As to Count II of the complaint, the defendant argues that the plaintiff has failed to allege a sufficient basis for sustaining an action based on fraud and has not stated the circumstances allegedly constituting fraud with particularity.
The five standard elements constituting a cause of action for fraud are:  a misrepresentation of fact;  fraudulently uttered;  with intent to induce reliance;  inducing justifiable reliance;  to the injury of a party. Averbach v. Rival Manufacturing Co., 809 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir. 1987). In determining whether a complaint states a cause of action, we are bound to consider not only the statements in the pleading itself but also to draw reasonable inferences in favor of the pleader. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, 1273 (3d Cir. 1974). We have reviewed the plaintiff's complaint and we believe that the plaintiff has pleaded sufficiently to give the defendant "fair notice" of the plaintiff's claim. In re Arthur Treacher's Franchise Litigation, 92 F.R.D. 398 (E.D.Pa. 1981). Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint, or in the alternative, for a more definite statement, will be denied.
Regarding Count III of the plaintiff's complaint, the defendant argues that the plaintiff fails to allege a sufficient basis for sustaining an action based on negligent misrepresentation. In order to plead an action for negligent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant asserted  a negligent  misrepresentation  in the course of a business, professional, employment or pecuniary transaction  with the intention by the defendant that the plaintiff would be induced to act thereupon  that the plaintiff justifiably relied upon the misrepresentation  and that damage to the plaintiff proximately resulted. Browne v. Maxfield, 663 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D.Pa. 1987). We have reviewed the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint and feel that they are sufficient to give the defendant notice of the nature of the plaintiff's claim. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss Count III of the plaintiff's complaint will be denied.
Similarly, we believe that the defendant's motion to dismiss Count IV of the complaint should be denied. Under Pennsylvania law, a claim of legal malpractice may rise under both contract and tort theories. Sherman Industries, Inc. v. Goldhammer, 683 F. Supp. 502 (E.D.Pa. 1988). Furthermore, a plaintiff may combine tort and contract claims in one malpractice complaint by asserting that the defendant has breached both specific contractual terms and a general lawyer's duty of care. Id. See also Guy v. Liederbach, 501 Pa. 47, 459 A.2d 744 (1983). Again, the plaintiff's allegations are sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the nature of the plaintiff's claims, so we shall deny the defendant's motion to dismiss Count IV of the complaint.
Finally, the defendant contends that plaintiff's civil RICO claim in Count V should be dismissed, or in the alternative, the plaintiff should be required to amend the complaint to provide greater specificity.
In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a civil RICO claim must allege  the conducting of  an enterprise  through a pattern  of racketeering activity. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S. Ct. 3275, 87 L. Ed. 2d 346 (1985); Saporito v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 843 F.2d 666 (3d Cir. 1988); vacated and remanded on other grounds, 489 U.S. 1049, 109 S. Ct. 1306, 103 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1989). The plaintiff alleges that the defendants used the mail, telecommunication and wire services in their fraudulent scheme and that this use constituted a predicate act of racketeering activity.
As a result, the fraudulent acts must be pleaded with particularity under Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(b). Seville Indus. Mach. Corp. v. Southmost Mach. Corp., 742 F.2d 786 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1211, 105 S. Ct. 1179, 84 L. Ed. 2d 327 (1985).
Since we have already determined above that Count II of the plaintiff's complaint sufficiently states a cause of action for fraud, we believe there is no reason to reiterate our reasoning here. Accordingly, we believe that the plaintiff has satisfied the requirement that the allegations of fraud be plead with particularity.
In addition, however, we must consider whether the plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded a "pattern" of racketeering activity. In order to satisfy this requirement, the plaintiff is required to show "at least two acts of racketeering activity" engaged in by the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The Supreme Court recently determined that "RICO's legislative history reveals Congress' intent that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity." H. J. Inc., et al. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., et al., 492 U.S. 229, 109 S. Ct. 2893, 106 L. Ed. 2d 195 (1989). Furthermore, the concept of a "pattern of racketeering activity" has been regarded expansively rather than restrictively. See Id.; See also Saporito v. Combustion Engineering Inc., supra.
As a result, we must apply the Supreme Court's analysis of RICO's pattern requirement to the present case, bearing in mind that we may only dismiss the plaintiff's RICO claim if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 81 L. Ed. 2d 59, 104 S. Ct. 2229 (1984).
The plaintiff asserts that on different occasions during the course of the attempted acquisition of the plaintiff by Coated Sales, the defendants used the United States mails, interstate telephone wires and wire transmissions in order to transmit the Letter of Intent and other information as well as conduct negotiations in furtherance of their fraudulent scheme. We believe that it is premature at this point to hold that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the RICO allegations. Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss Count V, or in the alternative for a more definite statement, will be denied.
AND NOW, this 18th day of December, 1989, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
 the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(7) is denied;
 the defendant's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is denied;
 the defendant's motion for a more definite statement pursuant to Rule 12(e) is denied; and
 the defendant is directed to file an answer to the complaint within twenty  days of the date of this Memorandum and Order.