tugs on its strings or pressure on its buttons." Id. at 15.
In the matter at hand, Plaintiff has presented no evidence that Defendant asserted any control over the Sonora Bay Resort. Marshall Donat, general counsel for Defendant, testified in his deposition that Club Med Sales is the non-exclusive retailer and exclusive wholesaler of vacation packages to Club Med Resorts. Deposition of Marshall Donat at 15. ("Donat Dep."). Club Med Sales is owned by Club Med Finance, N.V., which is incorporated in the Netherlands, which in turn is owned by Club Med Holding, B.V., which is incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles. Donat Dep. at 8.
Mr. Donat further testified that the Sonora Bay Resort is owned by Desarrollo Turistico Medeterranee de San Carlos, S.A., and operated by Operadora de Aldeas Vacationales, S.A., both of which are Mexican corporations. Id. at 21-22. According to Mr. Donat, Defendant Club Med Sales does not have any ownership interest in either the owner or operator of the Sonora Bay Resort. He testified that Club Med, Inc.,
does have an ownership interest in both the owner and operator of the Sonora Bay Resort,
but that Defendant Club Med Sales does not possess any such interest. Id. at 22, 83-84.
Plaintiff argues that the ownership interest by Club Med, Inc. in the owner and operator of the Sonora Bay Resort makes it possible for Defendant Club Med Sales to assert control over them. However, all of the evidence presented is directly to the contrary. Mr. Donat testified that Desarrollo Turistico Medeterranee de San Carlos, S.A. and Operadora de Aldeas Vacationales, S.A. operate separate and distinct from Defendant Club Med Sales, in that each keeps its own books and financial records; files its own tax returns; pays its own bills; maintains its own bank accounts; and hires and fires its own personnel, accountants, lawyers and consultants. Id. at 82-84. In short, Desarrollo Turistico Medeterranee de San Carlos, S.A. and Operadora de Aldeas Vacationales, S.A. are separate and distinct from Club Med Sales, and Club Med Sales does not in any way control their operations. Id. There is simply no evidence that the owner and operator of the Sonora Bay Resort were mere shams or controlled by Club Med Sales, as is required for Plaintiff to recover from it. Culbreth, 898 F.2d at 14.
Plaintiff next argues that while Mr. Donat testified that Desarrollo Turistico Medeterranee de San Carlos, S.A., and Operadora de Aldeas Vacationales, S.A. are separate and distinct entities from Defendant Club Med Sales, she is without sufficient information to determine the truth or falsity of this assertion and demands strict proof at trial. Plaintiff's Brief at 3. However, at this stage of the proceeding it is Plaintiff's burden to present "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P 56(e). In a motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff cannot merely deny Defendant's assertions or rely on the allegations contained in her pleadings, as she is attempting to do in this instance. Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2553. Plaintiff has failed to present any evidence that the separate status of Desarrollo Turistico Medeterranee de San Carlos, S.A., and Operadora de Aldeas Vacationales, S.A. were wholly ignored, or that Med Club Sales so controlled these corporations that their existences were mere shams. Culbreth, 898 F.2d at 14.
Plaintiff further contends that there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the intent or purpose of incorporating in different states and countries was to avoid liability for specific torts or a class of torts. However, Plaintiff has failed to come forth with any specific facts to support her claim that these entities were incorporated for any improper purpose or that such incorporations were mere shams. Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2553; Culbreth, 898 F.2d at 14; Stinson, 757 F. Supp. at 645.
Plaintiff's final contention is that, in addition to suing under a negligence theory, she also states claims for breach of contract and breach of warranties. However, after reviewing the Complaint, it does not appear that Plaintiff has stated claims under these theories. The only facts that could form the basis for such claims is that there was no air conditioning in the rooms, and the resort was overrun with children, when Plaintiff allegedly was informed that the rooms were air conditioned and children would not interfere with her vacation. Complaint at 2. Even if these facts could be construed as stating such claims, these claims would not meet the jurisdictional amount requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Based on the foregoing reasons, I shall enter the following Order:
AND NOW, this 16th day of September, 1993, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and all responses thereto, it is hereby ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED.
BY THE COURT:
Robert F. Kelly, J.