submitted under third circuit rule 12(6): May 30, 1990.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey; D.C. Civil No. 86-2719.
Hutchinson, Cowen and Seitz, Circuit Judges.
This appeal is from post-judgment orders in a diversity action governed by New Jersey law. Plaintiffs Jerry and Connie Keith prevailed before a jury which found that negligence on the part of defendant, Truckstops of America, caused injury to Jerry Keith. The orders denied defendant's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granted plaintiffs' motion to amend the judgment to include prejudgment interest. Truckstops appeals both orders.
Defendant argues that the district court erred in not granting its motion for a directed verdict in the first instance and its subsequent motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
As a preliminary matter, we note that the record in this case does not disclose that defendant made a directed verdict motion at the close of all the evidence, a prerequisite to our consideration of the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence. See Mallick v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 644 F.2d 228 (3d Cir. 1981); Follette v. National Tea Co., 460 F.2d 254 (3d Cir. 1972); Gebhardt v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 348 F.2d 129 (3d Cir. 1965); Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(b). However, defendant's counsel submitted an affidavit, in response to inquiries by this court, asserting that he made such a motion. Plaintiffs responded that they did not recall any such motion being made. While, at a minimum, the better practice would be for such motions to be made on the record, we will assume that such a motion was made. See Follette, 460 F.2d at 255; Gebhardt, 348 F.2d at 132-33.
We will therefore consider defendant's argument that the district court erred in denying its motions because the evidence was insufficient to support a case of negligence. A court uses the same standard in passing on a motion for a directed verdict as it uses in considering a JNOV motion, and our review of a district court's action on both motions is plenary. See Smollett v. Skayting Dev. Corp., 793 F.2d 547, 548 (3d Cir. 1986); Gilpin v. Langan, 789 F.2d 1034, 1037 (3d Cir. 1986). A court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, see Kelly v. Matlack, Inc., 903 F.2d 978, slip. op. at 5 (3d Cir. 1990); Blum v. Witco Chemical Corp., 829 F.2d 367, 372 (3d Cir. 1987) (JNOV), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 880 (1990); Macleary v. Hines, 817 F.2d 1081, 1083 (3d Cir. 1987) (directed verdict), and determine whether "the record contains the 'minimum quantum of evidence from which a jury might reasonably afford relief'", Smollett, 798 F.2d at 548 (quoting Denneny v. Siegel, 407 F.2d 433, 439 (3d Cir. 1969)).
In negligence cases under New Jersey law, a plaintiff must establish that defendant breached a duty of reasonable care, which constituted a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 471 A.2d 25, 29 (1984). The proprietor of a business "owes a duty of reasonable care to those who enter the premises upon [an] invitation [for business purposes] to provide a reasonably safe place to do that which is within the scope of the invitation." Butler v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 89 N.J. 270, 275, 445 A.2d 1141, 1143 (1982).
We now consider the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. Plaintiff Jerry Keith had taken his truck to the Truckstops facility to be serviced. As he was closing the hood on his truck after the servicing had been completed, he put one foot on top of the stairway that led down into the grease pit under his truck. When he did so, the stairway collapsed under him, causing him to fall into the pit and land on top of the stairway. He did not know what caused the stairway to fall.
Defendant maintains that since plaintiffs provided no explanation of what caused the stairway to fall, there is no direct evidence of negligent conduct or wrongdoing on its part.
There was, however, evidence that plaintiff was injured when he fell into defendant's grease pit; that the stairway leading down into the grease pit had been dislodged and was found lying at the bottom of the pit shortly after the accident; that the 200-pound metal stairway could only be moved by lifting it up off the bracket which secured it to the wall; that the normal position of the stairway when it was properly anchored was with the top step several inches below the surrounding concrete and that in the anchored position it would not have fallen; that when plaintiff stepped onto the stairway to close his hood it was level with the surrounding concrete; that the stairway was moved routinely by the mechanics in order to clean the work area at the end of a shift; that the service area was off limits to the general public; and that it was defendant's practice to permit owners access to the service area to close the hoods of their trucks after servicing.
There is no direct evidence as to how the stairway became dislodged. However, there was circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that defendant was negligent in failing to maintain its premises in a reasonably safe condition for a business invitee. Thus, the jury could have inferred that the heavy steel stairway was not properly secured at the time and collapsed under plaintiff at a position where he was permitted to be. We, therefore, conclude that the district ...