The opinion of the court was delivered by: HUYETT
DANIEL H. HUYETT, 3RD, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
The defendant Funds and their Trustees
have filed a motion to strike plaintiffs' jury demand.
The Fund defendants and their Trustees argue that the remaining claims in this case arise under section 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2), and section 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act [ERISA]. The defendants also contend that plaintiffs' remaining claims in Counts VIII, IX and X are equitable in nature and, therefore, the individual employee plaintiffs are not entitled to a trial by jury.
In response, plaintiffs candidly admit that "the right to a jury trial under ERISA is closely circumscribed." Plaintiffs' Brief in Opposition to Motion to Strike Jury Demand, p. 2. However, plaintiffs argue that the Third Circuit has not precluded the availability of a jury trial in situations where the claims brought pursuant to section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), of ERISA are legal in nature. Plaintiffs contend that the remaining claims are of a legal nature, at least in part, and that they fall within the scope of section 502(a)(1)(B).
ERISA does not provide for the right to a jury trial. Cox v. Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390, 393 (3d Cir. 1988); Turner v. CF&I Steel Corp., 770 F.2d 43, 46 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058, 88 L. Ed. 2d 776, 106 S. Ct. 800 (1986). Nor does the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution create a constitutional right to a jury trial when the claims and remedies are equitable in nature. Pane v. RCA Corp., 868 F.2d 631, 635-36 (3d Cir. 1989); Cox, 861 F.2d at 393. The legislative history on the right to a jury trial under ERISA is not enlightening. Turner, 770 F.2d at 46. Therefore, our courts have resorted to a case-by-case analysis of ERISA allegations to determine when a litigant is entitled to a jury trial.
At a pretrial conference held on September 12, 1989, the parties agreed that only Counts VIII, IX and X remain against the Fund defendants and their Trustees.
Count VIII of the second amended complaint alleges that the Funds' Trustees violated their fiduciary duties by "refusing to insure an equitable distribution of [the trustee] designation power . . . or . . . provide plaintiffs with a list of contributing employers. . . ." Count IX alleges that the Funds' Trustees engaged in a conspiracy to violate their fiduciary duties established under ERISA by succumbing to the influence of Trucking Management, Inc. ("TMI") and Central Pennsylvania Motor Carriers Conference, Inc. ("Conference"). Finally, Count X asserts that the Funds' Trustees violated their fiduciary duties by ignoring the intent of the "original settlers" of the Trust Agreements by allowing the trustee appointment power to remain in the hands of TMI and the Conference.
Each of these counts seek relief based upon the Funds' Trustees' alleged breaches of their fiduciary duties. Section 409(a) of ERISA states, in part, that "any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries . . . shall be personally liable . . . ." Section 502(a) provides for a variety of means of civil enforcement of the statutory rights provided by ERISA. Pane, 868 F.2d at 636. Pertinent portions of section 502(a) provide that a civil action may be brought under any of the following circumstances:
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -- . . . (B) to recover benefits due him under the terms of his plan, to enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan; . . . .
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a). The disposition of this motion rests upon a determination of what portion of section 502 plaintiffs rely for relief and whether the claims are equitable or legal in nature.
Plaintiffs argue that their claims are being brought pursuant to section 502(a)(1)(B). In Turner, the Third Circuit stated that "only equitable relief is available under Section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA." Turner, 770 F.2d at 46-47. However, later the Third Circuit concluded that a party "may" be entitled to a jury trial, if his claim for relief under section 502(a)(1)(B) is legal in nature. Cox, 861 F.2d at 394. Subsequently, the Third Circuit stated that causes of action authorized under section 502(a)(1)(B) were not explicitly denominated as equitable. See Pane, 868 F.2d at 636. This, according to plaintiff, supports the conclusion that they are entitled to a jury trial in this case, if their claims are legal in nature. The Fund defendants and their Trustees argue that plaintiffs' claims do not arise under section 502(a)(1)(B).
Unlike the previously discussed provisions of section 502(a), section 502(a)(2) has received little attention from our courts. This section allows certain parties to bring an action for appropriate relief under section 409, 29 U.S.C. § 1109, of ERISA. As previously mentioned, section 409 states that a fiduciary may be held personally liable for losses resulting from breaches of his or her fiduciary duty. ...