to dismiss, Springfield submitted an affidavit by its general partner in which he stated that the hotel had no sales representatives in Pennsylvania, did not ship goods into the state, had no place of business in the state and did not advertise or solicit business in Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs countered with the deposition testimony of Springfield's general manager who stated that the franchiser of the hotel, Hilton Inns, Inc. ("Hilton"), handled bookings for Springfield through its Philadelphia and Pittsburgh offices and that Springfield was listed in a nationally distributed "Hotel-Motel Red Book". In addition, plaintiffs also submitted an affidavit stating that their secretary used this Red Book to call Springfield and make their reservations.
In essence, plaintiffs based their general jurisdiction argument upon the claim that Hilton, as Springfield's franchiser, acted as Springfield's business agent. This court disagreed. This court also noted that Springfield did little business outside the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area therefore, the plaintiffs did not meet the systematic and continuous conduct of business in Pennsylvania requirement of 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301.
In the present matter, plaintiff's evidence which purportedly shows that Summit conducted business in Pennsylvania is less convincing then that presented in Wright. For example, in Wright, plaintiffs submitted evidence that their secretary actually relied upon a national directory to make their hotel reservations. Here, plaintiff submitted evidence of the existence of a national directory but submitted no evidence that the travel agent relied upon this directory to make the church group's reservation in Lumberton. Also, in Wright, plaintiff submitted evidence that Hilton had two Pennsylvania offices to handle reservations for Pennsylvania residents. Here, plaintiff has not submitted any evidence that Ramada has offices in Pennsylvania to assist Pennsylvanians. If the evidence submitted in Wright did not convince this court that it could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the nonresident hotel franchisee defendant then my exercise of personal jurisdiction over Summit also would be improper.
As for the question of advertising and jurisdiction, this court's more recent holding in Garofalo v. Praiss, D.D.S., 1990 WL 97800 (E.D. 1990) indicates that a nonresident defendant's advertising does not, by itself, satisfy the systematic and continuous conduct of business requirement of § 5301. This court, in Garofalo, clearly states that "'an advertisement seeking business in [a non-forum state], even had it been in an exclusively Pennsylvania directory would not, by itself, constitute 'continuous and substantial' business activity.'" Garofalo, 1990 WL at 2; quoting Reliance Steel Products Co. v. Watson, Ess, Marshall, & Enggas, 675 F.2d 587, 589 (3d Cir. 1982).
This court noted that even if the defendant's television appearances were primarily for advertisement purposes they did not establish that he was targeting the Pennsylvania market nor did they render it foreseeable to him that he could be haled into this court. Garofalo, 1990 WL at 2.
Plaintiff essentially presented no evidence that Summit conducted any business in Pennsylvania, rather, she created an agency argument in order to obtain jurisdiction over Summit based upon Ramada's activities in Pennsylvania. Apparently, she relies upon the language of § 5322(a) which states that "[a] tribunal of this Commonwealth may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person . . . who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action or other matter arising from such person: (1) Transacting any business in this Commonwealth. . . ." (emphasis added).
As support for this agency argument, plaintiff relies upon the Fourth Circuit case of Crinkley v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 844 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1988) and this court's decision in Drummond v. Hilton Hotel Corp., 501 F. Supp. 29 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The issue in both of these cases is whether a national hotel franchisor could be held liable on an agency theory where a hotel guest of a franchisee hotel is injured.
If plaintiff in our case were arguing that Ramada should be held liable under an agency theory for the drowning of Allegra Mack at the franchisee Ramada Inn of Lumberton than these cases certainly would support that argument. The issue here, however, is whether the court may assert jurisdiction over Lowe, Johnson and Summit when Ramada concedes that jurisdiction over it is proper. If I accept plaintiff's agency argument then anytime the franchisee of a national franchise is sued, jurisdiction may lie anywhere that jurisdiction over the franchisor itself would lie. This does not comport with the requirements of due process and the minimum contacts test as articulated in World-wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S. Ct. 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980); Hanson, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945).
Because plaintiff is unable to show that Summit systematically and continuously conducts busienss in Pennsylvania, this court may not exercise general personal jurisdiction over Summit.
2. Lowe and Johnson - the individual defendants and general jurisdiction
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence to suggest that Lowe or Johnson were served in Pennsylvania, resided in Pennsylvania at the time this cause of action began or consented to suit here. 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5301(a)(1). In fact, the pleadings and all the evidence presented by plaintiff indicates that Lowe and Johnson are not Pennsylvania residents, were not Pennsylvania residents at the time this lawsuit began did not consent to suit here.
Moreover, in order to establish personal jurisdiction over Lowe and Johnson, as individuals, for doing business in Pennsylvania plaintiff must show not only that they did business in this state as set forth in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5322 but also that the business they did was done by them for themselves and "not for or on behalf of the corporation." Bucks County Playhouse, 577 F. Supp. at 1210; quoting Techno v. Dahl Assoc., Inc., 521 F. Supp. 1036 (W.D. Pa. 1981). Plaintiff has not met either of these requirements. Therefore, this court does not have general personal jurisdiction over Lowe and Johnson.
3. Specific jurisdiction
In order to determine whether specific personal jurisdiction exists, I must determine whether Fields' claim is "'related to or arises out of the defendant's contacts with the forum.'" Mellon Bank, 960 F.2d at 1221; quoting Dollar Sav. Bank v. First Sec. Bank, 746 F.2d 208, 211 (3d Cir. 1984). The key to this inquiry is whether the "minimum contacts" test first articulated in International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945), is met. The purpose of this test is to prevent parties from being subject to "the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful 'contacts, ties, or relations.'" Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2181, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985); quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 319, 66 S. Ct. at 160. Thus, where, as here, a court seeks to assert specific personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant due process considerations require that the defendants have "'purposefully directed'" their conduct towards residents of the forum state and that the litigation itself arises from the alleged injuries which were caused by or related to these activities in the forum state. Burger King, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2182 85 L. Ed. 2d 528; Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774, 104 S. Ct. 1473, 1478, 79 L. Ed. 2d 790 (1984); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, 104 S. Ct. 1868, 1872, 80 L. Ed. 2d 404 (1984).
In order to comply with the requirements of due process, I may not exercise personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendants unless the minimum contacts between the defendants and Pennsylvania are such that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice are not offended." Gavigan v. Walt Disney World Co., 630 F. Supp. 148, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985). This rule exists to keep defendants from having to bear the burden of litigating in distant and inconvenient forums and to prevent states and their courts from overstepping the boundaries imposed upon them as "coequal sovereigns in a federal system." World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286, 100 S. Ct. at 559, 62 L. Ed. 2d 490 (1980).
Defendants' contacts with this state fail to meet these minimum contacts standards. There is no evidence which indicates that these defendants purposefully directed their conduct or activities at any Pennsylvania residents. Additionally, there is no evidence that these defendants have ever been to Pennsylvania, telephoned anyone in Pennsylvania, mailed anything to anyone in Pennsylvania or had any other contact with Pennsylvania.
Plaintiff has not put forth evidence to support a finding that this court properly may exercise either general or specific personal jurisdiction over Lowe, Summit or Johnsonn. Accordingly, an order follows which dismisses them from this case.
AND NOW, this day of, 1993, after considering defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for lack of personal jurisdiction, plaintiff's response and the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, and for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, it is ordered that the motion to dismiss of defendants R. Wayne Lowe, Bartlett Johnson and Summit Hotel Management Co. is granted. Plaintiff's complaint against defendants, R. Wayne Lowe, Summit Hotel Management Co. and Bartlett Johnson is dismissed with prejudice.
ANITA B. BRODY, J.