to render a verdict of not guilty; but that, if they believed the testimony of the government witnesses concerning defendant's participation, they would have the right to render a verdict of guilty, provided they were convinced beyond a reasonable doubt. I believe the charge was entirely correct. Since the defendant had taken the witness stand and testified to some involvement in the credit card transactions which turned out to have been fraudulent, it was necessary, solely for the protection of the defendant, to make sure the jury did not get the idea that his admitted involvement sufficed to establish guilt. There was no shifting of the burden of proof, nor any dilution in the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
The co-defendants testified for the government pursuant to plea agreements. Defense counsel cross-examined one of these witnesses, Cynthia Floyd, extensively concerning the terms of her plea arrangement, whereupon the government, without objection, introduced the written plea agreement into evidence. In these circumstances, I perceive no error in permitting that exhibit to go out with the jury, along with all of the other duly admitted exhibits. Neither am I aware of any conceivable prejudice to the defendant. The written plea agreement did not refer to this defendant. Neither at the time, nor in the present motion for a new trial, has my attention been directed to any feature of the exhibit which should have been excluded, or which impermissibly adds to or differs from the oral testimony on the subject.
The motion for a new trial will be denied.
AND NOW, this 3rd day of May, 1988, it is ORDERED:
1. Defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal is DENIED.
2. Defendant's motion for a new trial is DENIED.
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