aside" for nepotistic applicants of one space in every other
hiring class had the effect of perpetuating discriminatory
practices and displacing qualified black applicants, such as
Captain Garland and those referred by Captain Clark.
13. Rather than offering evidence as to the business
justification for its practices, USAir attempted to show that its
percentage of black pilots exceeded that which would have been
indicated if the appropriate labor market were defined by census
statistics. The use of statistics based upon census data by USAir
is dubious where, as here, there was an identified qualified pool
of actual black applicants. Even if accurate, the court rejects
the use of USAir's bottom line statistics to rebut Captain
Garland's case because such statistics are irrelevant to the
determination of whether an individual was discriminated against
or whether the particular challenged practice has a disparate
impact on Captain Garland or blacks as a group. Wards Cove, 109
S.Ct. at 2123 n. 8; Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 102 S.Ct.
2525, 73 L.Ed.2d 130 (1982).
14. The evidence also established that Captain Garland was
subjected to racial harassment and retaliation which was
sufficiently severe to alter his employment conditions "and
create an abusive work environment." Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986).
Captain Garland has shown that he was subjected to a pattern of
mistreatment by co-employees after filing his charge against
USAir with the EEOC. This mistreatment, which took the form of
being denied cockpit jump seat privileges, public ridicule and
professional ostracism, impaired Captain Garland's ability to
perform scheduled work and caused other harm to him. The court is
persuaded that the complained of treatment was directly linked to
Captain Garland's race and his pursuit of legal remedies and that
the harm suffered by him would also have been suffered by other
similarly situated reasonable people. The court is further
persuaded that USAir refused to take adequate steps to remedy the
hostile work environment and guarantee Captain Garland the rights
and privileges to which he was entitled by virtue of his
employment. Conditions did not improve until after Captain
Garland sought preliminary injunctive relief. The court thus
concludes that Captain Garland met his burden of proving
harassment and retaliation. See Andrews v. Philadelphia,
895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990).
15. The court concludes that Captain Garland was subjected to
prohibited employment discrimination as early as 1981. Since
Captain Garland's application remained active, the discrimination
amounted to a continuing violation which did not cease until
Captain Garland's employment in December, 1984. The court also
concludes that Captain Garland had no notice of this continuing
violation until shortly before filing an EEOC charge in November,
1984. The court is constrained, however, from awarding relief
under Title VII which goes back more than two years from the date
of filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280
(1975). The court therefore finds that Captain Garland is
entitled to full back wages, benefits and seniority rights
retroactive to November 13, 1982, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters v. Teamsters v. US., 431 U.S. 324, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52
L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). Pursuant to his § 1981 claim, Captain Garland
is entitled to compensatory damages for the pain and suffering
occasioned by USAir's deprivation of his right "to make and
enforce contracts . . . [on the same basis] as is enjoyed by
white citizens." Captain Garland is also entitled to a
declaratory judgment with respect to the discrimination to which
he has been subjected. Injunctive relief, enjoining USAir from
pursuing its discriminatory hiring practices which include an all
white Vice President's channel and an all white nepotistic/word
of mouth channel, shall also be issued.
16. At the reconvened hearing, this court shall hear evidence
and argument so as to make specific determinations on the amount
of damages to be awarded, including
back wages as of November 13, 1982 and compensatory damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1981, the form of declaratory and injunctive relief
to enter and whether other relief would be appropriate to award
in this case.
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