meet this burden by showing that the particular cause of action
arose from Universal's activities within the forum state which
would vest the Court with specific jurisdiction, or by
demonstrating that Universal has "continuous and systematic"
contacts with the forum state, which would vest the Court with
general jurisdiction. Id.
Tap argues that "the cause of action in this case arises out
of Universal's forum related activity." (Tap's Brief at 7).
Thus, Tap claims that this Court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over Universal pursuant to the doctrine of
Tap relies upon a subsection of Pennsylvania's long arm
statute which allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over any
party where the cause of action arises from "[t]ransacting any
business in this Commonwealth." 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §
5322(a)(1). The statute further provides that transacting
business includes "[t]he shipping of merchandise directly or
indirectly into or through this Commonwealth." 42
Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 5322(a)(1)(iii). Tap thus contends that
Universal's delivery of the Caterpillar engines to Snyder in
Jennerstown, Pennsylvania, provides the basis for this Court to
invoke its specific jurisdiction.
However, satisfaction of one provision of the long arm
statute alone does not, by itself, allow this Court to exercise
jurisdiction over Universal. Derman v. Wilair Services, Inc.,
590 A.2d 317, 320 (Pa.Super. 1991). Tap must also demonstrate
that the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with
constitutional requirements of due process. Id. This
constitutional requirement is met only if Tap can show that
Universal has minimum contacts with the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania.*fn1 Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 490.
Pursuant to the minimum contacts test, I must focus my
analysis on the relationship of the transaction to the forum.
Id. I must therefore consider whether Universal's contacts with
Pennsylvania are such that "`[it] reasonably should anticipate
being haled into court [here].'" Van Buskirk, 760 F.2d at 490,
quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).
The Third Circuit has enunciated a three prong test for
determining whether a defendant actually has minimum contacts
with the state. The court must first determine whether the
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
acting within the state, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of the state's laws. Next, the court must consider
whether the cause of action arises from defendant's activities
within the state. Finally, the court must decide whether the
defendant's acts have a sufficiently substantial connection
with the state to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.
Time Share Vacation Club v. Atlantic Resorts, Ltd.,
735 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir. 1984).
There is no question that Universal purposefully availed
itself of the privilege of doing business in Pennsylvania.
Having undertaken to ship goods into Pennsylvania, it was more
than foreseeable that the shipment would make its way there.
With this knowledge, Universal could reasonably anticipate
being haled into court in Pennsylvania.
The next question is more problematic: Did the cause of
action arise out of Universal's activities within the state.
Strictly speaking, Universal's only activity within
Pennsylvania consisted of shipping the engines into the state.
The actual cause of the injury, the alleged improper
construction of the engines, took place in the state of
Louisiana. However, in Van Buskirk, the Third Circuit found
minimum contacts despite the fact that defendant's only
activity in Pennsylvania was the shipment of goods (asbestos)
which caused injury within the state. 760 F.2d at 490-91. Thus,
by shipping nonconforming goods into Pennsylvania, Universal
caused an injury in Pennsylvania which allows this court to
exercise jurisdiction over it.
Finally, I must consider whether defendant's actions have a
connection with the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction
reasonable. Universal shipped the caterpillar engines into
Pennsylvania. Thus, it knew it was putting goods into the
stream of commerce in this state. Universal cannot now claim
that defending a lawsuit in Pennsylvania was beyond the realm
of possibility. Universal, however, argues that because it was
not aware that the engines were destined for Pennsylvania until
after it completed work on the first two engines, its
activities within this forum are too limited to allow this
Court to exercise jurisdiction.
This argument is not persuasive. Although Universal may have
agreed to construct the engines before it was aware that they
were destined for Pennsylvania, Universal knowingly shipped the
engines into this state once it was directed to do so.
Moreover, Universal continued to rebuild and make further
shipments once it was aware that the final destination of the
engines was in Pennsylvania. Thus, Universal consciously chose
to transact business within the commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
The connection between Universal's action and the forum is
therefore sufficient to make the exercise of this Court's
AND NOW, this 29th day of July, 1991 it is hereby
ORDERED, that Universal's motion to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction is DENIED.