only that teachers are told of proposed or tentative rosters at the end of a school year, no mention is made of seniority playing a role in the process. See Contract Article T-II, §§ 4a-b. Plaintiff could not provide any evidence of a teacher who was consulted with respect to her preferred roster for that school year. See Plaintiff's Deposition pp. 157-58. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not file a grievance as was her right if she felt that her contractual rights were being aggrieved. See Plaintiff's Deposition pp. 159-60. There is no evidence that Plaintiff was treated differently than others who were similarly situated. There is also no evidence that this action was taken based upon Plaintiff's gender or race.
In cause of action (16), Plaintiff alleges that Hoban notified Plaintiff that he would being using her classroom for registration, despite other available rooms. Other space was subsequently used as a result of Plaintiff notifying Hoban of the problem. See Complaint at P 32. Traditionally, at the beginning of the school year, registration for new students is conducted in a room on the first floor close to the main office. See Hoban's Affidavit P 9. During the 1990-91 school year, Plaintiff had one of the rooms on the first floor close to the main office. See Plaintiff's Deposition p. 168. Once Hoban knew its use would be inconvenient to the Plaintiff, he switched registration to a different room. See Hoban's Affidavit P 9; Plaintiff's Deposition pp. 167-68. Furthermore, Plaintiff admitted that she was not teaching a lesson that day and the students were following a shortened schedule. See Plaintiff's Deposition pp. 168-69. There is no evidence that this action was taken based upon Plaintiff's gender or race.
In cause of action (17), Plaintiff alleges Hoban caused Plaintiff's classes to be oversized and once the excess students were removed Plaintiff was left with predominately male classes. See Complaint at P 33. Plaintiff admitted that her classes were leveled before October 1990 (as provided for in her contract) and that other teachers in her department had oversized classes. See Plaintiff's Deposition pp. 172-73. Indeed, that academic year, 125 classes were oversized in all academic subjects involving black, white, male and female teachers. See Hoban Affidavit P 10 and Defendants' Exh. 7 (listing oversized classes and race/sex of teacher as of September 27, 1990). There is no evidence that Plaintiff was treated differently than others who were similarly situated. There is also no evidence that this action was taken based upon Plaintiff's gender or race.
In cause of action (18), Plaintiff alleges that Hoban accused Plaintiff of improperly allowing a student to attend classes, when the student should have been excluded from school for an incomplete measles immunization. See Complaint at P 34. During the 1990-91 school year there was an outbreak of measles of such serious nature that as of March 4, 1991, students without proof of immunization were excluded from school. See Hoban Affidavit P 10 and Defendants' Exh. 8 (notices sent to parents). The number of excluded students as of March 6, 1991 totaled 953. See Defendants' Exh. 10. Thirty-three out of the 84 advisors received the same form memorandum as Plaintiff. See Defendants' Exh. 11. Again, there is no evidence that Plaintiff was treated differently than others similarly situated. There is also no evidence that this action was taken based upon Plaintiff's gender or race.
In all of the above described incidents, Plaintiff has failed to establish any genuine issue that the actions were taken based upon her gender or race. Indeed, the evidence demonstrates Plaintiff was treated the same as others who were similarly situated.
Based upon the foregoing discussion, none of the Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against any the defendants pose any genuine issue of material fact and therefore must be dismissed.
3. Plaintiff's PHRA claims.
This court also will dismiss Plaintiff's supplemental state law claims arising under the PHRA. Plaintiff brought two PHRC claims against the School District of Philadelphia. One claim was filed September 1, 1987 and the second filed March 2, 1988. The first claim referred to allegations (1) and (2) stated in her complaint at PP 13-15. The second claim stated that she was subjected to retaliatory discrimination for filing her first complaint and allegation (4) listed in her complaint at PP 17-19. On November 30, 1988, Plaintiff was provided with the appropriate notice by the PHRC that Plaintiff could bring an action in the court of common pleas if she so chose with regard to her September 1, 1987 complaint. The Pennsylvania courts have determined that a two-year statute of limitations is applicable, and a plaintiff must file her complaint within two years of receiving her right to institute a court action. See Raleigh v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 379 Pa. Super. 606, 550 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa.Super. 1988), appeal denied 522 Pa. 613 (1989). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims (1) and (2) must be dismissed with prejudice as being time-barred since Plaintiff did not file suit within two years of her notice of her right to sue.
Neither side has presented evidence that the PHRC provided Plaintiff with appropriate notice of her right to institute a court action regarding her March 2, 1988 complaint. If notification was sent, the Plaintiff's claim would be time barred. This court, however, does not need to reach such a finding regarding allegation (4). As this court has dismissed all claims over which this court has original jurisdiction, this court will not exercise its discretion to decide this supplemental state law claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
Since the filing of her March 2, 1988 complaint, Plaintiff has not filed any complaint regarding alleged discrimination. See Plaintiff's Deposition p. 134. Pennsylvania courts have established that "an aggrieved employee is not at liberty to commence a civil action grounded on a violation of the PHRA without first presenting her claim to the PHRC." James v. International Business Machines Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 (E.D.Pa. 1990) (Ditter, J.) (citing Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, 522 Pa. 86, 559 A.2d 917, 921 (Pa. 1989). Plaintiff's failure to file a complaint with the PHRC regarding her alleged sex and race discrimination claims (5) through (18) [complaint PP 20-34] precludes any court action on these matters. Therefore, all Plaintiff's PHRC claims must be dismissed.
This court, therefore, dismisses all Plaintiff's federal civil rights claims and her supplemental PHRA claims.
BY THE COURT:
MARVIN KATZ, J.
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 812 F. Supp. 525.
AND NOW, this 20th day of January, 1993, it is hereby ORDERED that the above-captioned case is removed from civil suspense.
BY THE COURT:
MARVIN KATZ, J.
AND NOW, this 20th day of January, 1993, upon consideration of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, it is hereby ORDERED that judgment be entered in favor of the Defendants Board of Education of the City of Philadelphia, Constance Clayton, Loretta Scuderi, and Francis J. Hoban and against Plaintiff Evelyn L. Long for the reasons stated in this court's memorandum of the same date, except as to Plaintiff's state law claim regarding allegation (4) [Complaint PP 17-19], which is dismissed without prejudice.
BY THE COURT:
MARVIN KATZ, J.