against Dr. Van de Beek. A report of the allegations of Dr. Van de Beek's conduct was given to the District Attorney's Office which declined to file any criminal charges.
Six months later, on April 23, 1992, plaintiff was terminated by SEPTA Police Captain Cabanes with the concurrence of defendant Sharpe. The reason given for the termination was that while off-duty plaintiff exhibited conduct unbecoming of an officer during an incident on March 23, 1992 in which a bus driver was assaulted. Criminal charges, including aggravated assault, were filed against plaintiff after this incident. At a trial on September 17, 1992, plaintiff was acquitted of the charges against her except for the summary offense of harassment for which she was convicted. Plaintiff avers and the court will assume that it was actually plaintiff's sister who assaulted the bus driver and that plaintiff did not participate in or abet the assault.
Plaintiff was not afforded a hearing of any kind or any opportunity to present her story prior to her termination. Male officers who had criminal charges pending against them were not charged with engaging in conduct unbecoming of an officer or received lighter punishment such as a suspension.
Defendants Sharpe and Cabanes testified that they had no prior discussion about plaintiff's discharge with defendant Pierce or with each other. They testified that Captain Cabanes submitted a written report to Chief Sharpe through Deputy Chief Evans regarding the criminal charges against plaintiff with a recommendation that she be terminated for unbecoming conduct, and that Mr. Evans and defendant Sharpe concurred after reading the report. Captain Cabanes testified ...