The opinion of the court was delivered by: BARRON P. MCCUNE
BARRON P. McCUNE, Senior District Judge
We consider a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Harleysville Life Insurance Company ("Harleysville"). Plaintiff Nancy Mardell alleges that she was terminated from her position as Regional Director of Life Insurance for Harleysville in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C.S. § 621, et seq., and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000(e), et seq. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.S. § 1331. For the reasons discussed below, the motion for summary judgment will be granted.
Nancy Mardell applied for the position of Life Manager at Harleysville in December 1987.
Ms. Mardell submitted a resume and completed a job application. Contained on the job application Ms. Mardell signed is the following language:
"The information provided on this employment application is correct and complete to the best of my knowledge. I realize that falsification and/or incomplete information may jeopardize my employment now or in the future."
Both Glyn D. Mangum, then vice-president of sales, and William J. Forloine, then vice-president of marketing, interviewed Ms. Mardell. Mr. Forloine communicated to Mr. Mangum his impressions of Ms. Mardell. After considering Ms. Mardell's resume, job application and personal interview and Mr. Forloine's remarks, Mr. Mangum made the decision to hire Ms. Mardell. Ms. Mardell started work for Harleysville in February 1988.
Mr. Forloine, who became Ms. Mardell's direct supervisor when he became senior vice-president of marketing and sales, made the decision to terminate Ms. Mardell in February 1990 for stated reasons of poor performance. The within wrongful discharge action was filed September 6, 1991.
During the course of discovery, Harleysville learned for the first time that Ms. Mardell had misrepresented herself on her resume and job application. Harleysville has submitted the affidavits of Messrs. Mangum and Forloine which state that had they known of the alleged misrepresentations prior to hiring Ms. Mardell, they would not have hired her and had the alleged misrepresentations become disclosed during Ms. Mardell's employment with Harleysville, she would have been discharged immediately. According to Harleysville, Ms. Mardell misrepresented on her resume and job application that she had a college degree when she applied for the position at Harleysville and had had professional experience in various positions for which she had been paid.
When there is no issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment is proper. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986). The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Id. All inferences from the underlying facts are to be viewed in favor of the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202, 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986). Once the moving party has sustained his burden of proof, "the opposing party must introduce specific evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Williams v. West Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989) (citation omitted).
The issue we address is whether after-acquired evidence of Plaintiff's resume and application fraud precludes Plaintiff from seeking relief under Title VII and the ADEA. The appellate courts are split on the issue and it has ...