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In re Real Estate Title and Settlement Services Antitrust Litigation

filed: March 7, 1989.

IN RE REAL ESTATE TITLE AND SETTLEMENT SERVICES ANTITRUST LITIGATION; TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT AND PHOENIX ELEMENTARY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1, APPELLANTS


On Appeal From the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, D.C. MDL No. 633

Becker, Stapleton and Greenberg, Circuit Judges.

Author: Becker

BECKER, Circuit Judge.

This appeal is from an order of the district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania enjoining an Arizona state court damages suit by appellants, two Arizona school boards, against appellee title insurance companies for price fixing in violation of Arizona state law. Appellants were members of the plaintiff class in a multi-district class action before the same district court involving federal antitrust claims against the same defendants. These claims were settled, and the settlement was approved by the district court on June 10, 1986.

Prior to the approval of the settlement, the State of Arizona moved to opt out of the class action on behalf of itself and its residents. This motion was denied by the district court. Arizona appealed to this Court, and, without opinion, we affirmed the district court's decision. The school boards, represented by the Arizona Attorney General, then brought the Arizona state court suit, seeking redress under state antitrust law, based on the same allegedly illegal activity by the same defendants. The title insurance companies asked the district court which heard the original class action to enjoin the Arizona state court suit. The district court found that the earlier class action settlement agreement precluded the state court action and therefore granted the requested injunction.

Noting the absence of minimum contacts with the Pennsylvania forum and their lack of consent to jurisdiction, appellants contend that the district court lacked the power to enjoin their action because it did not have personal jurisdiction over them. Appellants' contention presents a conceptually difficult question, particularly in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-12, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628, 105 S. Ct. 2965 (1985). In Shutts, the Court held, with respect to damage class actions in which absent plaintiffs are allowed to opt out, that absent plaintiffs can be bound to a class action judgment even when they lack minimum contacts with the forum. We find this case to be distinguishable from Shutts, however. The school districts here have lost more than the absent plaintiffs lost in Shutts, and yet were given fewer procedural protections. The absent plaintiffs in Shutts were still able to challenge the adequacy of class representation in the forum of their choice, whereas the school boards in this case were forced under threat of injunction to address their adequacy claims to the distant Pennsylvania district court. Yet, while the absent plaintiffs in Shutts were given the opportunity to opt out of the class action, the school boards in this case were kept in the class action against their wishes.

Although the question is extremely close, we believe that in this situation it would violate due process for the district court to enjoin the school boards, which have not had minimum contacts with the forum nor consented to jurisdiction. We will thus reverse and remand the case with directions that the court vacate the injunction. In reaching this result, we also hold that the school boards did not consent to personal jurisdiction in the injunction proceeding by reason of Arizona's appearance on their behalf in the initial class action to move to opt out, or its appeal from the denial of that motion. That is because we believe that a party does not consent to having the full power of the court levied against it by merely attempting to extricate itself from the court's jurisdiction through an opt out motion.

I.

In January 1985, the Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against six title insurance companies charging price fixing in thirteen states. Shortly thereafter, private parties in each affected state filed "tag-along" antitrust class action suits seeking injunctive relief and treble damages. These private antitrust suits were consolidated for pre-trial purposes, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ยง 1407 (1982), and transferred to the district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, as MDL 633.

In January 1986, the class representatives and the defendant title companies reached a settlement. The settlement was prompted in large part by the Supreme Court's decision in Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 85 L. Ed. 2d 36, 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985). That case held that the federal antitrust laws do not allow recovery if the alleged anti-competitive activity was expressly permitted and actually supervised by a state. See 471 U.S. at 59-60. This expansion of the so-called "state action exception" to the antitrust laws adversely affected the plaintiff class' claims, because, in general, the states have heavily regulated the business of title insurance. See Dist. Ct. Op. at 34-36 (June 10, 1986).

The attorneys general of five states (Montana, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) filed motions contending that the representative plaintiffs had not adequately represented them because the settlement did not provide significant monetary relief for their residents. See id. at 32. These five states argued that the class representatives ignored the fact that the degree of regulation of the title insurance industry varied from state to state, and thus that the strength of defendants' state action defense could vary from state to state. See id. at 17-19. The district court rejected the contentions of the five attorneys general because it found that they had not established that the state action defense would not be applicable to price fixing in their states, and because other defenses could block recovery in their states anyway. See id. at 37-40. Arizona did not participate in the objections to the adequacy of representation. Arizona did, however, move to opt out of the class on behalf of itself and its residents. See id. at 24.

On June 10, 1986, the district court approved the settlement. In paragraph 3 of the order, the court defined the plaintiff class as:

All purchasers and insureds who purchased or received title insurance . . . from [the defendants] . . . with respect to real estate located in any of the thirteen Affected States during the period from January 1, 1981 to December 31, 1985 inclusive.

Dist. Ct. Order at 2 (June 10, 1986). Paragraph 8 defined the scope of the settlement in expansive terms:

all claims that plaintiffs and members of the class may have as against defendants . . . arising under the laws of the United States or of any state or other jurisdiction that are based on, relate to or arise out of any ...


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