The opinion of the court was delivered by: WEBER
Defendant Beharry has filed a Motion to Dismiss challenging the efficacy of plaintiff's Section 1983 claim. The parties have submitted briefs and this matter is now ripe for disposition.
Plaintiff is an attorney who was hired by Washington County to serve as a special prosecutor in the criminal prosecution of the County Controller, defendant Beharry, for alleged improprieties concerning a campaign contribution. Plaintiff performed his duties under this appointment and carried the case to a jury trial where defendant Beharry was acquitted.
Over time plaintiff has submitted several bills to the County for his services as special prosecutor. Although these bills were approved for payment by County officials, defendant Beharry as County Controller has consistently refused to issue payment to plaintiff.
Plaintiff instituted this action against the County and Beharry. Plaintiff asserts in Count I that defendants have deprived him of a property interest without due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Counts II and III plaintiff asserts pendent claims for breach of contract and unjust enrichment against the County only.
Under Parratt v. Taylor, where pre-deprivation process is impractical and adequate post-deprivation remedies are available, plaintiff is relegated to the available state remedies. In the present case defendant Beharry contends that the appropriate remedy is in a mandamus action.
In his brief plaintiff sets forth all the elements of a classic mandamus action, complete with strong supporting citations. Plaintiff alleges that he was properly hired and his salary was set by the County Salary Board, of which Beharry is a member, in accord with statutory requirements. Plaintiff alleges that these actions were subsequently affirmed by the state court in a suit instituted by Beharry. Plaintiff claims that Beharry as Controller had no discretionary authority to refuse payment to plaintiff, particularly in light of the state court litigation, and the issuance of payment on a duly executed contract is mandatory and merely ministerial.
Plaintiff cites Flaherty v. City of Pittsburgh, 100 Pa. Commw. 508, 515 A.2d 91 (1986) which very strongly supports our conclusion that this may be better characterized as a mandamus action, although that case did involve the Pittsburgh Home Rule Charter and not the statutory provisions for a County controller. That court stated:
A controller is not intrusted with the duty of supervising other department's contracts, but is only to determine whether a department has exceeded its funding limit or diverted funds for a purpose not within the scope of its spending authority. . . .
. . . Upon review of these provisions [of the Home Rule Charter], we do not find in them any indication that the controller may exercise discretionary judgment in examining these contracts. These provisions simply obligate the controller to see that the necessary appropriations are authorized and available and do not exceed the scope of the Council's intent. Since these requirements have been fulfilled, Flaherty must perform the ministerial duty of countersigning the contract. These provisions do not reveal any authority for the Controller to utilize his judgment concerning the propriety of the act to be performed. (Emphasis in original) (footnote and citations omitted).
Id., 515 A.2d at 92-93. That court rejected the Controller's claim that he had discretion to refuse payment where he believed bid-rigging had occurred. If, as plaintiff alleges, defendant Beharry was without discretion to refuse ...