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January 7, 1991


The opinion of the court was delivered by: Muir, District Judge.



This case arises from the arrest of the Plaintiff Michael Hackenburg by the Pennsylvania State Police for driving under the influence of alcohol, reckless driving, and driving while operating privileges are suspended pursuant to the Pennsylvania Vehicle Code, Title 75, Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, §§ 3731, 3714 and 1543(a) respectively. Defendants are State Police Troopers Charles K. Zukowski assigned to the Stonington Barracks and Stephen Krehel, assigned to the Hazleton Barracks.

On June 19, 1989, Hackenburg filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violation of his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. On October 1, 1990, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment and a statement of undisputed material fact pursuant to Local Rule 401.4. After requesting an enlargement of time, Defendants filed a brief on November 15, 1990. On December 13, 1990, Hackenburg filed a brief in opposition. Hackenburg failed to file a separate short and concise statement of material facts responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the statement filed by the Defendants. The Defendants were entitled to file a reply brief on or before December 28, 1990, but elected not to file one. This matter is therefore ripe for a decision.

Defendants make three arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment. First, Defendants argue that Hackenburg's action should be dismissed because it is barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Second, Defendants argue that summary judgment should be entered in their favor on all claims because there was probable cause for Hackenburg's arrest. Third, Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on all claims by virtue of the doctrine of qualified immunity.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine issue of material fact which is unresolved and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Summary judgment is an extreme remedy and should not be granted when there is a disagreement about the facts or the proper inferences which a factfinder could draw from them. Peterson v. Lehigh Valley Dist. Council, 676 F.2d 81, 84 (3d Cir. 1982). "When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in . . . [Rule 56], an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading. . . ." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). The adverse party must show by affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. Because summary judgment is a severe remedy, the Court should resolve any doubt about the existence of genuine issues of fact against the moving party. Ness v. Marshall, 660 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir. 1981).

The United States Supreme Court has stated that in motions for summary judgment a material fact is one which might affect the outcome of the suit under relevant substantive law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Supreme Court also stated in Anderson that a dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no `genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

Initially, the moving party has a burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). This may be met by the moving party pointing out to the court that there is an absence of evidence to support an essential element as to which the non-moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. The non-moving party then must make a sufficient showing as to the essential elements of his or her case that a reasonable jury could find in his or her favor. Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53.

The burden of proof required to defeat a summary judgment motion is guided by the burden of proof which a reasonable jury would be instructed to consider. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 242, 106 S.Ct. at 2505. The Court in Anderson stated:

    The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in
  support of the Plaintiff's position will be
  insufficient; there must be evidence on which the
  jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. The
  judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks
  whether reasonable jurors could find by a
  preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff
  is entitled to a verdict — `whether there is
  [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed
  to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon
  whom the onus of proof is imposed.'

Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

In light of these principles, we will now address the Defendants' motion.

Hackenburg does not dispute that the applicable statute of limitations in this case is two years. He also does not dispute that his civil cause of action which is based on allegations that his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated accrued on March 20, 1987 when he was arrested. Instead, he contends that the statute of limitations was tolled while state criminal proceedings were pending.

It is undisputed that (1) Hackenburg was arrested on March 20, 1987, (2) on July 14, 1987, his attorney, who was defending him against the charges, filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained against him by Defendants Zukowski and Krehel in the course of the stop and arrest, (3) a suppression hearing was held at which Hackenburg as well as Defendants testified about the events and circumstances surrounding the stop and arrest, (4) by order dated August 26, 1987, Judge James Rossini of the Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas granted Hackenburg's motion to suppress, (5) on September 9, 1987, Assistant District Attorney David Noon filed a notice of appeal to the Pennsylvania Superior Court challenging Judge Rossini's decision granting the motion to suppress, (6) on November 4, 1987, Judge Rossini filed a memorandum opinion in support of his prior order of August 26, 1987, granting the motion to suppress, (7) on May 26, 1988, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed Judge Rossini's decision granting the motion to suppress, (8) subsequently, on July 11, 1989, Assistant District Attorney John P. Muncer filed in the Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas a request to nolle prosequi ...

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