After conducting a hearing on August 24, 1988 concerning three disputed facts, the courts makes the following Findings of Fact:
35. Plaintiff Tonnie Knox never informed defendant, State Farm's representative that he lived in Pennsylvania on June 19, 1985, the day the application was executed.
36. At the end of November or early December 1986, Mr. Knox never told State Farm Insurance Company's office in Pennsauken, New Jersey that he lived in Camden, New Jersey with his brother.
37. In December 1986, Mr. Knox never told State Farm of New Jersey that he and his wife were separated and that he had moved in with his brother, Johnny Knox, in Camden.
For the sake of completeness, the court makes the additional Finding of Fact:
38. In a letter addressed to plaintiff, Tonnie Knox, dated October 15, 1987, nine months after the date of the accident, State Farm informed Tonnie Knox that his application was deemed null and void and that his coverage had been rescinded back to June 19, 1985, the date the policy had first been executed. The letter also advised plaintiff that he had never been insured by the New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Association. The letter stated that at the time Tonnie Knox submitted his application for insurance in New Jersey he did not meet the eligibility requirements for the issuance by the New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Association as set forth in N.J.Stat.Ann. 17:30E-1 et seq. The letter stated that the reason the policy was rescinded was because the insured lived in Pennsylvania.
In considering a motion for summary judgment, we must determine whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Arnold Pontiac-GMC, Inc. v. General Motors Corporation, 786 F.2d 564, 568 (3d Cir. 1986); Fragale & Sons Beverage Co. v. Dill, 760 F.2d 469, 472 (3d Cir. 1985); Wolk v. Saks Fifth Avenue, Inc., 728 F.2d 221, 224 (3d Cir. 1984); First Jersey National Bank v. Dome Petroleum Limited, 723 F.2d 335, 338 (3d Cir. 1983). The movant has the burden of demonstrating that there are no genuine issues of material fact and all reasonable inferences from the record must be drawn in favor of the non-moving party. Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 338, 340 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Athlone Industries, Inc., 746 F.2d 977, 981-82 (3d Cir. 1984); Small v. Seldows Stationery, 617 F.2d 992, 994 (3d Cir. 1980).
In view of the parties' stipulation of facts and the court's Findings of Fact, we find that there are no genuine issues as to any material fact and that this case is suitable for summary disposition.
Before we address the merits of the motions for summary judgment, it is necessary for us to determine, in a diversity action such as this, which state's law is to be applied. Since both parties cite New Jersey cases and statutes in their respective motions for summary judgment, we will assume that the parties agree that New Jersey law should govern this action. In any event, when confronted with a factual scenario similar to the one in the case sub judice, Pennsylvania Appellate Courts have held that Pennsylvania's Choice of Law Principles require that New Jersey law be applied to questions of contractual rights and remedies under New Jersey contracts of insurance. See e.g., McCabe v. Prudential Insurance Co., 356 Pa. Super. 223, 514 A.2d 582 (1986); Caputo v. Allstate Insurance Co., 344 Pa. Super. 1, 495 A.2d 959 (1985); Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Walter, 290 Pa. Super. 129, 434 A.2d 164, 167-68 (1981).
Turning our attention to the merits of the motions for summary judgment, we note that the New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Association insured plaintiffs' vehicle under a policy of insurance number JL159-093-30. Stipulation of Facts # 3. As such, the policy is governed by the provisions of the New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Availability Act ("the Act"), N.J.Stat.Ann. 17:30E-1, et seq. The Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
17:30E-7. Powers and duties
Pursuant to the plan of operation, the association [New Jersey Automobile Full Insurance Underwriting Association] shall have the power and duty to: