claimant's ability to function in the workplace, as did the assessment made by the Charles Drew Mental Health Center (R. 285).
Even if the Secretary determines that the claimant does not meet or equal a listed impairment, the claimant may still recover if he is unable to perform "substantial gainful employment" as exists in sustantial numbers in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. 404.1520(f).
Both parties have certain evidentiary burdens. The claimant bears the initial burden of demonstrating by medical evidence his inability to return to his former occupation. See, e.g., Ferguson, 765 F.2d at 36; Dobrowolsky v. Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 406 (3d Cir. 1979). If the claimant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the Secretary to show the existence of substantial gainful employment that the claimant has the capacity to perform. Id. at 406. The burden upon the Secretary is not one of persuasion, but of producing substantial evidence of "substantial gainful employment." Id.
Plaintiff has met his burden. He was a shipper-stacker, a position that required continual standing and walking, and lifting up to 35 pounds. The ALJ found that plaintiff's physical impairments would preclude constant walking or lifting more than 20 pounds at a time and that plaintiff is "unable to perform his past relevant work" (R. 21).
The ALJ appears to have relied on the testimony of a vocational expert in concluding that plaintiff is able to perform the duties of an office cleaner or a security alarm monitor or to engage in some manufacturing jobs of a sedentary nature (R. 18-21). In turn, the vocational expert's opinion was predicated on his belief that plaintiff could perform light work (R. 133-137). By definition, light work may entail a "good deal of walking or standing." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b) (1987). A person doing light work could be required to walk or stand frequently and for extended periods of time. Office cleaning, for example, is not a sedentary job. A security alarm monitor may be required to be on his feet in times of emergency. The ALJ did not specifically determine whether plaintiff's impairments precluded such activities. By implication, the finding that plaintiff had the "exertional capacity" to perform certain "sedentary and/or light work" suggests that the evidence of inability to walk or stand for more than minimal periods was accorded little weight. If so, the reasoning should be explained.
So, also, the evidence of mental impairment, while recognized, appears to have been minimized. The vocational expert does not appear to have been fully informed of these limitations and, therefore, could not consider the effect of them on plaintiff's employability.
In light of these apparent deficits in the testimony of the vocational expert, the Secretary cannot be said to have met the burden of producing evidence that plaintiff could perform an alternative job that exists in substantial numbers in the national economy. Podedworny v. Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984).
The claim will be remanded for proceedings consistent with this memorandum. Summary judgment does not appear to be justified for either party.
AND NOW, this 26th day of May, 1988 the motions for summary judgment of plaintiff and defendant are denied, and plaintiff's claim is remanded for further proceedings as more fully set forth in the accompanying memorandum.