R. 1984) ("Federal courts have the inherent power to enjoin litigants who use the courts as a stage for a personal vendetta of harassment or abuse.") Thus, when, as in the present case, "it is apparent that the litigation is baseless the issuance of an injunction is proper." Adams, 400 F. Supp. at 228 (quoting Boruski v. Stewart, 381 F. Supp. 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
Judicial resources are not infinite and plaintiffs' baseless litigation inevitably has postponed the resolution of claims of other litigants who as yet have had no day in Court. Therefore, I also find that a Rule 11 sanction in the form of an award of attorneys fees is both justified and necessary to penalize plaintiffs for their conduct in beginning and pursuing this action. The amount claimed by the Authority
is fair and reasonable and represents the fees and expenses actually incurred by it; the number of hours spent in defense also was reasonable. I will not attempt to impose an additional sanction to penalize plaintiffs for the substantial expenditure of judicial resources in this action and in the prior two federal actions; however that factor provides additional justification for the payment of attorneys fees that I am requiring. Plaintiffs have not challenged the amount of the requested award and have not asserted that payment thereof is beyond their means.
I have tried to dispose of this action without granting an injunction or issuing sanctions. At the first meeting, I urged plaintiffs to retain counsel and took the other actions described herein (slip at pp. 2-3). At the most recent hearing, with the consent of defendants, I talked privately but on the record to plaintiffs in an unsuccessful attempt to get them to discontinue the action. At the same hearing, Mr. Calesnick was given the opportunity to affirm that he would bring no additional actions but he declined to do so. I believe I have no course open to me except to issue an injunction and to impose a financial sanction. In my view, both are necessary to prevent future suits; and the award of attorneys fees is necessary to remedy the flagrant violation of Rule 11.
AND NOW, this 28th day of Sept., 1988, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:
1. Defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment are granted. The action against the Superior Court of Pennsylvania is dismissed with prejudice. Judgment is entered in favor of the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia and against plaintiffs.
2. The Authority's motion for a protective order is denied as moot.
3. Plaintiffs will pay the sum of $ 8,102.44 to the Redevelopment Authority of the City of Philadelphia.
4. For the reasons stated in the accompanying memorandum, plaintiff Milton A. Calesnick is permanently enjoined from filing any new action or proceeding in any court, state or federal, against any person, court, authority or any other entity in any way involved in the purchase, sale, or development of the real property at 130-132 Delancey Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, or in the disposition of the personal property which was located at that address.