The opinion of the court was delivered by: HUYETT
Mack Trucks impleaded Protection as an additional Defendant based on an indemnification provision in its contract with Protection. Protection argues that its liability is limited to payment of worker's compensation benefits and moves for summary judgment. For the following reasons, Protection's motion is denied.
A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper when the record shows "that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). This Court's role is to determine "whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986); Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 996 F.2d 632, 637 (3d Cir. 1993). The moving party has the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). Further, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 8 L. Ed. 2d 176, 82 S. Ct. 993 (1962). However, if the non-moving party fails to adduce sufficient evidence in connection with an essential element of the case for which it has the burden of proof, the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322.
B. Exclusivity Provision of the WCA
The exclusivity provision of The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act ("WCA"), 77 P.S. § 481(a), provides:
The liability of an employer under this act shall be exclusive and in place of any and all other liability to such employes . . . on account of any injury or death as defined in section 301(c)(1) and (2) or occupational disease as defined in section 108.
Accordingly, an employee's sole recourse against his employer for injuries sustained in the course of employment is usually a claim under the WCA. See, e.g., Rodgers v. Prudential ins. Co., 803 F. Supp. 1024 (M.D. Pa. 1992), aff'd, 998 F.2d 1004 (1993).
However, as in the present case, an injured employee may sue a third party who caused the injury. 77 P.S. § 481(b). The employer will not be liable to the third party for contribution or indemnity unless liability "shall be expressly provided for in a written contract entered into by the [employer]." Id. "The [WCA] requires an express provision for the statutory employer to assume an indemnity obligation in such circumstances." Remas v. Duquesne Light Co., 371 Pa. Super. 183, 537 A.2d 881, 883 (Pa. Super. 1988) (emphasis in original); see also Bester v. Essex Crane Rental Corp., 422 Pa. Super. 178, 619 A.2d 304, 307 (Pa. Super. 1993) ("the intent to indemnify against claims by the employees of the alleged indemnitor, however, must clearly appear from ...