guilty of fraud do not profit from their ill-gotten gains. Wang, 944 F.2d at 81. However, plaintiffs' claims cannot be aggregated simply because they frame their prayer for damages as equitable, rather than legal, relief. Packard, 994 F.2d at 1050. Plaintiffs seek disgorgement of profits as a means of obtaining money damages. To allow the amount in controversy to be measured by defendant's cost simply because the prayer for relief is partially phrased in terms of an equitable remedy "would eviscerate [the rule] that the claims of class members may not be aggregated in order to meet the jurisdictional threshold." Packard, 994 F.2d at 1050.
Similarly, the request for punitive damages cannot be aggregated. Pennsylvania law requires that the amount of punitive damages awarded to each plaintiff must "be reasonably related to the amount of actual damages suffered" by him or her. Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357, 377 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (citing Givens v. W.J. Gilmore Drug Co., 337 Pa. 278, 10 A.2d 12, 16 (1940)), aff'd, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985); accord, Chuy v. Philadelphia Eagles Football Club, 595 F.2d 1265, 1279 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing Hughes v. Babcock, 349 Pa. 475, 481, 37 A.2d 551, 554 (1944)). Thus, each member of the putative class holds a separate and distinct interest in a punitive damages award. Accord Kasky et al. v. Perrier Group of America et al., 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21177, No. 91-0489-R(M), slip op. at 6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 1991) ("The right to punitive damages is held by each plaintiff individually.").
B. Injunctive Relief
Perrier argues that this court has jurisdiction because plaintiffs seek an injunction that would cause them to change their advertising, and the costs of that injunction to Perrier would be far greater than $ 50,000. Pierson contends, however, that Perrier's position was directly rejected by the court of appeals in Packard, 994 F.2d at 1050. We find that the Packard court did not squarely address this issue. However, because the longstanding rule in this circuit is that, for purposes of determining the amount in controversy, the value of equitable relief must be determined from the viewpoint of the plaintiff rather than the defendant, we reject Perrier's argument that the cost to them of complying with the injunction should be considered.
In Packard, the plaintiff argued, as does Perrier here, that the court should measure the jurisdictional amount not by the benefit sought by each plaintiff, but instead by the defendant's cost of compliance. The third circuit declined to do so, stating that "we will not permit plaintiffs to do indirectly that which they cannot do directly. . . . [A] plaintiff may not turn what is essentially a legal claim into an equitable one merely by demanding an injunction requiring the payment of money." Packard, 994 F.2d at 1050 (citing Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 276 (3d Cir. 1984); Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, 715 (3d Cir. 1979)).
The instant case is distinguishable from Packard, however, because in that case "virtually all the relief sought [was] remediable by money damages." Plaintiff had not presented the district court with any data regarding the estimated cost defendant would incur by complying with the requested "truly" injunctive relief. The third circuit therefore did not reach the issue of whether the amount in controversy could be measured from the defendant's point of view in a case where the plaintiff class called for "truly" injunctive relief, the cost of which exceeded $ 50,000 for the defendant. 994 F.2d at 1050.
While Packard did not squarely address the issue of whether the defendant's cost of compliance could be used to calculate the amount in controversy, the rule in this circuit has long been that "in a suit for an injunction, the amount in controversy is determined by the value of the object to be gained by the plaintiff." Campbell Soup Co. v. Diehm, 111 F. Supp. 211, 214 (E.D. Pa. 1952) (citing Glenwood Light and Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat and Power Co., 239 U.S. 121, 36 S. Ct. 30, 60 L. Ed. 174 (1915); John B. Kelly, Inc., v. Lehigh Navigation Coal Co., 151 F.2d 743 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 779, 90 L. Ed. 1007, 66 S. Ct. 530 (1946)); accord, Comprehensive Group Health Services Board of Directors v. Temple University, 363 F. Supp. 1069, 1094 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank and Trust Co. v. Sandvick Steel, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 651, 654 (M.D. Pa. 1971).
The ninth circuit has considered an injunctive claim similar to the one made by plaintiffs in the instant case. In Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787 (9th Cir. 1977), a group of consumers sued Ford for damages and injunctive relief for falsely advertising "trailering special packages" that did not contain wiring kits to connect the trailer's electrical system to that of the towing vehicle. Id., 561 F.2d at 788. The ninth circuit found that "the right asserted by plaintiffs is the right of individual future consumers to be protected from Ford's allegedly deceptive advertising which is said to injure them in the amount of $ 11.00 each." Snow, 561 F.2d at 790-91. Therefore, the jurisdictional minimum was not met. Were it to decide otherwise, the court proclaimed, "All that plaintiffs would need to do to avoid the [non-aggregation] rule of Snyder and Zahn would be to pray for an injunction." Snow, 561 F.2d at 791.
Similarly here, the object sough by each putative plaintiff is to be free from deceptive advertising. To allow the amount in controversy to be measured by the cost to the defendant of complying with requested injunctive relief would be the same as allowing aggregation of the plaintiff's claims. See Snow, 561 F.2d at 790. Because we have already determined that the claims in this case are not common and undivided, aggregation will not be allowed, and the value of the requested injunctive relief must be calculated from the point of view of each member of the putative class.
The "common and undivided" interest test used to determine whether or not to aggregate multiple plaintiffs' claims for jurisdictional purposes has been described by commentators and courts as "mystifying," Charles A. Wright, Law of Federal Courts § 36 at 196 (4th ed. 1983) (quoting Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Graves, 381 F. Supp. 1159, 1162 (W.D. La. 1974)), and "a perpetual source of confusion for the federal courts," Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute--A Constitutional and Statutory Analysis, 24 Ariz. St. L.J. 849, 996 n. 592 (1992). Nevertheless, it is clear that members of the putative class in the instant case do not seek to enforce a right in which they have a common and undivided interest and that, therefore, their claims cannot be aggregated. Because it is undisputed that the amount in controversy, if not aggregated, does not exceed $ 50,000, Pierson's Motion to Remand is granted.
An appropriate order follows.
AND NOW, on this 23rd day of March, 1994, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion for Remand, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is GRANTED, and this action is hereby REMANDED to the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas.
BY THE COURT: