e. Made untrue and disparaging remarks about Greyhound, its services, its fares, the safety of its vehicles and condition of its business and operation;
f. Physically taken the luggage of prospective passengers, and carrying same down the street to the Peter Pan Terminal;
g. Grabbed the arms of members of the public including Greyhound passengers and physically walking them down the street to the Peter Pan Terminal;
h. Given the false impression that there is a labor strike against Greyhound by picketing with signs in front of Greyhound's Terminal and stating that Greyhound is "on strike" and that Greyhound drivers are "scabs";
i. Stopped and blocked cars in the middle of the street and also physically escorted persons exiting taxicabs in front of the Greyhound Terminal and physically walking and leading them down to the Peter Pan Terminal;
j. Threatened a Greyhound's employee with physical violence;
k. Littered in, or around plaintiff's property;
l. The acts of the Peter Pan "hawkers" intensifies on weekends and holidays.
See also Plaintiff's Exhibit 5 (videotape of "hawker's" conduct).
48. According to the credible testimony of Martin Pisciotti, after the November 23 Agreement of Counsel prohibiting trespass there were further incidents of trespass by "hawkers" in the Greyhound Terminal.
49. From on or about March 2, 1990 and continuing to on or about May 27, 1993, Greyhound was involved in a labor strike with the Amalgamated Transit Union ("ATU") during which the ATU frequently picketed in front of the Greyhound Terminal. The strike ended on or about May 27, 1993 and there have been no ATU pickets since that date.
II. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), in that the action is between citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $ 50,000. See Order of January 19, 1994 denying defendant's motion to dismiss.
2. The acts and occurrences giving rise to the claims alleged in this action took place in substantial part in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, within the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and venue is therefore proper in this Court pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391 (a)(2) and (3).
3. Pennsylvania law applies to all plaintiff's claims other than the trespassing incident which occurred in Mount Laurel, New Jersey. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
4. New Jersey law applies to the trespassing claim based upon the January 3, 1994 incident in Mount Laurel, New Jersey. Id.
5. The plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the four requirements for injunctive relief: (1) a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) that it would be irreparably injured by denial of the injunctive relief; (3) that granting injunctive relief will not result in greater harm to the non-moving party; and (4) that the relief is in the public interest. SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254-55 (3d Cir. 1985); In re: Arthur Treacher's Franchisee Litigation, 689 F.2d 1137, 1143 (3d Cir. 1982).
6. An injury is deemed irreparable if it cannot be adequately compensated by an award of damages. Cosner v. United Penn Bank, 358 Pa. Super. 484, 517 A.2d 1337 (Pa. Super. 1986).
7. Because the trial held on January 24 and 25, 1994 was a final trial on plaintiff's trespass and public nuisance claims, plaintiff must establish that it is entitled to relief on those claims (as opposed to establishing a probability of success on the merits) before injunctive relief can be granted.
8. Under Pennsylvania common law a party is liable for trespass if it intentionally enters land in possession of another or causes a third party to do so. C & K Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 537 F. Supp. 480, 487 (W.D. Pa.); Restatements (Second) of Torts § 158.
9. Under New Jersey common law, a party is liable for trespass if it intentionally enters land in possession of another or causes a third party to do so. Burke v. Briggs, 239 N.J. Super. 269, 571 A.2d 296 (N.J. Super. 1990).
10. Pennsylvania has adopted Section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts for the elements of a claim for public nuisance. Com. v. Danny's Book Store, 155 Pa. Commw. 281, 625 A.2d 119, 121-22 (Pa. Commw. 1993); Muehlieb v. City of Philadelphia, 133 Pa. Commw. 133, 574 A.2d 1208, 1211 (Pa. Commw. 1990).
11. Section 821B provides:
(1) A public nuisance is an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public.
(2) Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public right is unreasonable include the following:
(a) whether the conduct involves a significant interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort, or the public convenience, or
(b) whether the conduct is proscribed by a statute, ordinance or administrative regulation, or