The opinion of the court was delivered by: BY THE COURT; J. WILLIAM DITTER, JR.
On May 5, 1993, I granted defendants' partial motion to dismiss and motion for a more definite statement. Because pursuant to those orders, plaintiff would be redrafting significant portions of his complaint, I ordered him to "clarify his allegations against the Township of Springfield" and to "state explicitly which defendants are responsible for which wrongful acts" as well. Plaintiff now moves for reconsideration of my order on six grounds, each of which I find unpersuasive.
Plaintiff argues that my dismissal of his complaint (with leave to amend) for failure "to state clearly and specifically what each defendant did and why those actions entitle [him] to relief" is inconsistent with the federal requirement of notice pleading and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Unit, 122 L. Ed. 2d 517, 113 S. Ct. 1160 (1993). The Fifth Circuit had adopted a "heightened pleading standard" in section 1983 cases which stated:
Id. at 1163, quoting Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1473 (5th Cir. 1985). In Leatherman, the Supreme Court rejected this standard. I did not require Ersek to re-draft his complaint to pre-empt any potential defenses, nor to plead with any special care because this is a section 1983 municipal liability suit. I merely told him to make his claims in a straightforward way because his complaint is rife with unsupportable generalizations.
In any event, I have not prejudiced Ersek in any way. I gave him leave to re-draft his entire complaint (with one exception, to be addressed below), so that he would plead not with "heightened" particularity but with intelligible particularity.
Next, Ersek contends I should not have granted defendants' motion for a more definite statement on the conspiracy, defamation, and false light charges, arguing that his allegations satisfied the federal pleading requirement that defendants be able to respond. I held, however, not that defendants could not respond, but that Ersek's conclusory allegation of conspiracy was contradicted by the rest of his complaint, which described the defendants acting without any shared plan whatsoever. (See opinion of May 5, 1993, at 12.) For this reason, I thought it generous that defendants only asked for a more definite statement and not for outright dismissal.
With regard to the defamation claim, Ersek charges so many defendants with "disseminating" information and "publicly and privately maintaining" Ersek's guilt that his claim cries out for re-drafting. Can a defendant who "privately maintains" an opinion be liable for defamation? Is Ersek serious in his assertion that one who is convinced and remains convinced that another is guilty of a crime but never says a word about it is liable for defamation?
Last, Ersek's false light claim is entirely unsupported by any fact in his 23-page complaint. (See opinion at 12-13.) I granted defendants' motion for a more definite statement of these claims so that Ersek could re-draft them to comport with his factual assertions. This is appropriate under any system of pleading.
3. The Other More Definite Statements
Ersek also contends that I should not have ordered clarifications sua sponte of the other counts of his complaint. To the extent those counts charge "all defendants" with things that Ersek's own factual assertions contradict, however, or charge (for example) that "the actions of defendants complained of by plaintiff" represented an official policy and practice of Springfield Township, (complaint P 57), my order was wholly appropriate. In modern litigation, a judge is not to be content to loll at the rail and count the days as they slip by. On the contrary, he is responsible not only for steering the litigation ship, but for ensuring that the voyage is as just, speedy, and inexpensive as possible.
Ersek also objects to my dismissal with prejudice of count II, which he asserts charged the defendants with violating Ersek's right to substantive due process by arbitrarily and unreasonably terminating his employment with the Springfield Country Club. Ersek contends I should not have decided at this stage that defendants' decision was arbitrary and unreasonable. I did not, however, dismiss Ersek's claim for that reason, and since Ersek apparently believes I did, I will state my holding again. I said that Ersek's own presentation of the facts contradicted his conclusory assertion that his employment was terminated. (See opinion of May 5, 1993, at 4.) Ersek's complaint had stated that in September, 1991, he was advised that his employment contract, which was scheduled to expire in December, 1991, would be "terminated" as of that date (complaint PP 42-43.) Thereafter, the Springfield Board of Commissioners "proposed renewing plaintiff's contract of employment for an additional year" at approximately half-salary. (Id. P 43.) What I held was that Ersek had failed to state a claim for arbitrary and unreasonable termination because he nowhere alleged he had been terminated, actually or constructively. All Ersek alleges is that he was made an offer he considered unattractive, to which he responded by ...