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MCLAUGHLIN v. BRENNAN

November 16, 1988

ANN McLAUGHLIN, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor
v.
THOMAS F. BRENNAN and HELEN L. BRENNAN trading and doing business as BRENNAN TRUCK and AUTO REPAIR



The opinion of the court was delivered by: WEBER

 Plaintiff brings this action against defendants seeking damages for alleged violations, and to enjoin future violations of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 207. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that their mechanics are exempt from the overtime provisions. Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion on this same issue. Having found no question of material fact to exist, we now address these motions.

 An exemption from the overtime provisions of the FLSA exists for "any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has power to establish minimum qualifications and maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of Section 304 of Title 49." Section 304 of Title 49 was repealed in 1983 and its provisions reenacted in 49 U.S.C. § 3102. Section 3102(b)(1) provides that the Secretary may prescribe requirements for:

 
qualifications and maximum hours of service of employees of . . . a motor carrier; . . .

 (emphasis added). Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 3101, the term "motor carrier" in Section 3102, has the same meaning as given to it in 49 U.S.C. § 10102. Section 10102(13) defines "motor carrier" as "a motor common carrier and a motor contract carrier." A "motor common carrier" is further defined in Section 10102(14) as:

 A "motor contract carrier" is further defined in Section 10102(15) as:

 
. . . .
 
(B) a person providing motor vehicle transportation of property for compensation under continuing agreements with one or more persons --
 
(i) by assigning motor vehicles for a continuing period of time for the exclusive use of such person; or
 
(ii) designed to meet the distinct needs of each such person.

 Therefore, in order for defendants' employees to be exempt from the overtime provisions of the Act, defendants must qualify as either a "motor common carrier" or a "motor contract carrier."

 Although defendants ask the Court to find them an exempt "motor carrier," they do not specify which type of "motor carrier" they profess to be. We will, therefore, examine whether they qualify under either category.

 Defendants have presented and rely upon a document dated May 12, 1986 and entitled "Interstate Commerce Commission Decision No. MC-191213." That ...


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