Company, 113 F.R.D. 595 (S.D. Fla. 1986) and Johnson v. County of Chester, 413 F.Supp. 1299 (E.D.Pa. 1976), it is legally certain that plaintiffs have failed to meet the amount in controversy requirement.
Plaintiffs' second argument against dismissal must also be rejected. Plaintiffs contend that "Act 143 creates a statutory entitlement to continued commissions on the part of the Kemper agent class for a period from between 15-27 months." See Plaintiffs' Memorandum In Opposition To Defendant's Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction at 13. Plaintiffs' interpretation of Act 143, 40 P.S. § 241 et seq. is simply incorrect.
Act 143 regulates the ability of insurance companies to terminate contracts with insurance agents and agencies in Pennsylvania. Id. at § 242(a). In the event an insurance company decides to terminate an agency agreement due to an insurance agent's adverse experience, mix of business, or lack of premium volume, Act 143 requires insurers to make certain attempts to rehabilitate the agent's business before termination. Id. at §§ 242(e), 242(f). Further, when an insurer notifies an agent that its contract will be terminated, "the insurer shall offer to continue such agent's policies and any amendments thereto, through such agent for a period of 12 months from the effective date of termination, subject to the insurer's current underwriting standards [and] the terminated agent or an agent under rehabilitation shall be entitled to receive commissions on account of all business continued or written pursuant to this subsection in accordance with the commission rates in such agent's agreement." Id. at § 243 (emphasis added).
Act 143 only addresses the termination of insurance agency agreements.
Further, Act 143 does not reach or regulate changes in insurance agent compensation or commission rates absent termination.
As a unilateral change by Kemper in the commission rates paid to insurance agents would not terminate the individual agency agreements, Act 143's provisions are inapplicable to this case. Accordingly, the Court must reject plaintiffs' argument under Act 143. As plaintiffs have failed to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement, the Court does not possess original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).
For the reasons stated above, I shall grant defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
An appropriate order follows.
Daniel H. Huyett, 3rd, Judge
April 14, 1992
Upon consideration of defendant Federal Kemper Insurance Company's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs' response and for the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum:
Defendant Federal Kemper Insurance Company's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is GRANTED. The complaint is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Daniel H. Huyett, 3rd, Judge