Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court of Pennsylvania Entered July 29, 1987 at No. 89 Harrisburg 1986 Reversing and Remanding for Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas, v. Entered in The Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County at Nos. 977, 1043(a) C.D. 1984 and 2491 C.D. 1985,
Nix, C.j., and Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos and Stout, JJ. Stout, J., filed a concurring opinion. Nix, C.j., concurred in the result. Zappala, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
On February 10, 1986, Appellee, Jorge Frometa was charged with one count of possession with intent to manufacture and deliver cocaine, three counts of unlawful delivery of cocaine and two counts of criminal conspiracy. He entered pleas of guilty to these charges and was sentenced to a term of four (4) to eight (8) years imprisonment. Frometa is a Cuban National who entered the United States as part of the Marielito boat lift off the coast of Key West, Florida on May 21, 1980. As a result of his convictions an immigration detainer was lodged against Frometa by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
Following sentencing, Frometa filed a motion to modify his sentence which was denied by the court. A direct appeal was taken and dismissed as untimely. Frometa then petitioned the court under the Post Conviction Hearing Act alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to advise him of the collateral consequences of entering guilty pleas, namely the possibility of being deported. After an evidentiary hearing was held, the court denied post conviction relief and Frometa appealed. On appeal the Superior Court, relying upon its decision in Commonwealth v. Wellington, 305 Pa. Super. 24, 451 A.2d 223 (1982), determined that counsel was ineffective in failing to advise Frometa of the deportation consequences of pleading guilty. The Superior Court reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for the withdrawal of the guilty pleas. Commonwealth v. Frometa, 366 Pa. Super. 313, 531 A.2d 434 (1987). We granted the Commonwealth's petition for allowance of appeal and we now reverse.
In Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987) this court set forth the standard for judging claims of ineffectiveness. This standard requires a showing that counsel's performance was unreasonable, where the claim is of arguable merit, and that the defendant was prejudiced. Id., 515 Pa. at 158, 159, 527 A.2d at 975.
Just as the trial judge must insure that a guilty plea is voluntarily and knowingly made, ". . . allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused appellant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea". Commonwealth v. Williams, 496 Pa. 486, 488, 437 A.2d 1144, 1146 (1981) citing, Commonwealth v. Jones, 477 Pa. 266, 383 A.2d 926 (1978). Central to the question of whether the defendant's plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly is the fact that the defendant know and understand the nature of the offenses charged in "as plain a fashion as possible". Commonwealth v. Anthony, 504 Pa. 551, 559, 475 A.2d 1303, 1307 (1984). As Justice McDermott stated in Anthony, "[a] guilty plea is not a ceremony of innocence, it is an occasion where one offers a confession of guilt". Id., 504 Pa. at 559, 475 A.2d 1303, 1307-1308 (1984). Thus, in Anthony we noted that a trial judge is not required to go to unnecessary lengths to discuss every nuance of the law regarding a defendant's waiver of his right to a jury trial in order to render a guilty plea voluntary and knowing. Id., 504 Pa. at 560, 475 A.2d at 1308 fn. 4.
Similarly, a defendant's lack of knowledge of the collateral consequences of pleading guilty does not undermine the validity of his guilty plea. Like the distinctions in the law regarding the waiver of the right to a jury trial, alluded to by Justice McDermott in Anthony, the collateral consequences of pleading guilty are both numerous and remote.*fn1 Most importantly, they are irrelevant to the determination
of whether a guilty plea was entered voluntarily and knowingly. Therefore, we now hold that counsel, in providing adequate assistance to a criminal defendant who is contemplating a guilty plea, is not required to advise a defendant of the collateral consequences of pleading guilty.
Deportation is but one of a host of collateral consequences of pleading guilty. See, United States v. Romero-Vilca. 850 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1988). See also, Collateral Consequences of Guilty Pleas in the Federal Criminal Justice System, 16 Harvard C.R.C.L.L.Rev. 157 (1981). Thus, counsel in the present case was not ineffective in failing to advise Frometa of the possibility of deportation.*fn2
And, as there was no ineffectiveness on counsel's part the defendant's request for ...