Appeal from the Order dated January 13, 1988 in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, Civil Division, at No. 09421-1987.
Joel E. Hausman, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Lynn MacBeth, Pittsburgh, for appellee.
Brosky, Del Sole and Johnson, JJ.
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Marvin Apple, Appellant, filed a Complaint against Thelma Grace, Appellee, for unpaid rents due under a residential
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lease agreement. Apple also filed a Certificate of Service of the Complaint. When Apple received no responsive pleading from Grace, he entered a Default Judgment. Grace then presented a Petition to Open and/or Strike the Default Judgment. The trial court ordered the Default Judgment be stricken. We find that the trial court erred in striking the Default Judgment and reverse.
The trial court struck the Default Judgment because it found that Apple had not met the requirements of Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 237.1 "Notice of Praecipe for Entry of Default Judgment." Rule 237.1 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) No judgment by default shall be entered by the prothonotary unless the praecipe for entry includes a certification that a written notice of intention to file the praecipe was mailed or delivered to the party against whom judgment is to be entered and to his attorney of record, if any, after the default occurred and at least ten days prior to the date of the filing of the praecipe.
The trial court found that Apple did furnish certification that such notice was given, along with a copy of the notice itself. However, the court found that the certification was insufficient because it did not set forth when or how the notice was furnished. Apple's certification read: "I certify that Notice of the entry of this judgment was given pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 237.1. A copy of said Notice is Attached." (It should be noted that the form of the notice used by Apple was in compliance with Rule 237.1 and is not at issue here.)
Apple appeals from the trial court's order and argues that the certification was sufficient. We agree. We can find no basis in the caselaw for the strict requirements demanded by the trial ...