Article 3, section 7(e) provides, in relevant part:
The Board shall negotiate all traveling and national scales subject to the jurisdiction of the Federation.
Article 3, section 7(f) provides:
The International Executive Board is given full power and authority to promulgate, adopt, revise, change and/or adjust all prices for traveling musicians and to promulgate, adopt, revise, change, suspend and/or repeal any rules, laws and/or Bylaws pertaining to traveling musicians, including those relating to the filing of contracts or written statements for traveling engagements and/or the procedure for collections of dues based on earnings (work dues) from any traveling member for performing services within the jurisdiction of a Local of which he/she is not a member. The Board may exercise its powers and authorities under this Section in such manner and to such extent as in the sole judgment of the Board maybe in the best interest of the Federation and the members thereof.
Article 3, section 7(i) provides, in relevant part:
The Board or a sub-committee thereof shall be deemed eligible to hear, decide and determine all matters and questions concerning or affecting the Federation or any of its members or Locals, as well as all matters and questions in which said Federation, its Locals or members, may be interested.
I find as follows:
1. Plaintiff Locals have not shown immediate, irreparable injury. It is speculative and doubtful that producers and the Locals would bargain seriously for local musicians above the maximum specified in the contested International agreement. Hence, this is probably more of a symbolic quarrel rather than a ripe, practical one.
2. There would be a substantial hardship on defendant if injunctive relief were granted. The International would be precluded from bargaining for touring musicians to get a fair share of the work in the Locals' areas.
3. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of ultimate success. The Bylaw at issue is probably subject to a rule of reason. The absolutist notion that the Locals could rule out all touring musicians is probably an unreasonable construction. The International's designation of a maximum is probably a reasonable interpretation of the Bylaw, resolving the competing interests of the local and touring musicians. The collective bargaining agreement, including the contested provision, was the result of tough, hard negotiating with the theatrical producers. It is doubtful that sections 11, 12 and 13 of the Bylaws apply to foreclose this collective bargaining agreement. The International's interpretation of those sections is consistent with past practice and procedure. For example, when Ringling Brothers Circus objected to hiring requirements unilaterally imposed by various Locals, the International negotiated an agreement with the Circus superseding the requirements of the Locals. Also, at the International's 1983 Convention, the delegates adopted Article 3, sec. 7(f) of the Bylaws, giving the International broad regulatory powers over matters effecting touring musicians.
4. The failure to reach a compromise could well lead to fewer touring productions in certain cities.
5. Injunctive relief would be a hardship on the producers who negotiated a seemingly reasonable accommodation with the International.
6. The rights claimed by the plaintiffs can probably be rectified by damages if real losses ever occur.
7. The public interest is in a reasonable resolution of work sharing conflicts between local and touring musicians, rather than in absolutist posturing over hypothetical problems. The internal political processes of the union can act to check unreasonable conduct by the International's officers and its negotiating committee.
8. The balance of equitable considerations tips toward denying a preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs have not sustained their burden of proof for preliminary injunctive relief.
BY THE COURT:
MARVIN KATZ, J.
AND NOW, this 6th day of July, 1992, after a hearing, it is hereby ORDERED that plaintiffs' Motion For A Preliminary Injunction is DENIED for the reasons stated in the foregoing Memorandum.
BY THE COURT:
MARVIN KATZ, J.
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