also denied direct access to lavatory and running water, and must utilize, upon gaining access to the tier's cell block from a corrections guard, the facilities in the one vacant cell on that tier.
In addition, the living arrangements in the gallery areas of 2 South, 2 North and 3 South have caused the interaction between inmates of different classifications. For example, the inmates housed in the gallery area of 3 South are general population prisoners who come into contact with the Mental Health inmates confined in the cell block of 3 South. Similar problems have arisen with Administrative Custody inmates of the other tiers of the New Jail, despite the fact that these inmates are supposed to be segregated from the remainder of the prison population.
Two holding cells measuring 6' by 10' are located in the Old Jail area. At the time of the preliminary injunction hearing, only one inmate occupied each cell at a time, but I noted that both cells were equipped for the possibility of double bunking in the future. Each cell contains a toilet and a sink. Originally, these cells were designed for only temporary housing of prisoners pending classification and assignment to permanent cells. However, these cells have been used for long-term housing of inmates in special need of isolation from the general prison population.
Presently, these cells are used to house as many as five inmates at one time. I find that such occupation is only for the temporary incarceration of inmates entering and leaving LCP. However, this confinement limits the total living space of each prisoner to only 12 square feet per prisoner. Moreover, inmates in this section of LCP have much more limited opportunities for block out time.
THE GED AND WEIGHT ROOMS
From May 1986 to October 1986, the GED classroom was used to house up to 20 inmates on cots in a dormitory fashion. These inmates shared one toilet and sink, and had to be escorted to a separate area to shower. At the time of the initial preliminary injunction hearing, I found that this practice had terminated and "that the current administration would [not] again use this room to house inmates."
Because of the recent influx of prisoners to LCP, the prison has reinstituted its practice of using the GED classroom for this purpose. Eighteen general population inmates are housed on cots in the GED room. One inmate has complained of an assault by another prisoner upon him with the leg broken off from one of these cots. Warden Meisel candidly admitted on direct examination that he has received reports of parts of cots being used in this fashion, and that this presents a ongoing concern of his in maintaining prison security.
In addition, another twelve general population inmates are housed in the nearby weight room of the prison.
The inmates in the weight room share bathroom facilities with the inmates in the GED room, and a guard must allow them access to this area for this purpose. One prison guard oversees the inmates in the weight room and GED room. These inmates do not have any separate day room area, and they must go to the Old Jail day room area or outside LCP during "block out" time. This, of course, lessens the total "day room" area available to each prisoner in the Old Jail section of LCP.
Some prisoners have complained that they have been attacked by other inmates. I find that the crowded conditions at LCP have increased the potential for inmate violence, and that several recent assaults may be directly attributable to the present conditions at LCP. Moreover, the practice of housing inmates in the gallery areas of the New Jail section of LCP creates a present and imminent danger of future inmate violence. This is, in part, caused by the intermingling of inmates assigned to segregated units with inmates from the general population. I find that any additional increase in the inmate population at LCP, a prospect which seems very likely, would further jeopardize inmate safety.
LCP is currently unable to satisfy the minimum requirements established by Pennsylvania law for prisons in the areas of inmate classification, housing, bedding, law libraries, discipline, punishment and medical treatment. In addition, the availability of treatment programs at LCP has been reduced as a result of the present over-crowding.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison conditions which inflict cruel and unusual punishment. The meaning of cruel and unusual punishment is drawn "from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346 (citation omitted). "Today the Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments which, although not physically barbarous, 'involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,' or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime. Among 'unnecessary and wanton' inflictions of pain are those that are 'totally without penological justification.'" Id. (citations and footnote omitted). Conditions of confinement which, alone or in combination, deprive inmates of the "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities" as measured by this contemporary standard must be held unconstitutional. Id. at 347. However, the Eighth Amendment does not mandate that prisons housing "persons convicted of serious crimes be free from discomfort." Id. at 349.
The conditions of confinement for pretrial detainees must be evaluated under a slightly different standard. The Court must determine whether these inmates have been deprived of their liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 and n. 16, 60 L. Ed. 2d 447, 99 S. Ct. 1861 (1979). Incarceration of pretrial detainees does not constitute a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the conditions of confinement amount to punishment of the detainee. Id. at 535; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 95 L. Ed. 2d 697, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
In exercising its authority to detain a person pending trial, the Government "is entitled to employ devices that are calculated to effectuate this detention." Bell, 441 U.S. at 537. "Loss of freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement . . . . The fact that such detention interferes with the detainee's understandable desire to live as comfortably as possible and with as little restraint as possible during confinement does not convert the conditions or restrictions of detention into 'punishment.'" Id. In determining whether a condition of confinement amounts to punishment in the constitutional sense of the word, the court must determine
whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some legitimate governmental purpose. Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention facility officials, that determination generally will turn on "whether an alternative purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned [to it]." Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to "punishment." Conversely, if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goal -- if it is arbitrary or purposeless -- a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not constitutionally be inflicted upon detainees qua detainees.
Id. at 538-39, quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69, 9 L. Ed. 2d 644, 83 S. Ct. 554 (1963) (citations and footnotes omitted).
"Overcrowding is often the root cause of many complaints made by prisoners." Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1256 (9th Cir. 1982). Crowding alone is insufficient to create a constitutional violation. It may only be viewed as cruel and unusual punishment "if it led to 'deprivations of essential food, medical care, or sanitation' or if it 'increased violence among inmates or create[d] other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.'" Gilland v. Owens, 718 F. Supp. 665, 688 (W.D.Tenn. 1989), quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348.
Whether prison conditions are challenged under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court has repeatedly cautioned that federal courts must not interfere with the policy choices of state officials concerning the operation of prisons. See O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 96 L. Ed. 2d 282, 107 S. Ct. 2400 (1987); Bell, 441 U.S. at 554. In deciding to grant plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, I am mindful that the question before me is whether the confinement of prisoners at LCP is within constitutionally permissible limits, and my obligation to protect the constitutional rights of those persons confined in LCP. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 352; Bell, 441 U.S. at 562. My focus has not been on whether the conditions of incarceration at LCP offend my personal sensibilities, but on whether the record, as it exists at this time, establishes that the conditions at LCP have worked actual privations and hardships. I conclude that they have.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In ruling on this motion for preliminary relief, I must consider the moving party's likelihood of success on the merits; the probability of irreparable injury to the moving party in the absence of relief; the potential harm to the non-moving party; and the public interest. S.I. Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 211 (3d Cir. 1982).
An injunction is an extraordinary remedy and this court's power to issue injunctive relief should be exercised sparingly. Best Resume Service, Inc. v. Care, 602 F. Supp. 653, 656 (W.D.Pa. 1985); Crawford v. Davis, 249 F. Supp. 943, 945 (E.D.Pa. 1966), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 921, 15 L. Ed. 2d 676, 86 S. Ct. 923 (1966). Relief should only be granted when the equities are clearly in the moving parties favor. Sovereign Order of St. John of Jerusalem-Knights of Malta v. Messineo, 572 F. Supp. 983, 988 (E.D.Pa. 1983).
On the basis of the record before me, I conclude that the conditions at LCP would subject the pretrial detainees as well as the sentenced inmates to punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, if the population of LCP were allowed to remain at its present level. Without a population cap, the inmates at the prison would be subjected to continued genuine "privations and hardship," and that these privations are not merely limited to the crowded conditions at LCP. Consequently, I find that plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits. I intimated as much in my earlier decision when the inmate population was approximately 160 inmates less.
The present prison population is approximately 110 inmates over the maximum number of permanent beds at LCP. In NB2, inmates are now triple bunked in 11 cells. This requires that 11 inmates sleep on mattresses on the floor near a toilet and sink unit. Moreover, these inmates are confined to their cells for 20 hours of the day. Also, for the remaining four hours of the day, the same inmates are restricted to the NB2 hallway area during their block out time.
The present population at LCP has required that the administration at LCP improvise the living arrangements for over 100 inmates. Consequently, inmates are being housed in areas not originally intended to act as cells or living areas. In most instances, these inmates have only limited access to bathroom facilities and must rely upon the availability of prison guards for access to those facilities set aside for their use in other portions of the prison. In one instance, 30 inmates must share a single toilet and sink unit.
Not only does the housing of inmates in this fashion create sanitation and habitation problems, but also it severely limits the average amount of space available for the total prison population during block out time. For example, the 30 inmates housed in the GED classroom and weight room must share day area space with those inmates quartered in the Old Jail section of LCP. Also, the bedding set up in the gallery areas in 1 South, 2 North and 2 South substantially reduces the amount of space available to inmates housed in those sections of the prison.
The combination of limited block out time,
reduced living space in many areas of the prison, limited access to bathroom facilities for many inmates and decreased availability of day area space leads me to conclude that LCP does not provide adequate shelter for a large portion of its population.
In addition, the record before me strongly suggests that a present and possibly imminent danger of inmate violence exists at LCP. Much, if not all, of this danger is directly attributable to the overcrowded conditions at LCP. A pretrial detainee, still cloaked with the presumption of innocence, should not be subjected to such a danger. The risk of future inmate violence is exacerbated by the intermingling of general population inmates with those inmates supposed to segregated from the remainder of the prison population.
I find that the potential for harm in the future resulting from prospective inmate violence caused by overcrowding constitutes irreparable harm to the plaintiff class.
I have considered the public interest. Nonetheless, I cannot ignore my responsibility to safeguard the constitutional rights of the inmates at LCP. After all, the public has an interest in protecting the civil rights of all persons as guaranteed under the United States Constitution. Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1057, 1065 (E.D.Pa. 1987).
Accordingly, considering all of the competing interests present in this case, I shall grant plaintiffs motion. I note that I have wide latitude in fashioning a remedial order. However, this authority is not without its bounds. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16, 28 L. Ed. 2d 554, 91 S. Ct. 1267 (1971). I may not use my jurisdiction and remedial authority to order more extensive remedies than required. Union County Jail Inmates v. Di Buono, 713 F.2d 984, 1001 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1102, 104 S. Ct. 1600, 80 L. Ed. 2d 130 (1984). In the first instance, I shall allow the defendants the primary responsibility for curing the constitutional violations which exist at LCP.
A reduction of the prison population to the total number of permanent beds should cure the constitutional violations which presently exist at LCP. Therefore, I shall order that defendants reduce the population of LCP to 310 inmates and maintain a population cap of 310 inmates on a permanent basis.
Finally, in order assure that the public interest is adequately protected, I shall allow defendants a period of forty-five (45) days in which to comply with my order.
An appropriate order follows.
October 5, 1989
Upon consideration of the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, the response of defendants, the pretrial submissions of the parties, the evidence adduced at the hearings on this matter, the evidence adduced at the hearings on plaintiffs' initial motion for a preliminary injunction, and the arguments of counsel, and for the reasons stated in the attached memorandum, plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction is GRANTED.
It is hereby ORDERED and DECREED as follows:
1. The occupancy at Lehigh County Prison shall be limited to the 310 permanent beds presently available in the cell areas at the prison. Defendants shall reduce the inmate population at Lehigh County Prison to a level of 310 total inmates within forty-five (45) days of the date of this order.
2. This preliminary injunction shall remain in full force and effect until the final hearing on the merits or approval by this Court of the Consent Decree executed by the parties, whichever comes first.
3. No bond shall be required to be posted by plaintiffs as security for this preliminary injunction.
IT IS SO ORDERED.