Appeal from the Order Entered March 18, 1988 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Civil, No. 4869 November Term, 1985.
John Enright, Philadelphia, for appellant.
Robert Hayes, Philadelphia, for Blue Cross, appellee.
Cirillo, President Judge, and Wieand and McEwen, JJ.
[ 380 Pa. Super. Page 168]
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in favor of appellee Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia and against appellant Mary Jefferson.
Mary Jefferson was hit by a van in February of 1984. Because of injuries she allegedly sustained to her left shoulder and hip, she underwent extensive medical and hospital treatment. At the time of her injury, Jefferson was insured for hospitalization expenses under a group insurance policy between her employer, the Philadelphia School District, and Blue Cross of Greater Philadelphia, and for medical expenses by Equitable Life Assurance Society. Shortly before the accident, Jefferson had voluntarily terminated her coverage with Blue Cross and Equitable, and had switched her insurance coverage to an HMO plan provided
[ 380 Pa. Super. Page 169]
by Health America. The termination was to become effective on March 15, 1987.
Jefferson submitted claims for her hospital and medical expenses to Blue Cross, Equitable, and Health America, as well as State Farm Insurance Company, her No-Fault automobile insurer. State Farm refused payment of the claims, contending that her primary insurers should pay her medical and hospital expenses. Blue Cross, Equitable, and Health America also refused to pay the claims. Blue Cross, the only appellee here, claimed that Jefferson was not insured for any expenses arising after March 15, 1987, the date upon which her termination became effective. Further, it noted that it had never received any notification from the health care providers of the services in question, only a letter from Jefferson's attorney, and therefore, in any case, it was unable to determine which of the claims made by Jefferson were for expenses covered under the insurance policy.
The parties agreed to arbitrate the matter, and the arbitrator found for the defendant insurers. Jefferson appealed the arbitrator's decision to the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Appellee Blue Cross moved for summary judgment, denying that there was any issue of material fact, and arguing that as a matter of law, it was not liable for any expenses arising after the termination date. Jefferson argued that an issue of material fact did exist, although she did not state what that issue was, and also argued that if no factual dispute did exist, she, rather than Blue Cross, was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. She contended that the policy was an occurrence policy, and that therefore, the insurer was liable for all expenses arising out of any injury occurring during the policy period. The trial court granted summary judgment for Blue Cross, finding that the policy covered expenses arising during the policy term, rather than injuries occurring during that period. Jefferson then appealed to this court.
[ 380 Pa. Super. Page 170]
Jefferson argues the same issues to us on appeal as she argued in her motion contesting summary judgment. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party's pleadings, and give to him or her the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. To uphold the trial court's grant of summary judgment, not only must there be no genuine issue of material fact, but the moving party must have been entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Curry v. Estate of Thompson, 332 Pa. Super. 364, 368, 481 A.2d 658, 659 (1984).
Here, Jefferson argues that the case involves genuine issues of material fact with regard to the termination clause included in her policy which should have resulted in the denial of Blue Cross' motion for summary judgment. Jefferson is not, however, explicit on what those material issues of fact are. Rather, she seems to argue that the trial court erred as a matter of law in granting summary judgment because the policy provision upon which it relied in ruling for Blue Cross was ambiguous. She argues that the provision in question could have reasonably led her to believe that her coverage would continue after the policy terminated on March 15, 1987, because the injury which gave rise to those expenses occurred during the policy term.
The interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law for the court to consider. Adelman v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 255 Pa. Super. 116, 123, 386 A.2d 535, 538 (1978). The policy must be read in its entirety, and the words must be given their plain and proper meaning. It should be read to avoid ambiguities if possible, and the language should not be tortured to create them. Monti v. Rockwood Insurance Co., 303 Pa. Super. 473, 476, 450 A.2d 24, 25 (1981). A provision is ambiguous only if reasonably intelligent persons considering it in the light of the entire policy could honestly ...