St. Onge v. McNeilus Truck and Mfg., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 280, 282 (D. Minn. 1986).
A party's domicile may be determined by a number of factors, including: "voting registration and voting practices, location of personal and real property, location of brokerage and bank accounts, location of spouse and family, . . . driver's license and automobile registration, and payment of taxes." Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 750 (9th Cir. 1986).
Plaintiff, by way of affidavit, has stated that he was employed with CIGNA with the understanding that he would return to the United States; that during 1986 he returned to this California to look for employment, but was unsuccessful in his attempt; that he "continued to own and maintain his home in California and to maintain [his] bank account, [his] voter registration and driver's license there and to pay California taxes as before. . . ." Plaintiff's Affidavit, para. 8. Plaintiff also states that as of March 14, 1986, the date of the suit, he intended to move his family back to California "as soon as I could find a job there." Id.
Defendants, for their part, have produced a handwritten letter, dated March 11, 1986, from Mr. Liakakos an international manufacturing company, located in Athens, Greece.
In Sadat v. Mertes, supra., the plaintiff, one Moheb A.H. al Sadat, had taken an overseas job which required him to relocate to Beirut, Lebanon. After the plaintiff's employment was terminated, the company agreed to pay the cost of transporting Mr. Sadat and his family from Lebanon back to the United States. The plaintiff, however, did not return to the United States, but left for Alexandria, Egypt, where he registered as a permanent resident. In his affidavit in opposition to the defendant's motion to dismiss, he stated that he "owns his home in Cairo, Egypt and considers himself a resident of Egypt . . . [and] maintains said home in Cairo, Egypt . . . ." Based upon this evidence, the Seventh Circuit found that Mr. Sadat was domiciled abroad, and therefore was not a state citizen for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). Sadat, 615 F.2d at 1181-82.
In this case, by contrast, plaintiff never purchased property in Greece, but rented an apartment there, on a yearly basis. Plaintiff's affidavit, para. 4. He continued to pay California taxes, and maintained his bank account, voter registration, and driver's license. At the conclusion of his employment with CIGNA, he returned to California where he searched, unsuccessfully, for employment. This case is, therefore, distinguishable from Sadat.
Although plaintiff, prior to the commencement of this action, wrote a letter to a Greek company, inquiring about employment possibilities, he also went to the United States during this same time, where he spent three months looking for employment in California. Accordingly, the application to the Greek company does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that plaintiff had acquired a new domicile in Greece.
Based on the evidence before me, I find that at the time this suit was commenced and removed to federal court, plaintiff had the intent to remain a Californian domiciliary; consequently, this court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2).
An order follows.
AND NOW, this 23rd day of November, 1988, this court's memorandum, dated August 16, 1988, is vacated to the extent that it determined that this court maintained subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2), but is modified to reflect that this court maintains subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) for the reasons stated in the opinion accompanying this order.