§ 1983." Id. at 427
The Supreme Court points out, however, that such a claim cannot be supported by merely alleging that the existing training program for a class of employees represents a policy for which the city is responsible. Id. Rather, the issue is whether the training a municipal employee receives is adequate to avoid violations of the constitutional rights of the citizens with whom he comes into contact. If it is not, the issue becomes whether such inadequate training can justifiably be said to represent a city policy for which liability may be imposed. Id. To prove that inadequate training represents such a policy, a party may show that, "In light of the duties assigned to specific officers and employees the need for more or different training is so obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to the need." Id. Only in that event may the failure to provide proper training be found to represent policy for which the city is responsible, and for which the city may be held liable if that policy causes injury. Id. at 428.
The Supreme Court continues and provides some further guidance for resolving the issue of a city's liability. Id. The Court states that the focus must be on the adequacy of the training program in relation to the tasks the particular employees must perform. Id. Evidence of a particular employee's conduct or of an injury is not sufficient to hold the City liable under this theory of liability. Id. In addition, it must be "the identified deficiency in a city's training program" which actually causes the injury, i.e., the deprivation of rights alleged.
At this point, we feel compelled to state that we are limiting our reconsideration of this issue to the equal protection claim against the City. (See 665 F. Supp. 381, pgs. 32-35). In plaintiff's supplemental brief in support of his motion to reconsider, it seems that plaintiff is also asserting a due process claim based on "inadequate training." Such a claim is not being reconsidered by this Court.
In light of the Supreme Court's holding in City of Canton, our prior ruling as to the equal protection "inadequate training" theory of liability must change. Implicit in this Court's earlier decision was the imposition, on the plaintiff, of a greater burden of proof than the Supreme Court has now imposed. As a result of our review of the record as it then stood and the record as it stands supplemented by an expert report, this Court finds genuine issues of material fact for trial. Plaintiff's motion to reconsider this issue, therefore, will be granted. Plaintiff may proceed to trial on this issue subject to any additional problems raised by motions in limine and the like, which we do not here address.
In sum, we grant the plaintiff's motion to reconsider his equal protection "inadequate training" claim against the City. The plaintiff may, at this point, proceed to trial on this issue. We deny the plaintiff's motion to reconsider his due process "special relationship" claim.
An appropriate Order follows.
AND NOW, this 13th day of October, 1989, upon consideration of Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider, Doc Nos. 37 and 40, and Defendants' response thereto, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART in accordance with the attached Memorandum.
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