The opinion of the court was delivered by: KATZ
MARVIN KATZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
Defendant Philadelphia Stock Exchange (the "Exchange") has moved to dismiss the pro se complaint of plaintiff Alfred Ferreri.
In his complaint Mr. Ferreri raises various claims against the Exchange, as well as against other parties, including numerous securities law violations, and claims under the common law for misrepresentation, fraud and breach of contract.
The Exchange argues that, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Mr. Ferreri's complaint against them should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
On a motion to dismiss, all material allegations of the complaint are to be treated as true and are to be interpreted in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. A complaint may be dismissed only if it appears that the plaintiff will be unable to establish any set of facts in support of his complaint which would entitle him to relief. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 2 L. Ed. 2d 80, 78 S. Ct. 99 (1957); Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1977); Truhe v. Rupell, 641 F. Supp. 57, 58 (M.D. Pa. 1985). The complaint of a pro se plaintiff, however, is held to a less stringent pleading standard than would a complaint drafted by an attorney. Similarly, the allegations contained in a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Becker v. Commission of Internal Revenue, 751 F.2d 146, 149 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972)); see also Carr v. Sharp, 454 F.2d 271, 272 (3d Cir. 1971).
Plaintiff's complaint contains a number of allegations seeking to hold the Exchange liable for a variety of violations under the federal securities laws.
In Count II of his Complaint, plaintiff asserts that the Exchange violated section 6 of the Exchange Act of 1934, and is therefore liable to him for over $ 500,000 in losses that Mr. Ferreri claims to have suffered in his options transactions. According to the complaint, the Exchange abrogated its fundamental duty to maintain an orderly market in securities traded by its members by permitting Mr. Mainardi [plaintiff's trading partner] to engage in the alleged irresponsible activity. Plaintiff's Complaint para. 73. Section 6 provides for SEC registration of any securities exchange that complies with certain requirements, including the promulgation of particular types of rules. It is well established in this circuit that there is no private right of action against a stock exchange under section 6 for a stock exchange's refusal or inability to enforce these rules. Walck v. American Stock Exchange, 687 F.2d 778 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1300, 103 S. Ct. 2118 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1451, 104 S. Ct. 29 (1983). Accordingly, Mr. Ferreri may not now assert just such a cause of action against the Exchange, and Count II of plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.
Count III of plaintiff's complaint also asserts claims under rules 8c-1 and 15c3-1. Section 8 and its accompanying rule, rule 8c-1, govern the hypothecation of customers' securities by brokers and dealers. There is no allegation in plaintiff's complaint that the Exchange acted as either a broker or dealer. Indeed, plaintiff himself acknowledges that "defendant is registered with the SEC as a National Securities Exchange and functions as a self regulatory organization (SRO) . . . ." Plaintiff's Complaint para. 24. Sections of the securities laws, such as section 8, which govern the conduct of brokers and dealers, are inapplicable in the absence of any allegation or evidence that the person or persons sought to be charged acted as either brokers or dealers. See Mid-Carolina Oil, Inc. v. Klippel, 526 F. Supp. 694, 696 (D.S.C. 1981), aff'd without op., 673 F.2d 1313 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1107, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1315, 102 S. Ct. 2906 (1982). Plaintiff cannot then assert a cause of action against the Exchange under section 8 or its accompanying rule.
Plaintiff is similarly unable to assert a claim against the Exchange under section 15 or its accompanying rule, rule 15c3-1. Section 15 provides generally for the registration and regulation of brokers and dealers, and rule 15c3-1 sets forth the net capital rules for those same brokers and dealers. Again, plaintiff's complaint contains no allegation that the Exchange acted as either a broker or a dealer in its interaction with Mr. Ferreri. Count III of plaintiff's complaint is therefore dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
In Count IV of his complaint, Mr. Ferreri seeks to hold the Exchange liable under section 20 of the Exchange Act. Plaintiff asserts that the Exchange "failed in its public duty to act as a controlling person notwithstanding its far reaching self regulatory authority and operational facilities at its disposal." Plaintiff's Complaint para. 92. There is no private right of action against a stock exchange under section 20. Baty v. Pressman, Frohlich & Frost, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 390 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); McLaughlin v. Campbell, 410 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (D.Mass. 1976); Carr v. New York Stock ...