against violence and theft from other inmates. When the cell is double-locked, however, other inmates cannot enter.
16. When the door was opened, Shemanski and Williams ordered the inmates to strip for a search of their persons. Proudfoot removed his clothes but became belligerent.
17. Proudfoot was ordered to submit to a visual inspection of his buttocks. He did not cooperate with this order and demanded that such an inspection be conducted by a medical officer. Thereafter, Proudfoot was ordered to redress to be taken to the day captain's office for a full anal cavity search.
18. At this point, Proudfoot, believing mistakenly that the search was motivated by harassment, became aggressive and resistent and a struggle ensued during which Shemanski and Williams attempted to handcuff Proudfoot. During this struggle Proudfoot sustained injuries to his left eye and right temple. Neither Proudfoot, Shemanski, nor Williams purposefully punched or struck.
19. Proudfoot did not attempt to dispose of contraband by flushing it down the toilet.
20. After the altercation, Proudfoot was escorted to the day captain's office by the defendants and then to sick call by Lieutenant Charles Croll. Defendants did not push Proudfoot against the walls of the cellblock during this transfer.
Plaintiff's suit alleges that defendants, employees of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, violated his federal constitutional rights, creating a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
as well as violating his rights under state law. As in any civil case, plaintiff had the burden of proving his case by a preponderance of the evidence.
Three separate incidents form the basis of the remaining claims in this suit. After hearing the evidence, I am persuaded that each of the three searches of plaintiffs' cell was conducted for a legitimate purpose and that they were not conducted to harass or intimidate plaintiff. However, I also recognize plaintiff's frustration and anger over having his cell searched three times in eight days. Although I find that each search was conducted for a legitimate purpose, plaintiff may have felt he was being harassed because of his legal activities.
A. Search of October 16, 1991
The first search, on October 16, 1991, was conducted by defendants Witman and Thomas. Although I find that they did disrupt the order of plaintiff's legal materials, I find that their conduct was not unreasonable in the context of a cell search and that no liability attaches from this part of the search. A prisoner has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his cell that would entitle him to Fourth Amendment
protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1984). Searches can only rise to an Eighth Amendment violation when they are conducted for "calculated harassment." See id. at 530. As I have found each of the searches was properly motivated, there can be no Eighth Amendment violation in that regard.
I also find, however, that Witman did open sealed, oversized envelopes that were addressed to a federal judge and an attorney and appeared to scan the letters. There was absolutely no evidence that Thomas was involved in any way with the search of the legal mail.
The status of prisoners' legal mail is an evolving one, and the case law in this Circuit on the issue of reading outgoing legal mail in the prisoner's presence is not settled.
The Third Circuit has not ruled directly on the issue of whether prison officials may read inmate legal mail. The Courts of Appeal in other circuits have addressed the issue and have found that prisoners have a constitutionally protected right actionable under section 1983 not to have legal mail read by prison officials, drawing from Wolff v. McDonald, 418 U.S. 574, 94 S. Ct. 2963 (1974).
See, e.g., Lemon v. Dugger, 931 F.2d 1465 (11th Cir. 1991); Davidson v. Scully, 694 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1982); Jensen v. Kecker, 648 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1981); Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1980); Smith v. Shimp, 562 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1977); Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1976).
The Third Circuit mentioned some of these cases in passing, but with seeming approval, in the context of a case concerning an attorney's access to a prison. See Sturm v. Clark, 835 F.2d 1009, 1015 n.13 (1987) ("The burden remains upon the prison officials to assert legitimate reasons for interfering with a prisoner's incoming mail. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. at 413, 94 S. Ct. at 1811; Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600 (6th Cir. 1986). Several courts have held that mail relating to a prisoner's legal matters cannot be read, and may only be opened in the prisoner's presence. Taylor v. Sterrett, 532 F.2d 462, 477-78 (5th Cir. 1976); Bach v. Illinois, 504 F.2d 1100, 1102 (7th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).") The court in Bryan v. Werner, 516 F.2d 233 (3d Cir. 1975), was concerned with legal materials being sent through the prison law clinic, and the effect of materials sent with the imprimatur of the clinic, presenting an interest of the prison that may outweigh the effect of reading the mail, and is distinguished on that basis.
The right of a prisoner to send and receive legal mail is uncontroverted and implicates both First and Sixth Amendment concerns, through the right to petition the government and the right of access to the courts. When that legal mail is read by prison employees, the risk is of a "chill," rendering the prisoner unwilling or unable to raise substantial legal issues critical of the prison or prison employees. The Bureau of Corrections apparently recognizes this risk, which is why the regulations contain specific (if not totally clear) provisions for dealing with legal mail.
Even if plaintiff cannot show that defendant Witman actually read the letter, plaintiff perceived the letter as read as a result of Witman's conduct and that was enough to raise the possibility of a chill. Had Witman complied with what Administrative Directive 803 provides when read in the manner most protective of the prisoner's rights -- that the letters be opened when there is reason to believe that there is a threat to security, and read only by order of a higher official -- the risk of a chill would have been considerably reduced and balanced by the prison's legitimate penological interest in discovering contraband. See Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S. Ct. 2254 (1987).
I consequently find that Witman violated plaintiff's constitutional right of access to the courts and therefore plaintiff has proved a cause of action under section 1983. However, I also find that Witman is entitled to qualified immunity in connection with this incident.
Qualified immunity insulates state actors from liability if they could have reasonably believed that the action was constitutionally valid in light of the legal rules that were "clearly established" at the time the action was taken. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987). Witman did not violate a clearly defined legal duty. The question of reading a prisoner's outgoing legal mail remains unsettled -- neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit has addressed the matter squarely. Furthermore, the line between an impermissible reading (or apparent reading) of outgoing legal mail and a permissible checking of that mail for contraband may blur easily. Witman did not act unreasonably, especially as the envelopes were oversized and contained enclosures, making them of a type more likely to contain contraband. Therefore, Witman is entitled to this defense.
B. Search of October 24, 1991
Like the search of October 16, 1991, the search conducted by Witman and Thomas on October 24, 1991 was conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose and was not carried out in a purposefully destructive manner. The actions of the corrections officers in conducting this search were within the bounds of reasonableness. Therefore, no liability arises from this search.
C. Search of October 29, 1991
The events of October 29, 1991 present the most difficult issues for resolution. The accounts of that night as given by the witnesses at trial are irreconcilable with one another. To recover under section 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, plaintiff must prove that defendants Shemanski and Williams used excessive physical force constituting "'the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Hudson v. McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (quoting Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S. Ct. 1078, 1084 (1986)). When the prison officers use force to keep order, they "must balance the need 'to maintain or restore discipline' through force against the risk of injury to inmates." Id. at 999 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S. at 321-22, 106 S. Ct. at 1085)). In sum, the "core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Id. I find here that the evidence does not support a finding of unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
When defendants Shemanski and Williams entered Cell A-55 on the evening of October 29, 1991, they did not do so with the intent to provoke, harass, or injure plaintiff, but to carry out the search ordered by their superior. The corrections officers were unaware of the previous two searches of plaintiff's cell, and although plaintiff understandably may have perceived the search as harassment, it was not intended that way by defendants. Therefore, plaintiff's hostility to this search could not have been anticipated by the defendants, and they acted as they thought necessary in the situation. The escalation of tension into physical struggle was not intended by either plaintiff or defendants, and after weighing the evidence presented, plaintiff has not proved a claim under section 1983 for a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.
Although, as discussed, the Fourth Amendment does not provide the basis for a section 1983 action for prisoners in the context of searches of their cells, it may do so in the context of searches of the person. In Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 558, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979), the Supreme Court held that determining the reasonableness of searches "requires a balancing of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search entails." I find that the search was reasonable; defendants Shemanski and Williams had been sent to search for contraband, and courts should, to the extent consistent with the Constitution, defer to the judgment of prison officials in evaluating activities related to safety and control of the prison. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-27, 104 S. Ct. 2194, 3200 (1984). I do not find that defendants acted in an unreasonable manner toward plaintiff in connection with the stripsearch.
Plaintiff also alleges claims under Pennsylvania common law for assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and outrageous conduct. Under Pennsylvania law, an assault occurs when one acts with the unprivileged intent to put another in reasonable and immediate apprehension of a harmful or offensive conduct and which does cause such apprehension. See Cucinotti v. Ortman, 399 Pa. 26, 159 A.2d 216 (1960). Intentional infliction of emotional distress and outrageous conduct require intent that goes beyond all acceptable bounds. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) (adopted in Pennsylvania in, e.g., Papieves v. Lawrence, 437 Pa. 373, 263 A.2d 118 (1970). As already stated, I find that defendants Shemanski and Williams acted without the requisite intent to harm plaintiff, and therefore I find for defendants and against plaintiff on these claims.
Conclusions of Law
1. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not protect prisoners from unreasonable searches of their cells.
2. A search of a prisoner's cell may violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution if it is conducted for the purpose of "calculated harassment."
3. The searches of plaintiff's cell on October 16, 1991, October 24, 1991, and October 29, 1991 were not conducted for the purpose of "calculated harassment."
4. Plaintiff has not proved a violation of his rights in connection with the searches of his cell and judgment will be entered in favor of the defendants on the Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims based on such searches.
5. Under the First and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution, prison officials may not read outgoing legal mail of prisoners, or create the impression that such mail has been read so that the prisoner is chilled in exercising his rights.
6. Defendant Witman violated plaintiff's rights by giving the appearance of reading plaintiff's outgoing legal mail.
7. Defendant Witman could have acted in the reasonable belief that his conduct was not unconstitutional.
8. Defendant Witman did not violate a "clearly established" legal principle by the manner is which he searched the mail.
9. Because defendant Witman did not act with an improper motive and because he did not violate clearly established legal principles, he is entitled to a defense of qualified immunity and judgment will be entered in his favor.
10. The use of excessive physical force constituting "the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and provides a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
11. Defendants Shemanski and Williams did not use excessive physical force constituting the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.
12. Because plaintiff has not met his burden of proving a violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, judgment will be entered in favor of defendants Shemanski and Williams in this matter.
13. Under Pennsylvania law, plaintiff must prove that defendants acted with intent to cause apprehension of physical contact and created such apprehension to sustain an action for assault.
14. Plaintiff has not met his burden of proof as to the intent of defendants Shemanski and Williams, and judgment will be entered in their favor on the claim of assault and the claims of outrageous conduct and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
15. Judgment on all claims will be entered in favor of defendants and against plaintiff.
EDITOR'S NOTE: The following court-provided text does not appear at this cite in 803 F. Supp. 1048.
AND NOW, this 17 day of September, 1992, after a trial before the Court held on August 17-19, 1992,
It is ORDERED that Judgment is entered for defendants and against plaintiff.
BY THE COURT:
JOHN R. PADOVA, J.