Amplifier Research Corp. v. Hart, 144 Bankr. 693, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (president of defendant corporation dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction when plaintiff did not set forth what president did to subject himself to jurisdiction); Donner v. Tams-Witmark Music Library, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1229, 1233 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (courts generally have not exercised personal jurisdiction over individuals for their acts done in a corporate capacity). Allowing personal jurisdiction over a corporate officer or director, based on the officer's corporate activities, would subject corporate officers or directors to suit in any state where their corporation does business and would violate due process. Simkins, 601 F. Supp. at 1344-45 (citation omitted). MSL has failed to show that Monk's own activities in Pennsylvania would warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at 1345.
The same is true so far as jurisdiction over Monk by reason of the court's jurisdiction over the other organizational defendants, ABA, LSAC, or LSAS. The complaint alleges that Monk "participated" in "enforcing the anticompetitive ABA accreditation criteria at issue" through his position with the AALS. Plaintiff's own allegation defeats any contention that Monk, as an individual, did anything relating to MSL.
Nor does co-conspirator jurisdiction provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over Monk as an individual.
Monk as an individual cannot conspire with the AALS because, as the executive director of the AALS, he is not legally distinct from it. Similarly, because MSL has alleged that Monk's activities vis a vis the other organizational defendants were carried out in his capacity as executive director of the AALS, he cannot individually be said to have conspired with the organizational defendants. MSL makes clear that whatever Monk did, he did for the AALS.
MSL fares no better if it is argued that Monk conspired with the other 21 individual defendants. Monk could, as a matter of law, individually conspire with other entities, including the individual defendants. Weiss v. York Hosp., 745 F.2d 786, 813 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1060, 84 L. Ed. 2d 836, 105 S. Ct. 1777 (1985). Plaintiff's allegation, however, is not that Monk did so, but that he did not do so. Therefore, the swath cut by the catch-all allegation that "defendants have engaged in combinations, conspiracies, and agreements, and have organized a group boycott," and that they have "engaged in a conspiracy to monopolize and attempt to monopolize" does not extend the allegations against Monk from his participation only through the AALS, to encompass any unspecified activities by Monk as an individual acting for himself.
Although this court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the four organizational defendants, plaintiff's allegations show there is no personal jurisdiction over Monk. No basis for general jurisdiction has been asserted, and MSL has plead itself out of court with regard to specific jurisdiction over Monk. Monk's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction must be granted, and I need not consider his Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion or his venue argument.
An appropriate order follows.
AND NOW, this 20th day of June, 1994, it is hereby ordered that the motion of defendant, the American Association of Law Schools, to dismiss the claims against it is DENIED; and the motion of defendant, Carl C. Monk, to dismiss the claims against him for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
J. William Ditter, Jr., J.