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UNITED STATES v. CONLEY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA


January 7, 1994

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
JOHN F. "Duffy" CONLEY, WILLIAM C. CURTIN, SHEILA F. SMITH, JOHN FRANCIS "Jack" CONLEY, THOMAS "Bud" McGRATH, MARK A. ABBOTT, THOMAS ROSSI, WILLIAM STEINHART, ROBERTA FLEAGLE, ROBIN SPRATT, MONICA C. KAIL, WILLIAM J. REED, JOANNE T. SMITH, KENNETH "Ron" GOODWIN, LAWRENCE N. "Neudy" DEMINO, SR., CHRISTOPHER "Chris" KAIL, JOSEPH A. DEVITA, FRANK GAROFALO, THOMAS D. CIOCCO, MICHAEL SUKALY, PHILLIP M. "Mike" FERRELL, ANESTOS "Naz" RODITES, and WILLIAM E. RUSIN, Defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by: DONALD J. LEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION

 Before the Court is Defendant John F. "Duffy" Conley's motion to suppress his statement at the Main Hotel on October 30, 1989. (Document No. 377, in part).

  FINDINGS OF FACTS

 The Encounter at the Windgap Facility

 1. During the month of October, 1989, Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agent John Donnelly ("S.A. Donnelly") was in the midst of an investigation into organized crime and gambling devices.

 2. Although there was an ongoing, independent federal investigation of John F. "Duffy" Conley ("Conley"), S.A. Donnelly was not aware of it. Conley was not a target of S.A. Donnelly's investigation.

 3. S.A. Donnelly sought out Conley, whose name had surfaced in the records of the Arnold Coin Company during S.A. Donnelly's investigation, in order to secure Conley's cooperation in his investigation.

 4. In the middle of October, 1989, S.A. Donnelly arrived unannounced at Conley's office at the Windgap Avenue facility of Duffy's Vending, Conley's company.

 5. S.A. Donnelly introduced himself to Conley as an FBI agent and indicated that he wanted Conley to give him information regarding video poker machine operations.

 6. Conley, who had legal problems and concerns regarding his own video poker machine operations, was alarmed by the presence of an FBI agent. Conley asked whether the conversation would be off the record.

 7. S.A. Donnelly told Conley that he was willing to speak off the record and Conley was not the target of the investigation. Both S.A. Donnelly and Conley understood that nothing said would be used against Conley.

 8. Although never getting specific about what could be done for Conley, S.A. Donnelly intimated that he was in a position to help Conley. S.A. Donnelly contemplated assisting Conley if Conley agreed to enter into a relationship as a cooperating witness.

 9. S.A. Donnelly directed Conley's attention to poker machine gambling. He inquired into Conley's relationships with other vending companies in western Pennsylvania. He also inquired into Conley's knowledge of the activities of Ninny Lagatutta, Sonny Ciancutti and the Arnold Coin Company.

 10. Conley stated that he knew Ninny Lagatutta was in the vending business. Conley and S.A. Donnelly discussed a video poker machine location in the Brookline section of Pittsburgh that was owned by Lagatutta. Conley did not tell S.A. Donnelly of any illegal activities by any person or company in response to S.A. Donnelly's inquiries.

 11. S.A. Donnelly asked Conley if he was willing to discover information about the aforementioned persons and company. S.A. Donnelly primarily focused his attention on Ninny Lagatutta.

 12. Conley was non-committal, neither agreeing or refusing to seek the requested information on behalf on S.A. Donnelly.

 13. S.A. Donnelly and Conley agreed to get in touch in the future, and S.A. Donnelly gave his card to Conley.

 14. Neither S.A. Donnelly nor Conley took notes during, or otherwise recorded, the encounter at Windgap.

 15. S.A. Donnelly maintained a friendly, non-adversarial demeanor throughout the encounter at Windgap.

 16. The encounter, which lasted between five and twenty minutes, ended amicably.

 The Encounters at the Main Hotel

 17. On October 30, 1989 S.A. Donnelly and Special Agent Patricia Moriarity went to the Main Hotel in Carnegie, Pennsylvania in a limited undercover capacity.

 18. Although S.A. Donnelly had information that the Main Hotel was a location where Conley maintained video poker machines, he did not "know positively" that this information was accurate. *fn1"

 19. S.A. Donnelly was still conducting his independent investigation, in which Conley was not a target.

 20. S.A. Donnelly and S.A. Moriarity were sitting at the bar having coffee when Conley arrived. Conley greeted the bartender and began emptying money out of a pinball machine.

 21. Conley approached the bar to speak with the bartender regarding the division of the money taken from the machines. Conley recognized S.A. Donnelly. S.A. Donnelly initiated a conversation with Conley, saying hello and calling him as "John" or "Duffy." *fn2"

 22. S.A. Donnelly reintroduced himself, reminding Conley that he was the FBI agent who had visited him. Conley indicated that he remembered him. S.A. Donnelly also introduced Patricia Moriarity as an FBI agent.

 23. S.A. Donnelly asked Conley whether the pinball machines on the premises were Conley's machines and whether the video poker machines on the premises were Conley's machines. Conley answered that the machines were his machines.

 24. S.A. Donnelly then invited Conley to sit down, have some coffee and talk. Conley replied that he was late for an errand and had to leave, but he was willing to return and talk.

 25. S.A. Donnelly and S.A. Moriarity escorted Conley outside, and Conley left on his errand. The agents went to their car to wait and see if Conley would return.

 26. The initial encounter at the Main Hotel lasted approximately five minutes.

 27. Between fifteen and thirty minutes passed, but Conley in fact returned to talk to S.A. Donnelly. S.A. Donnelly, S.A. Moriarity and Conley reconvened in the bar of the Main Hotel.

 28. S.A. Donnelly did not inform Conley whether they were speaking on the record or off the record.

 29. S.A. Donnelly did not inform Conley whether Conley's statements would be used against him.

 30. S.A. Donnelly did not inform Conley of his Miranda rights.

 31. After Conley mentioned that he had ongoing legal problems implicating his association with the Pennsylvania Association of Video Operators ("PAVO"), S.A. Donnelly informed Conley that Conley was under no obligation to speak with him and informed Conley that the agents "did not want to hear anything about that, about his legal problems at all." (N.T. July 8, 1992, at 8).

 32. S.A. Donnelly stated that he had observed patrons of the Main Hotel receiving pay-offs from the bartender. Conley replied that such a scenario was entirely possible.

 33. S.A. Donnelly and Conley discussed PAVO.

 34. When S.A. Donnelly opined that Conley was in violation of federal law, Conley inquired as to what federal law he was violating. S.A. Donnelly cited the Illegal Gambling Business statute, and Conley expressed ignorance of the provisions of that statute. S.A. Donnelly then told Conley that he should ask his counsel about the statute and asked Conley who represented him. At that point, Conley informed S.A. Donnelly that his counsel was William Difenderfer. *fn3"

 35. S.A. Donnelly never told Conley that he had a right to consult counsel during the encounter. S.A. Donnelly never told Conley that he should discuss his conduct with counsel before making any incriminating statements.

 36. S.A. Donnelly and Conley discussed Conley's recent arrest on state gambling charges and the preliminary hearing scheduled for November 3, 1989.

 37. In response to a question regarding his conduct being illegal under state and federal law, Conley stated that he had no intention of leaving the video poker machine business. Conley stated that poker machine locations and his employees were dependent upon the business, and he had no intention of laying-off employees.

 38. S.A. Donnelly broached the subject of the Arnold Coin Company, asking Conley if he had found any information. Conley admitted that he had done business with the company through an informal partnership, but Arnold Coin Co. sent a letter stating that it did not want to continue the relationship.

 39. S.A. Donnelly asked if Conley had found out what locations Ninny Lagatutta had. Conley stated S.A. Donnelly probably knew as well as he did, because Conley's only way of knowing was his own involvement with video poker machines in town. Conley further stated that he knew Ninny Lagatutta and spoke with him about machines, but Conley did not have information about Ninny Lagatutta being involved in anything else.

 40. S.A. Donnelly urged Conley to find out more about Ninny Lagatutta. Conley stated that if he heard anything more, he would let S.A. Donnelly know.

 41. S.A. Donnelly asked Conley if he had any information on Sonny Ciancutti and the New Kensington area.

 42. S.A. Donnelly asked if Sonny Ciancutti or Ninny Lagatutta had ever approached Conley seeking "tribute" or trying to "muscle" him. Conley stated that he had never been approached by any organized crime figure. He further stated a belief that the federal government had declared poker machines illegal because organized crime was mistakenly believed to have infiltrated the video poker machine business.

 43. The encounter ended amicably, with Conley acknowledging that he had S.A. Donnelly's telephone number in the event that he had more information.

 44. The second encounter at the Main Hotel lasted twenty to thirty minutes.

 45. Neither S.A. Donnelly nor Conley took notes during, or otherwise recorded, the encounters at the Main Hotel.

 46. S.A. Donnelly maintained a friendly demeanor throughout both encounters with Conley at the Main Hotel.

 47. S.A. Moriarity observed, but did not participate in, the conversations between S.A. Donnelly and Conley during the second encounter at the Main Hotel.

 48. At the conclusion of the second encounter, S.A. Donnelly returned to his office in Pittsburgh and wrote out a draft FD-302, which was subsequently typed.

 49. S.A. Donnelly did not believe that the encounter at the Main Hotel was off the record.

 50. Conley believed that the encounter at the Main Hotel was off the record. Conley would not have engaged S.A. Donnelly in this conversation had Conley believed that it was on the record.

 51. Conley's belief that the encounter at the Main Hotel was off the record was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

 52. On October 30, 1989, Conley was around twenty-nine or thirty years old.

 53. Conley is neither uneducated nor unintelligent.

 DISCUSSION

 Statements not obtained in violation of a person's Miranda rights or right to counsel are nonetheless subject to suppression as violative of due process if the statements are "coerced" or "involuntary." Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1253-54, 113 L. Ed. 2d 302 (1991); Lego v Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 483, 30 L. Ed. 2d 618, 92 S. Ct. 619 (1972). A statement is coerced or involuntary if the behavior of "law enforcement officials was such as to overcome the will to resist and bring about a confession not freely self-determined." Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544, 5 L. Ed. 2d 760, 81 S. Ct. 735 (1960). Coercive police activity is a necessary predicate to finding a confession involuntary. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167, 93 L. Ed. 2d 473, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986). There must be some causal connection between the police conduct and the confession. Id. at 164, n.1. It is the government's burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged statements are voluntary. Lego, 404 U.S. at 483. The ultimate issue of voluntariness, however, is a question of law for the Court. Fulminante, 499 U.S. at , 111 S. Ct. at 1252.

 The Court must examine the totality of the circumstances in order to determine if a confession was coerced or involuntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 93 S. Ct. 2041 (1973). In determining whether the defendant's will was overborne in a particular case, a court must assess the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the interrogation. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 266. For example, a court should look to the following:

 

the youth of the accused; his lack of education or low intelligence; the lack of any advice to the accused of his Constitutional rights; the length of the detention; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment such as deprivation of food or sleep.

 Id. at 226. It is well established that an involuntary confession may result from psychological, as well as physical, coercion. Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 603 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986).

 A promise by a law-enforcement officer may qualify, under the circumstances, as coercion. See Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 50 L. Ed. 2d 194, 97 S. Ct. 202 (1976); Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States, 371 U.S. 341, 347-48, 9 L. Ed. 2d 357, 83 S. Ct. 448, rehearing denied, 372 U.S. 950, 9 L. Ed. 2d 975, 83 S. Ct. 931 (1963); Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 42 L. Ed. 568, 18 S. Ct. 183 (1897); United States v. Fraction, 795 F.2d 12, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Pinto, 671 F. Supp. 41, 59-60 (D. Maine 1987). In particular, where an express or implied promise not to use statements against, or not to prosecute, a declarant is made, see Fraction, 795 F.2d at 14-15, is not contingent or qualified, see Shotwell Mfg. Co., 371 U.S. at 348-52; United States v. Fountain, 776 F.2d 878, 884 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Nussen, 531 F.2d 15, 20-21 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 839, 50 L. Ed. 2d 107, 97 S. Ct. 112 (1976), and in fact induces the statement, see Fraction, 795 F.2d at 15; Fountain, 776 F.2d at 885-86, the promise is of such a nature that it can easily be found to have overcome a person's resistance to giving a statement to authorities. Shotwell Mfg. Co., 371 U.S. at 347-48; United States v. Powe, 192 U.S. App. D.C. 224, 591 F.2d 833, 845 & n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409, 412 (4th Cir. 1968); Pinto, 671 F. Supp. at 56-58; see also Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524, 527 (11th Cir. 1982) ("We note that, under the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment, evidence of guilt induced by a government promise of immunity is 'coerced' evidence and may not be used against the accused") (dictum).

 A promise that statements made will not be used against the declarant purports to remove the specter of proving one's own guilt by making a statement. Such a promise is a truly powerful one, going to the heart of a declarant's reservations about giving a statement. *fn4" Cf. Holland v. McGinnis, 963 F.2d 1044, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992) (Police trickery in form of exaggerating the strength of evidence against a defendant "did not interject the type of extrinsic consideration that would overcome [the defendant's] will by distorting an otherwise rational choice of whether to confess or remain silent"), cert. denied, 122 L. Ed. 2d 360, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 1053 (1993).

 Promises to inform the prosecutor of cooperation or to provide mental treatment are distinguishable from promises not to use statements because the former promises are addressed to collateral problems. Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 610 (3d Cir. 1986) ("While promises of help with collateral problems have been found, in combination with other coercive factors, to render confessions involuntary, . . . in general, such promises are less coercive to the accused than promises directly related to the criminal proceedings at hand") (citations omitted); see also Streetman v. Lynaugh, 812 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1987) ("Certain promises, if not kept, are so attractive that they render a resulting confession involuntary. . . . A promise of immediate release or that any statement will not be used against the accused is such a promise") (citations omitted); United States v. Shears, 762 F.2d 397, 402 & nn. 4-5; State v. Waugh, 238 Kan. 537, 712 P.2d 1243 (1986); State v. Erks, 214 Neb. 302, 333 N.W.2d 776 (1983); State v. Rook, 304 N.C. 201, 283 S.E.2d 732 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1038, 72 L. Ed. 2d 155, 102 S. Ct. 1741 (1982). *fn5"

 Once coercion infects the dynamic of the investigative process, the process is tainted until the circumstances have evolved in such a manner as to dissipate or attenuate the taint of the coercion. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 310, 84 L. Ed. 2d 222, 105 S. Ct. 1285 (1985); Westover v. United States, 382 U.S. 969, 15 L. Ed. 2d 463, 86 S. Ct. 561 (1966); United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1991); Quartararo v. Mantello, 715 F. Supp. 449, 460-66 (E.D.N.Y.)(taint of promises of lenience not dissipated), aff'd, 888 F.2d 126 (2nd Cir. 1989);. As the Elstad Court indicated regarding successive confessions:

 

When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the second confession. See Westover v. United States, decided together with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S., at 436, 86 S. Ct., at 1602; Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707, 87 S. Ct. 1338, 18 L. Ed. 2d 423 (1967).

 Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310. In analyzing dissipation of the taint of coercion, the inquiry is fundamentally the same as the voluntariness inquiry: Under the circumstances, was the challenged statement an "act of free will?" Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 486, 9 L. Ed. 2d 441, 83 S. Ct. 407 (1963).

 Turning to the totality of the circumstances in this case, the Court concludes that Conley's statements at the Main Hotel on October 30, 1989 were involuntary, coerced statements. Although the "typical" indicators of coercion are not present in this case, S.A. Donnelly's promise to speak off the record and his friendly manner combined to overcome Conley's reticence about making statements to the FBI.

 It is undisputed that Conley was not in custody during any of his encounters with S.A. Donnelly. He suffered no physical punishment whatsoever, and none was threatened. The combined duration of his two encounters with S.A. Donnelly at the Main Hotel was approximately one-half of an hour. Conley is a man in his early thirties who is neither unintelligent nor uneducated. Although he was never advised of his right to remain silent, Conley nonetheless was aware of -- and asserted -- that right.

 At the outset of the initial meeting at the Windgap, Conley asked if what he said was off the record. S.A. Donnelly assured Conley that he was willing to speak of the record and, furthermore, that Conley was not the target of the investigation. Both S.A. Donnelly and Conley understood that nothing said would be used against Conley.

 The promise was express and direct as to being off the record, and it clearly implied that nothing Conley said would be used against him. This promise went to the heart of Conley's manifest reservations about speaking to the FBI about matters that could easily incriminate him. The promise was unqualified and not contingent upon cooperation or truthfulness; it was not limited to specific topics. Aware of his right to remain silent, Conley was induced by this promise to forego standing on his rights and to entertain S.A. Donnelly's requests for information. Conley's will to stand on his right to remain silent was overcome by S.A. Donnelly's assurances.

 At no time during the encounter at Windgap did S.A. Donnelly state or do anything to dispel his and Conley's understanding that nothing Conley said would be used against him. Although S.A. Donnelly was apparently willing to enter into a more formal agreement with Conley if he deemed Conley cooperative, he did not mention such a formal agreement. S.A. Donnelly did not express that the potential use Conley's statements depended upon such a formal agreement or that further statements by Conley would be used against him because no formal agreement was reached.

 S.A. Donnelly remained friendly throughout the encounter at Windgap. He asked Conley to obtain further information. Although Conley was non-committal in this regard, S.A. Donnelly and Conley agreed to get in touch in the future, and S.A. Donnelly gave Conley his card containing his telephone number. Clearly, at this point, S.A. Donnelly had taken no action that would attenuate the force of his promise on Conley's will to stand on his rights, and, moreover, S.A. Donnelly and Conley contemplated further contacts in the course of S.A. Donnelly's investigation.

 At no time during the encounters at the Main Hotel did S.A. Donnelly or S.A. Moriarity take any action to attenuate the force of S.A. Donnelly's previous promise. S.A. Donnelly, using a friendly manner, reminding Conley of who he was, and implicitly referencing their previous encounter, initiated the first encounter at the Main Hotel. S.A. Donnelly asked Connelly about Conley's ownership of machines at the Main Hotel. Thereafter, S.A. Donnelly invited Conley to have coffee and to talk. During the first encounter at the Main Hotel, S.A. Donnelly did not manifest any change of heart as to their previous understanding, and took no action that would attenuate the effect of his previous promise.

 The second encounter at the Main Hotel occurred after Conley returned from his business errand. After Conley mentioned that he had ongoing legal problems regarding PAVO, S.A. Donnelly informed Conley that Conley was not obligated to speak with him, but he also assured Conley that the agents "did not want to hear anything about that, about his legal problems at all." S.A. Donnelly then asked Conley about the pay-offs that the Main Hotel bartender had made before Conley arrived, and a discussion of Conley's legal problems, including PAVO, ensued. It was in the course of this conversation that the subject of Conley's attorney arose. S.A. Donnelly stated that Conley's legal problems included being in violation of the Illegal Gambling Business statute, and S.A. Donnelly suggested that Conley should discuss the statute's provisions with his attorney. Having discussed Conley's legal problems, S.A. Donnelly turned the conversation to the subject of his investigation of organized crime and video poker machine gambling, covering the same subject matter as the discussion at Windgap.

 S.A. Donnelly's statement that Conley did not have to talk to him, in context, did not attenuate the force of his previous promise not to use Conley's statements against him. Because S.A. Donnelly's promise was not contingent upon cooperation and full disclosure, this statement did not in fact put Conley on notice that S.A. Donnelly no longer felt himself bound by his promise not to use Conley's statements against him. S.A. Donnelly's statement would not have put an objectively reasonable person on notice. To the contrary, according to S.A. Donnelly's direct testimony, this statement was coupled with a disclaimer of interest in Conley's legal problems. As S.A. Donnelly had assured Conley at Windgap, at the time he promised to speak off the record, that Conley was not a target in his investigation, this disclaimer of interest reinforced, rather than attenuated, the effect of S.A. Donnelly's promise on Conley's will to stand on his rights.

 S.A. Donnelly's advice to Conley about consulting his attorney regarding the provisions of the federal illegal gambling business statute was just that -- not an admonition to consult counsel before making potentially incriminating statements. S.A. Donnelly's advice came towards the end of their discussion of Conley's problems and before the discussion turned to organized crime and video poker machine gambling, rather than at the outset of the second encounter at the Main Hotel. It arose in a different context than the statement about Conley's lack of obligation to speak and the disclaimer of interest in Conley. Moreover, S.A. Donnelly's advice is not inconsistent with not using Conley's statements against him. There being no contention that S.A. Donnelly and Conley understood that Conley would not be prosecuted for his own activity, and given S.A. Donnelly's friendly demeanor throughout his dealings with Conley, a reasonable person could interpret S.A. Donnelly's statement as friendly advice to a potential informant.

 The Government also relies on the presence of S.A. Moriarity at the Main Hotel to distinguish the encounter at Windgap from the encounters at the Main Hotel. Had S.A. Moriarity controlled the conversation or even participated in it beyond her being introduced to Conley, her conduct might have had an attenuating effect. She did not. The Government has not shown that Conley was aware of any FBI practice to use two agents when an interview is for the record. Moreover, S.A. Donnelly included S.A. Moriarity in his disclaimer of interest in Conley.

 At Windgap, S.A. Donnelly made a promise to Conley that they could speak off the record. *fn6" The clear implication, and the understanding of both S.A. Donnelly and Conley, was that Conley's statements would not be used against him. This promise was unqualified and unconditional.

  S.A. Donnelly and Conley both contemplated the possibility of further contacts at the conclusion of the Windgap encounter. Thus, the passage of approximately two weeks did not operate to diminish the force of S.A. Donnelly's promise.

 At the Main Hotel, S.A. Donnelly never expressly stated that Conley was speaking for the record or that his statements could be used against him. The conduct of S.A. Donnelly and S.A. Moriarity, the content of the discussions at the Main Hotel and the circumstances surrounding them did not give notice that S.A. Donnelly's promise was no longer in force.

 Rather than militating in favor of a determination of voluntariness or being simply irrelevant under the circumstances, the absence of traditional indicia of coercion and S.A. Donnelly's friendly demeanor favor a determination of involuntariness. Had S.A. Donnelly arrested Conley or adopted an adversarial posture towards him, Conley would have had at least some objective reason not to rely on S.A. Donnelly's promise.

 As it was, in response to Conley's stated desire to be off the record, S.A. Donnelly made his promise. S.A. Donnelly's promise to Conley at Windgap was the cause of Conley's statements at the Main Hotel. The promise overcame Conley's will to stand upon his right not to incriminate himself at Windgap and continued to have that effect at the Main Hotel.

 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

 1. Conley's statements at the Main Hotel on October 30, 1989 were not voluntary.

 2. Conley's statements at the Main Hotel on October 30, 1989 must be suppressed.

 An appropriate order will be entered.

 ORDER OF COURT

 AND NOW this 3rd day of January, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant John F. "Duffy" Conley's motion to suppress his statement at the Main Hotel on October 30, 1989, (Document No. 377, in part), is GRANTED.

  Donald J. Lee

  United States District Judge


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