The opinion of the court was delivered by: BY THE COURT; J. CURTIS JOYNER
Presently before the Court is the motion of defendants Loius A. Iatarola and the Louis A. Iatarola Realty Appraisal Group, Ltd. ("Iatarola") for Judgment on the Pleadings and/or Summary Judgment based primarily on the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 122 L. Ed. 2d 525, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993).
Because our decision is based to some extent on the exhibits attached to the motion and plaintiffs' response, we will treat this as a motion for summary judgment. In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court must consider whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). This court is required to determine whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). In making this determination, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S. Ct. at 2512. While the movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of genuine issues of material fact, the nonmovant must then establish the existence of each element of its case. J.F. Feeser, Inc. v. Serv-A-Portion, Inc., 909 F.2d 1524, 1531 (3d Cir. 1990) citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986).
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
While there are numerous elements to this statute,
the only element in contention in the instant case is whether the Iatarola defendants participated, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association's ("FidFed") affairs.
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, 122 L. Ed. 2d 525, 113 S. Ct. 1163 (1993), the Supreme Court adopted the "operation or management test" in defining the words "conduct or participate," and held that in order to violate § 1962(c), the defendant "must have some part in directing" the enterprise's affairs. 113 S. Ct. at 1170. "In sum," the Court stated, "we hold that 'to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs,' § 1962(c), one must participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself." Id. at 1173.
Applying this test, this court finds that the Iatarola defendants did not participate in the operation or management of FidFed. In making this decision, we have attempted to apply the various guidelines scattered throughout the Reves decision.
Neither the Supreme Court nor the Eighth Circuit in the underlying Arthur Young & Co. v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310 (8th Cir. 1991) decision intimated that the degree to which the enterprise relied upon the defendant, that is, the importance of the defendant's role, could be considered in determining whether the defendant operated or managed the enterprise. Here, the gist of plaintiffs' argument in favor of 1962(c) liability is that because of the nature of the enterprise at issue here, a federal savings and loan institution, and the important role real estate appraisals play in that business, Iatarola's intentional preparation and submission of misleading appraisals so substantially influenced the decision making of FidFed's Board of Directors as to effectively operate or manage FidFed. We do not question that the appraisals were the keystone of the Board's decision to grant the various loan requests. However, the accountant's financial report in Reves was equally pivotal to all the financial decisions of the enterprise because Arthur Young portrayed the gasohol plant as being solvent whereas the reality was that the plant was not economically viable. Thus, we find that even where the wrongdoers provide misleading or fraudulent information which significantly influences a major decision of the enterprise, this still does not constitute "operation or management" of the enterprise in order for 1962(c) liability to attach.
Plaintiffs argue that this case differs from the Reves case in that the Iatarola defendants, unlike the accounting defendants in Reves, did not base their appraisals on information provided by the enterprise itself but rather engaged in independent review of the properties involved in the loans. However, we find no distinction between the cases. In Reves, Arthur Young knowingly prepared financial reports for 1981 and 1982 based on documents prepared by a convicted felon. Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1167; Arthur Young, 937 F.2d at 1317. In addition, Arthur Young ignored other critical evidence regarding who owned the gasohol plant at issue, when they owned it and other important factors effecting the valuation of the gasohol plant. Arthur Young, 937 F.2d at 1317. When presenting the financial report at the annual meeting, Arthur Young intentionally omitted its doubts about the accuracy of the report. Id. at 1318-19. Thus, the defendant in Reves was not merely rendering professional services which by chance were based on information provided by other wrongdoers. See Nolte v. IFC Leasing Corp., 994 F.2d 1311, 1993 WL 183996 (8th Cir. 1993)(attorneys who provided tax advice based solely on information provided by employees of enterprise found not liable under § 1962(c)); Lewicky v. Chou, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4127, 1993 WL 96114 (N.D. Ill. 1993)(accountant who gave tax advice based on information he knew to be inaccurate and failed to correct, still not liable under § 1962(C)). Arthur Young knowingly prepared misleading financial reports and knowingly presented an inaccurate picture of its clients' financial circumstances at the annual meetings and to the Board of Directors. See Reves, 113 S. Ct. at 1177 n. 5 (Souter, J., dissenting)(Arthur Young's valuation based on creative accounting rather that reliance on the ...