business contacts the Court found to exist in Perkins.") (emphasis supplied).
The defendant has cited several cases in support of its theory that the plaintiffs have failed to show "continuous and substantial" forum activities. Upon a thorough review of those cases, however, the court finds them distinguishable. The plaintiff has cited Gulentz v. Fosdick, 320 Pa. Super. 38, 466 A.2d 1049 (Pa. Super. 1983), as "on all fours" with the present case. There, the Pennsylvania Superior Court found jurisdiction over the defendant trucking company who was found to have "continuous and substantial" contacts with the Commonwealth as part of its "general business." Id. at 1051. The court stated that, "the issue to be decided on this appeal is whether the activities of [the defendant corporation] in Pennsylvania were sufficient to give our courts in personam jurisdiction over Schanno Transportation Inc." Id. at 1051-52. In so doing, it noted that the appellants in Gulentz did not appeal the order of the lower court sustaining the jurisdictional challenges to the individual truckers who drove for Schanno. Thus, the issue of whether the Gulentz court had jurisdiction over the individual truckers was never addressed, which leaves Gulentz readily distinguishable. Moreover, the fact that 3.7% of Schanno's business (more than $ 735,000.00 revenue in gross receipts from only five of several pickup/delivery stops presented into evidence) was conducted in Pennsylvania also supported the court's finding of jurisdiction.
The plaintiff contends that Morrison is a "direct beneficiary" of the roads of Pennsylvania and, therefore, is subject to personal jurisdiction in the state. He contends that Morrison traveled over 106,000 miles through Pennsylvania from 1989 through 1992 and, because he is paid by the mile and must purchase gasoline for the truck (which his employer reimburses) he has maintained sufficient contacts with the Commonwealth to establish jurisdiction. Moreover, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant was entitled to police protection while traveling Pennsylvania's highways.
However, the plaintiff's argument misses the point. Here, all that has been established is that Morrison's job required him to frequently drive through Pennsylvania. Such a broad reading of the due process limitation on personal jurisdiction would then make every driver traveling on another state's highways subject to that state's jurisdiction, regardless of where the cause of action arose. If personal jurisdiction could be established by the mere act of traversing another state's highways, the underlying concerns of due process would be defeated, namely, that "it is reasonable and fair to require [a defendant] to conduct [its] defense in that state." Time Share Vacation Club, 735 F.2d at 63; see also Federal Ins. Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 886 F.2d 654 (4th Cir. 1989)(in determining that personal jurisdiction was inappropriate, the Court of Appeals noted that the defendant had not "created 'continuing obligations' between itself and residents of the forum").
Accordingly, the court concludes that the present record does not establish in personam jurisdiction over Morrison.
Finally, in the alternative, the plaintiff argues that subsection four of Pennsylvania's Long-Arm statute allows jurisdiction over defendants who have "caused harm or tortious injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside of the commonwealth." See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 5322(4). The plaintiff contends that because his primary injuries occurred not from the accident itself, but as a result of the subsequent inter-operative coagulapathy
performed in a Pennsylvania hospital, jurisdiction is proper. This position cannot be accepted. See Hilferty v. Neesan, 506 F.Supp. 218 (E.D. Pa. 1980). In Hilferty, the plaintiff, a Pennsylvania citizen, who had been injured at the defendants' New Jersey residence, sought to obtain jurisdiction over the defendants in federal court in Pennsylvania. The court held that "the mere fact that a plaintiff may have some residual pain and suffering while recuperating in the forum state from an accident which occurred entirely out of state is not the type of harm 'caused in the Commonwealth' that the long arm statute contemplated." Id. at 220; see also Shong Ching Lau v. Change, 415 F.Supp. 627, 629-630 (E.D. 1976). The Hilferty rationale is equally applicable here and, thus, the plaintiff's alternate ground for establishing jurisdiction is also without merit.
In sum, the court concludes that the plaintiff has not established a sufficient factual basis upon which this court can conclude that it has in personam jurisdiction over defendant Morrison. Accordingly, Morrison's motion to dismiss will be granted and an appropriate Order will be entered.
William J. Nealon
United States District Judge
Date: December 30, 1992
NOW, this 30th day of December, 1992, in accordance with the attached Memorandum, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant Morrison's motion to dismiss is granted.
William J. Nealon
United States District Judge