decided: June 8, 1988.
IN RE: ORDINANCE NO. 1-9-86, LOGAN TOWNSHIP, BLAIR COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA. WARD ENTERPRISES, INC., APPELLANT
Appeal from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, in the case of In Re: Ordinance No. 1-9-86 Logan Township, Blair County, Pennsylvania, No. 285 C.P. 1986.
Beverly J. Mears, with her, Charles P. Wasovich and Alexander A. Notopoulos, Goodman, Notopoulos, Silverman, Croyle, Wasovich & Mears, for appellant.
Karen L. Steele, Leopold, Eberhardt & Goldstein, for appellee.
Judges Craig and Barry, and Senior Judge Kalish, sitting as a panel of three. Opinion by Senior Judge Kalish.
[ 116 Pa. Commw. Page 641]
Appellant, Ward Enterprises, Inc., appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County which sustained the preliminary objections of appellee, Township of Logan (Township), and dismissed appellant's complaint. We affirm.
On January 9, 1986, the Board of Supervisors of Logan Township passed an ordinance regulating the use and location of storage trailers within the Township. Appellant filed a complaint in the common pleas court pursuant to section 702, cl.XXV of The Second Class Township Code (Code), Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, added by the Act of April 27, 1945, P.L. 319,
[ 116 Pa. Commw. Page 642]
will bar recovery due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In Roeder v. Hatfield Borough Council, 439 Pa. 241, 266 A.2d 691 (1970), our Supreme Court, in construing sections or ordinances containing language similar to 53 P.S. § 65741, stated that "we have consistently held that the only questions the court . . . can consider relate to defects in the process of enactment of the ordinance and that it has no jurisdiction to decide substantive issues concerning the ordinance's validity." Id. at 245, 266 A.2d at 694. As the Court indicated, the purpose is to provide a fast and efficient method of questioning the procedure involved in the adoption of an ordinance.
While the failure to attach a map, plan or drawing may affect the substantive issue of whether the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague, it has no procedural effect on the mechanics used in enacting the ordinance. Appellant was not deprived of a legal remedy when the proper procedure was followed. Indeed, the record shows that appellant has instituted an action for a declaratory judgment in which it does raise the substantive issue of vagueness.
Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court.
Now, June 8, 1988, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, No. 285 C.P. 1986, dated March 25, 1987, is affirmed.
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