The opinion of the court was delivered by: LOWELL A. REED, JR.
This is a case of alleged employment discrimination. Currently before me are the defendants' motions for summary judgment, in limine and to strike (Document No. 3).
This Court has jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(5)(f)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 621 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331.
In her complaint, Arnett alleges that on or about November 7, 1990, DISC issued a job opportunity announcement for the position of equal employment specialist, GS-7. Arnett timely submitted an SF-171 employment application. Soon thereafter, Arnett was notified that she was not qualified for the position because her SF-171 application had not reflected a sufficient amount of time as a representative for the Federal Women's Program ("FWP") to qualify her for the GS-7 level.
On December 6, 1990, the same position was readvertised at the GS-5 or GS-7 level. Arnett revised her SF-171 to reflect the number of hours she spent on the FWP and reapplied for the position. Eventually, the personnel office found that both Arnett and another woman, Kelly Williams ("Williams"), were qualified for the position at the GS-7 level as well as the GS-5 level. There were six other applicants who qualified at the GS-5 level only.
On or about January 1991, Williams, who was under thirty (30) years old, was chosen for the position. Soon after Williams was selected, Arnett learned that another equal employment specialist would be leaving and that Arnett was being referred for the position. However, on March 14, 1991, Arnett received a letter informing her that Jaima McCabe ("McCabe"), a 29-year old woman, had been chosen for the position. McCabe had been one of the applicants for the earlier position who had qualified at the GS-5 level.
In this action, Arnett is complaining that she was not given either position because she is a woman who is over forty years old. Arnett claims, and the defendants admit in their answer to her complaint, that every woman selected for the position of equal employment specialist has been under the age of forty and every male equal employment specialist has been over the age of forty. Complaint at PP 52-53; see also Arnett's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of James D. Rice, attached as Exhibit C. Arnett also claims, and the defendants again admit in their answer, that she and other woman candidates over forty have been referred for the position of equal employment specialist, but have been ultimately rejected in favor of younger women or men over forty. Complaint at P 54.
In the current motions, the defendants seek summary judgment on count two of Arnett's complaint which seeks compensation for "age-plus-sex" discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendants also request an order striking Arnett's demands for a jury trial and for compensatory and punitive damages
and precluding Arnett from introducing at trial evidence concerning compensatory damages.
For the reasons discussed below, I will deny the defendants' motion for summary judgment and the defendants' motion in limine, and will grant the defendants' motion to strike Arnett's demands for a jury trial and for compensatory and punitive damages.
A. Motion for Summary Judgment
1. Summary Judgment Standard
The examination to be undertaken of a summary judgment motion in federal court is set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. ...