opportunity to modify or even terminate the contract. Since the defendant continued to deal with the plaintiff in Pennsylvania, the defendant took on features of a more active purchaser. Between 1985 and 1987, the defendant corporation sent payments into Pennsylvania and placed orders with the plaintiff by mail and phone. These contacts alone, however, are not enough to find that the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in this forum. See, Freedom Forge Corp. v. Jersey Forging Works, Inc., 549 F. Supp. 99, 101 (M.D. Pa. 1982) (discussing orders generally); Baron & Co. v. Bank of New Jersey, 497 F. Supp. 534, 538 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (discussing mailing checks); See also, Dee Paper Co. v. Springfield Electrical Specialties, Inc., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2431, No. 86-5606, slip op. at 3 (E.D. Pa. March 31, 1987) (discussing phone calls and mailings); Stop-A-Flat Corporation v. Electra Start of Michigan, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 647, 650-651 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (stressing need for defendant's visit to forum for purposes of negotiation); The Western Union Telegraph Co. v. T.S.I., Ltd., 545 F. Supp. 329, 335 (D.N.J. 1982) (stressing need for defendant's visit to forum for purposes of negotiation). Moreover, even if these contacts were sufficient, the plaintiff has produced no evidence to show how extensive the defendant's contacts were between 1985 and 1987. Without such evidence, I cannot determine whether the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of doing business in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., Societe Nouvelle Generale v. Kool Stop Int'l., 633 F. Supp. 153, 155 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (emphasizing need for plaintiff to produce evidence to establish jurisdiction).
The plaintiff does make reference to a contract which was incorporated into the parties' relationship in 1987 and allegedly applied retroactively. The defendants vigorously dispute this assertion, however, contending that they never agreed to the terms of the alleged 1987 contract. Other than making conclusory allegations, the plaintiff has failed to produce any facts or a legal theory upon which I could find that the alleged contract governed the relationship between the parties. Moreover, even if I could make such a finding, it is doubtful whether it would change my decision due to the plaintiff's failure to produce evidence to support a prima facie case of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, I find that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation.
2. Jurisdiction over Bruce Murawski
Plaintiff also seeks to assert jurisdiction over Bruce Murawski in his individual capacity based upon his actions taken as an official of Murawski Corporation. Generally, the resolution of this issue would require a separate analysis. See Minigraph, Inc. v. Qualitech Computer Centers, Inc., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5951, No. 86-5869, slip op. 11-17 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1987). In this case, however, I need not engage in this separate analysis. Since I found that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant corporation based on the corporation's contacts with this forum, I find that the Court also lacks jurisdiction over defendant Murawski based on those same contacts.
Accordingly, I find that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendant Bruce Murawski.
C. Transfer Under § 1404(a)
Since I have found an absence of facts of record which establish this court's jurisdiction over the defendants with respect to the plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, this case must either be dismissed or transferred to the Northern District of Illinois, where it could have been originally brought. Societe Nouvelle Generale, 633 F. Supp. at 155.
In this case, the plaintiff has filed an amended complaint alleging several tort claims and unfair trade practice claims. In addition, the plaintiff seeks to pierce the corporate veil in order to hold Bruce Murawski personally liable. In light of the fact that the contract claim will have to be brought in the Northern District of Illinois and the fact that most of the evidence relating to the plaintiff's additional claims are situated in Illinois and outside the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, I find that it would promote the interests of justice and the convenience of the parties and witnesses if this case was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois.
An appropriate order follows.
AND NOW, this 18th day of AUGUST, 1988, upon consideration of the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claims due to lack of personal jurisdiction or in the alternative to transfer this case to the Northern District of Illinois, and the plaintiff's response thereto, it is
That the defendants' motion is GRANTED and the plaintiff's claims are transferred to the Northern District of Illinois.
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