Plaintiff's total monthly payment amounted to $ 298.75. (A.R. p. 1).
3. The last mortgage payment received by the mortgagee, American Residential Mortgage Corporation, was in November, 1991. (A.R. p. 28).
4. The date of default on the mortgage is January 1, 1992. (A.R. p. 35).
5. By letter dated February 13, 1992, American Residential Mortgage Corporation notified plaintiff that the mortgage was in serious default. Plaintiff had not paid the mortgage payments for the months of December 1991, January 1992 and February 1992. (A.R. p. 12). Plaintiff was advised that she would be given an opportunity to request assistance from HUD if she qualified.
6. A second letter was sent on April 9, 1992 by American Residential Mortgage Corporation advising plaintiff that the mortgagee had determined that plaintiff did not qualify for assistance from HUD. However, the plaintiff was advised that she had the right to contact HUD directly to request assistance. (A.R. pp. 15-16).
7. By letter dated April 24, 1991, HUD acknowledged receipt of plaintiff's request for consideration for mortgage relief and instructed the plaintiff as to the types of documentation and information needed by HUD to make a determination as to whether the plaintiff qualified for the Assignment Program. (A.R. 21).
8. By letter dated June 16, 1992, HUD advised the plaintiff that the information provided was insufficient to make a determination as to whether the plaintiff qualified for the Assignment Program. However, plaintiff was advised that she had an opportunity to submit additional documentation, as well as an opportunity to request a face-to-face conference with a HUD representative if she so chose. (A.R. pp. 35-39).
9. Plaintiff requested and was granted a face-to-face conference which was held on July 13, 1992. (A.R. p. 41).
10. Following the conference, plaintiff was given five (5) additional days to submit relevant information, including federal tax returns, copies of paystubs, statements from Mr. Field's employer, E.Z. Park, explaining the reason he was laid off from his job in January 1991 and copies of utility and telephone bills. (A.R. p. 41).
11. According to plaintiff's Federal Income Tax Return, plaintiff's wages for the year 1990 were $ 12,327. (A.R. p. 42).
12. According to plaintiff's 1991 W-2 form, plaintiff earned $ 13,037.25 in gross wages for the year. (A.R. p. 45).
13. According to the Request for Verification of Employment completed by plaintiff's employer, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange, plaintiff earned $ 5,915.00 in regular wages and $ 346.08 in overtime wages from January 1, 1992 through June 10, 1992 -- the date the Request form was signed. (A.R. p. 137).
14. There was no significant reduction in plaintiff's wages over the period from September 1991 through July 1992, the period prior to and following the date of default which was January 1, 1992. (A.R. pp. 46-51).
15. Mr. Fields was terminated by his employer, E Z Parks, Inc. because of his involvement with a stolen car. (A.R. pp. 140, 150, 167-168).
16. According to Robert Derr, the General Manager for E Z Parks, Inc., the signature on the Request for Verification of Employment submitted by the plaintiff was a forgery. Mr. Derr provided HUD with an Affidavit to this effect. (A.R. pp. 140, 150, 154).
17. After receiving all of the documentation submitted by plaintiff, it was HUD's decision that plaintiff had not met the criteria for eligibility under the Assignment Program. A final decision letter dated August 4, 1992 from HUD was sent to the plaintiff explaining the rejection of plaintiff's application. (A.R. p. 148).
18. HUD notified the mortgagee that foreclosure proceedings could be commenced. (A.R. 149).
19. HUD was contacted by a staff member of Community Legal Services (CLS), who requested that HUD reconsider its final decision rendered in this case. CLS claimed that the fact that Mr. Fields received unemployment compensation should be considered over the "word of someone spoken to over the phone." (A.R. p. 159-161).
20. Although there is no provision in HUD's regulations or Handbooks requiring this type of reconsideration, HUD voluntarily agreed to re-examine its decision. After a careful evaluation of the previous findings, HUD notified Community Legal Services, by letter dated May 4, 1993, that HUD was reaffirming its original negative decision. (A.R. pp. 162-163).
21. Plaintiff received all the rights to which she was entitled in the processing of her application for mortgage relief under HUD's Mortgage Assignment Program. 24 C.F.R. Section 203.650, et. seq.
In addition to these facts, plaintiff asserts that at the same time that Field's unemployment compensation lapsed, she was unable to work as much overtime as she ordinarily could and the family's income dropped. She states her net income averaged $ 181.09 per week in November, 1991 and $ 184.38 in December. In contrast, she averaged $ 200.45 per week net pay for the period of January - June 1992. Ms. Rodriguez also avers that she first became aware that E Z Parks had informed HUD that Fields was terminated due to his involvement with a stolen car when she received HUD's Final Negative Decision dated August 4, 1992, leading to her request that HUD reconsider its decision.
Rodriguez agrees with the defendants that this case involves a challenge to informal agency action and that the standard of review contained in Section 10(e)(2)(A) of the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(A), applies. It provides that the reviewing court shall
hold unlawful and set aside agency action findings and conclusions found to be --
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law